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PREFACE 
The "Payload Safety Guidelines Handbook" has been prepared to assist STS (Space 
Transportation System) payload developers in achieving compliance with the documented 
payload safety requirements of the NASA Office of Spaceflight. The guidelines contained in 
this handbook apply to all payloads to be carried by the STS. They are not to be construed as 
requirements but are suggested design or operational options for the elimination and/or control 
of hazards. 
The guidelines incorporate system safety experience accumulated by NASA, DOD, and 
aerospace industry sources on manned and unmanned spacecraft and aircraft. Of necessity, the 
guidelines are generic because they are intended to be applicable to any payload. 
This publication will be reviewed and revised as appropriate to reflect new experience or 
changing emphasis to ensure continuing viability. Any questions or requests for addit ions and 
changes should be directed to Mr. J. 6. Hammack, Chief, Safety Division, code NS, Johnson 
Space Center. 
M. L. Kaines 
Director 
Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance 
and ~c?vklo~rnent  program I 
TARLLE OF CONTENTS 
Section 
INTRODUCTION 
PURPOSE 
SCOPE 
ORGANIZATION 
DATA SOURCES 
STS PAYLOAD HAZARDS DEFINITION 
PAYLOAD HAZARDS 
Hazard Description 
PAYLOAD SAFETY GUIDELINES 
BIOMEDICAL 
Design 
Fl ight Operations 
Ground Operations 
CAUTION AND WARNING (HAZARD DETECTION 
AND SAFING) 
Design 
Fl ight Operat ions 
Ground Operations 
CRYOGENICS 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
ELECTRICAL 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
i v  
Section 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
HUMAN FACTORS 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
HYDRAULICS 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operat ions 
MATERl ALS 
Design 
FI ight Operat ions 
Ground Operations 
MECHANICAL 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
OPTICAL 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
Section 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
PROPULSION 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
PYROTECHNICS 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
RADIATION 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
STRUCTURES 
Design 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
TABLES 
Table 
3.7-1 HYDRAULIC FLUID CHARACTERISTICS 
3.12-11 FLAMMABILITY AND TOXICITY 
PROPERTIES OF PROPELLANTS 
3.14-111 RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS AND 
EXPOSURE RATE CONSTRAINTS FOR 
UNIT REFERENCE RISK 
1.0 INTRODUCTION.- The STS (space transportation system) wi l l  be used to carry into space 
many different types of payloads. The developers of these pay loads wi l l  have varied experience 
and famil iar i ty with both systems safety and manned spaceflight. The payload safety guidelines 
handbook has been developed a t  the request of the OSFIDirector, Reliability, Quality and Safety 
and the NASA Off ice of Planning and Program Integration to  provide the payload community 
wi th a centralized source of accumulated experience achieved in past Government and industry 
aerospace programs. The guidelines handbook imposes no requirements on the payload 
community but suggests options for the elimination and/or control of hazards. 
The goal of this handbook is to  promote payload safety while permitt ing the maximum 
flexibil i ty in the control of hazards. Two key elements involved in achieving this goal are ( I )  
effective communications between NASA and the payload community and (2) uti l ization of the 
knowledge and experience from previous programs. The payloads safety guidelines handbook is 
intended to provide these elements to  the payload community. 
This handbook provides the payload developer with a uniform description and interpretation of 
the potential hazards which may be caused by or associated wi th a payload element, operation, 
or interface wi th other payloads or with the STS. I t  also includes guidelines describing design or 
operational safety measures which suggest means of alleviating a particular hazard or group of 
hazards, thereby improving payload safety. 
1.1 PURPOSE.- The purpose of this handbook is to  assist the payload developer in  achieving 
compliance wi th the documented payload safety requirements of NASA OSF. The handbook 
accomplishes this intent by: 
a. Identifying the basic hazards involved with payloads intended for the STS. 
b. Providing design and operations safety guidelines which eliminate or minimize 
potential hazards and thereby improve payload safety. 
c. Providing the safety guidelines in a subsystem format for easy access and use. 
1.2 SCOPE.- The guidelines contained in this document apply to all payloads intended to  be 
carried by the STS. They are suggested design or operational means of avoiding hazards which 
i f  not corrected could adversely affect the safety of the STS. The STS consists of the space 
shuttle, spacelab, upper stages and ground sites needed to  support these elements. 
1.3 ORGANIZATION.- This handbook is organized into three sections: Introduction, STS 
Payload Hazards Definition, and Payload Safety Guidelines. Section 2.0, STS Payload Hazards 
Definition, defines the top level hazards affecting payloads. It also covers the various causes, 
failure modes, and potential effects of these hazards. 
Section 3.0 of the handbook contains the safety guidelines which have been prepared to  assist 
the payload developer in improving the design and operational safety of his particular payload. 
The guidelines cover STS payloads located in the orbiter payload bay, inside the crew cabin, in 
the spacelab, or external to  the orbiter. 
The guidelines are not designed for specific payloads but contain generic data which wi l l  assist 
individual payload designers and developers. This approach is necessary because of the wide 
variety, complexity, and early stage of development of the majority of payloads proposed for 
the STS. 
The guidelines address payload design, operations during flight, and operations during ground 
activit ies including transportation, test and checkout, installation, and refurbishment. For the 
convenience of the developer, the guidelines are grouped by commonly understood subsystem 
designators such as electrical, pyrotechnics, etc., and by subject t i t les such as materials, human 
factors, and radiation. 
Each subsystem guideline section is preceded by an index for that subsystem. The index 
identifies the main elements comprising that subsystem. The top level hazards associated with 
each of these main elements are identified in the index and comprise a summary of those 
hazards applicable to that particular subsystem element. This cross index will aid the handbook 
user in determining which guideline satisfies his particular application. 
1.4 DATA SOURCES.- The identified hazards and the safety guidelines were developed from a 
data base consisting of manned and unmanned spacecraft and aircraft experience from NASA, 
DOD, and industrial sources. Data obtained from these sources included existing safety studies 
and safety standards, related payload studies, and payload description documents. The 
documents from which these data were obtained are listed in the bibliography section for 
background information, since pertinent data has been incorporated into the body of this 
handbook. The listing of a document in the bibliography section is not to be construed as the 
imposition of the document as a requirement. 
2.0 STS PAYLOAD HAZARDS DEFINITION. 
2.1 PAYLOAD HAZARDS.- A hazard is t h e  presence of any potential risk situation caused by 
an unsafe a c t  or condition. There a r e  numerous potential risk situations associated with t h e  STS 
payloads which directly or indirectly a f f e c t  t h e  sa fe ty  of STS flight or  ground personnel. One of 
t h e  purposes of this handbook is t o  assist t h e  payload developer in recognizing t h e  hazards 
associated with STS payloads. The identification of such hazards is t h e  necessary s tar t ing point 
for  t h e  development of sa fe ty  guidelines which may be  used t o  el iminate or control t h e  hazards. 
Although the re  may be  many secondary or contributory hazards, 10 basic hazard groups were  
identified as t h e  primary concerns applicable t o  STS payloads. These hazards have sa fe ty  
implications during all mission phases on ground and flight crews, t h e  STS vehicle, or o ther  
payloads. 
The hazard groups were  derived f rom a variety of sources such as: (a) a general knowledge of 
STS payload energy sources which a r e  primary sources of hazards, (b) utilization of experience 
gained from previous manned space programs a s  t o  hazards encountered or prevented, and 
(c) o ther  representative sources of hazard grouping or categorizations. The list of hazard 
groups used in this handbook is in general agreement  with all such sources. A difficulty common 
t o  all lists, including this one, is t h a t  the re  is considerable overlap between hazard groups, and 
t h e  assignment of any secondary hazard t o  a part icular group can of ten be  arbitrary.  The 
manner in which hazards a r e  grouped or subdivided is therefore  not particularly significant. 
What is important is t h a t  t h e  payload developer be  aware  of all t h e  basic hazards associated 
with his payload. 
2.1. I Hazard Description.- The basic hazard groups, including representative examples of their  
causes and e f fec t s ,  a r e  discussed briefly in t h e  following paragraphs. The groups a r e  numbered 
consecutively f rom I t o  10 t o  agree  with t h e  hazard references  in each subsystem guidelines 
index. 
I .  COLLISION.- This group involves those hazards which occur when payloads or  payload 
e lements  a r e  allowed t o  break loose and impact STS s t ructure ,  o ther  payloads, or f l ight  and 
ground personnel. These hazards a r e  caused by structural  failure, procedural er ror  or  
inadequate ground handling equipment. Failure of payload a t t a c h  points can c r e a t e  equipment 
projectiles tha t  can penetra te  manned compartments  and injure t h e  crew. Penetra t ion of t h e  
cabin may result in loss of cabin pressure and crew asphyxiation. Inadequate or  incorrect  
procedures during payload deployment, retrieval, o r  during EVA (extravehicular activity) can 
lead to collision of t h e  payload with t h e  orbiter  or o ther  STS elements. Damage t o  cri t ical  
orbi ter  control surfaces  o r  primary s t ructure  is possible and could prevent a successful re turn  t o  
Earth. Ground handling equipment such a s  slings, cradles, holddown arms, etc., can fail and 
injure personnel during ground operations, 
2. CONTAMINATION.- This group of hazards is associated with t h e  release of toxic, 
f lammable,  corrosive, condensible, or part iculate mat ter .  Contamination is caused by leakage, 
spillage, outgassing, loose objects, abrasion, and f rom t h e  growth of fungus or release of volatile 
condensible materials .  Leakage of hazardous fluids or gases can be initiated from cracked or  
worn seals, gaskets, valve seats,  flanges and joints. Spillage of liquids f rom containers, tanks or  
valves can directly,  or indirectly by vaporization, degrade t h e  atmosphere or equipment 
operation. Many materials  outgas toxic products, irr i tants,  or foul odors which can damage t h e  
senses, and t h e  respiratory system of crewmen. Loose objects, dirt,  and abrasive action within 
payload components can provide a source of part icles t h a t  f loat  in t h e  zerogravity environment 
of habitable a reas  and can enter  into t h e  eyes, ears,  noses, or  mouths of personnel and into 
sensitive equipment. Fungi growing f rom materials  providing nutrients in moist, warm 
environments a r e  bacterial infection sources and contaminants in operating equipment. 
3. CORROSION.- This group involves those hazards resulting f rom t h e  structural  degradation 
of metal l ic  and nonmetallic equipment. Material corrosion can be  caused by a variety of means. 
Leakage of corrosive or reaci ive  material  onto  metall ic o r  nonmetallic equipment can quickly 
degrade its usefulness, M ~ t e r i a l  incompatibility or t h e  joining of cer ta in  dissimilar metals  can 
lead t o  corrosion. Environmental ext remes of t empera tu re  and humidity a r e  sources of 
deterioration of metals  containing carbon or for  most organic materials. Examples of the  types 
of corrosive processes which can degrade metal  and nonmetal equipment include s t ress  
corrosion, e lect rolyt ic  corrosion, and polymerization. Causative agents  will include acids, salts, 
solvents, halogens, etc. The e f f e c t  of corrosion on equipment can lead t o  mechanical failures, 
premature  wear, seizure,  and short  circuits. The loss of a cr i t ica l  function due t o  corrosion 
could lead t o  any of t h e  10 basic hazard groups identified herein, and t h e  loss of crew, vehicle, 
o r  mission is possible. 
4. ELECTRICAL SHOCK.- This group includes those hazards responsible for personnel injury 
or  fa ta l i ty  because of electrical  current  passing through any portion of t h e  body. Electrical  
shock can  be  caused by con tac t  with a "live" circuit  because of human error  in performing an  
operation, a procedural error,  or an  equipment fai lure such a s  an  insulation breakdown in 
exposed wiring. Other  causes  may be s t a t i c  e lect r ic i ty  discharge, lightning strikes, o r  shor t  
circuits  caused by moisture, bent  connector pins, or  wires, etc. S t a t i c  electrici ty or lightning 
could be hazardous without adequate  grounding or  shielding protection. The e f f e c t  of electrical  
shock can  vary f rom a mild burn t o  loss of consciousness and electrocution. Cuts  and bruises 
a r e  possible from t h e  involuntary reaction t o  t h e  shock. 
Other  electrical  sys tem hazards a f f e c t  t h e  performance and operation of equipment and thereby 
a f f e c t  t h e  c r e w  indirectly. Almost all payload subsystems a r e  e i the r  electrically controlled o r  
contain electrical  components which can malfunction and cause  almost any conceivable 
hazardous si tuation depending on t h e  t i m e  and location of occurrence. For example, electrical  
arcing could result in f i r e  or  a faulty electrical  circuit  relay could cause  premature  activation 
of a pyrotechnic device. Electrical  equipment malfunctions should therefore  be  considered as 
contributing fac to rs  for each of t h e  I0  basic hazard groups. 
5,  EXPLOSION.- These hazards result from t h e  t h e  violent release of energy as a result  of 
payload e lement  overpressurization, fire, chemical reaction, excessive temperature,  mal- 
functioning equipment o r  structural  fai lure causing t h e  release and collision of equipment with 
other  s t ructures  or equipment. The overpressur izat ion of pressure vessels, accumulators, 
batteries,  etc., can result in explosion. Excessive t empera tu re  f rom a f i re  or  a failed cooling 
system can  result in explosion of cryogenic tanks, gas generators,  pyrotechnic charges, squibs, 
etc. Equipment which can  disintegrate explosively include pumps, motors, blowers, rocket 
motors, generators, lasers, etc. The e f f e c t s  of these  explosive hazards on t h e  crew could range 
f rom fragmentation injuries t o  e y e  o r  respiratory sys tem irritation, burns, and asphyxiation. 
These e f f e c t s  would be t h e  result  of shrapnel o r  toxic/corrosive fluids or gases being released 
from t h e  exploding component. 
6 .  FIRE.- This group deals with t h e  rapid oxidation of payload e lement  combustibles. F i r e  
can occur  when a fuel and a n  oxidizer a r e  exposed t o  a n  ignition source. It can also occur when 
hypergolics a r e  inadvertently mixed. Fuels o r  combustibles consist generally of organic 
material ,  chemicals, and cer ta in  metals. Examples of these  mater ia ls  include rubber, wood, 
clothing, paint, plastics, solvents, and magnesium. Any high temperature  device or  source of 
electrical  arcing o r  sparking can  provide t h e  ignition source for fire. Examples of these  devices 
a r e  bearings, motors, generators,  heaters, lasers and faulty electrical  wiring. The e f f e c t s  of 
f i r e  can b e  catastrophic in t h e  closed environment of a space  vehicle. Death by asphyxiation, 
smoke inhalation, or  burns a r e  directly a t t r ibutable  t o  fire. The destruction of cri t ical  controls 
o r  l ife support equipment by f i r e  can indirectly cause  t h e  loss of crewmen or  t h e  vehicle. 
7 .  INJURY AND ILLNESS.- - This group includes those hazards capable of infl icting physical 
i n j u r i e s n y  sort on the flight or ground crews during all mission phases. Physical 
injuries may be caused by impact or collision wifh stationary objects having sharp edges or 
protruding parts or with shrapnel or projectiles from exploded tanks or accelerated loose 
objects, Physical injuries may also be caused by ingesting particulate matter, touching hot or 
cold surfaces, and by the loss of breathable atmosphere. Crew illness could result from 
exposure to pathogenic bacteria, toxic materials, or to excessive radiation levels. 
8. LOSS OF ORBITER ENTRY CAPABILITY.- This group involves those hazards which could 
degrade the structural, aerodynamic, and thermodynamic integrity of the orbiter and could 
prevent its safe return from orbit. Such orbiter functional degradation can be caused by 
payload elements which cannot be refracted within the orbiter mold line or which prevent the 
closure of the payload bay doors. It can also be caused by payl'oad element contact or collision 
with orbiter structural members, control surfaces, or primary insulation areas during payload 
deploylretrieval activities. The payload elements preventing payload bay door closure include 
booms, antennas, solar panels, and other hinged or extendable/retractable components. Failure 
of such equipment may be caused by loss of electrical or hydraulic power, structural fracture, 
and jammed or malfunctioning retract mechanisms. Pressure vessel rupture, inadvertent f i r ing 
of pyrotechnics or activation of propulsion systems could result in collision with sensitive areas 
of the orbiter. The eventual consequence of these hazards could be abandonment of the orbiter 
in space or possible loss of the crew and vehicle during an attempted entry. 
9. RADIATION.- This group involves those hazards associated with the exposure of the 
human body and sensitive control equipment t o  ionizing radiation, ultraviolet or infrared light, 
lasers, and electromagnetic or RF (radio frequency) generating equipment. Ionizing radiation 
hazards may be caused by leaking or inadequately shielded radioactive equipment such as RTG's 
(radioisotope thermoelectric generators), particle accelerators, vidicons, liquid metal heat 
exchangers, etc. Overexposure of personnel to  such radiation could result in tissue damage, 
permanent injury, or death. The crew could experience painful burns and eye damage from 
overexposure t o  ultraviolet or infrared light sources or to concentrated laser light beams. RF 
and electromagnetic radiation sources such as radar equipment and antennas can trigger 
ordnance devices or interfere with operation of cr i t ical communication equipment. 
10. TEMPERATURE EXTREMES.- This group includes those hazards associated with the 
departure of temperature from normal. It also includes extreme heat or cold such as that 
generated by fire; cryogenics, and the environment of space. These hazards may be caused by 
insulation breakdown, short circuits, seal leaks, plumbing failures, and procedural and human 
error in handling or operating hot and cold generating equipment. Examples of equipment 
affected by temperature extremes include bearings, motors, electrical components, heaters, 
batteries, tanks, and lines, In addition to  fire, these hazards can lead to structural degradation 
and mechanical equipment seizure, The ground and fl ight crews could suffer skin burns or 
frostbite as a direct result of contacting hot or cold materials. They could also be exposed to  
contamination hazards i f  overexpansion or retract ion of payload components leads to the 
release of toxic matter. 

3.0 PAYLOAD SAFETY GUIDELINES.- The payload sa fe ty  guidelines in this section were  
prepared t o  assist payload developers in achieving compliance with documented sa fe ty  require- 
ments  for  payloads using t h e  space transportation system. For easy access by payload 
developers, t h e  guidelines a r e  grouped into 15 generic subsystems. They provide t h e  means fo r  
payload developers t o  recognize hazards and also serve  a s  development and design aids in 
meet ing payload sa fe ty  requirements, The guidelines a r e  a source of experience retention d a t a  
fo r  sa fe  design and operations with a baseline of accumulated experience in manned and  
unmanned spacefl ight as well a s  military and commercial  operations. 
Since payloads will b e  designed t o  incorporate operational sa fe ty  features,  most of t h e  
guidel ines a r e  design oriented. The number of generic operational guidel ines included in t h e  
handbook is minimal because operat  ions planning requires specific equipment configuration and  
definite mission objectives. Only t h e  most general type of operational guidelines could b e  
prepared and included at this early s t age  of payload definition. As payload equipment 
configuration and mission objectives a r e  established, specific operational sa fe ty  guidelines can  
be  developed by t h e  responsible NASA Center  or  by t h e  payload developer t o  complement those  
included in t h e  handbook. 
The preparation of t h e  payload sa fe ty  guidelines consisted of four steps. ( I )  A d a t a  search was  
performed by visiting t h e  participating NASA Centers,  DOD, and t h e  aerospace industry. (The 
reference sources a r e  tabula ted in t h e  reference section of this document.) (2) The d a t a  were  
reviewed, and applicable sa fe ty  concerns and equipment hazards were  collected and categor ized 
under t h e  appropriate subsystems. Da ta  were also categorized under t h e  10 hazards discussed in 
paragraph 2.1. (3) A preliminary hazard analysis was performed for each subsystem t o  assure 
t h a t  t h e  necessary guidelines were  developed for payloads. (4) The guidelines were  revised for  
payload applicability and developer understanding . 
Each of t h e  15 subsystem guideline subsections contains a n  index, a subsystem description, and 
t h e  guidelines. The subsystem description contains a description of t h e  hardware e lements  and 
their  in terfaces  with a brief discussion of t h e  associated hazards. The guidelines contain t h r e e  
main headings: design, flight operations, and ground operations. Under these  th ree  headings 
will b e  found subheadings of equipment elements. Included with t h e  subheadings a r e  the  hazards 
(as  defined in paragraph 2.1) which a r e  t o  be controlled by t h e  guidelines. 
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.- The biomedical subsystem consists of medical experiment equipment 
designed t o  obtain data  on man's adaptation and performance in t he  space environment. It also 
consists of scientific equipment designed t o  obtain experimental da ta  on the effects  of space 
environments on micro-organisms, plant life, primates, vertebrates, and invertebrates. 
The medical experiments consist of measuring instruments such as ergometers, probes, body 
mass measuring devices, and blood pressure measuring devices. Also included a r e  recording 
instruments such a s  electroencephalographs, electrocardiographs, metabolic analyzers, and the  
associated electronic assemblies. Many of these types of equipment have been developed for 
manned space programs and will continue t o  be required and refined for future applications. 
The equipment for scientific investigation of living cells will range in complexity and design 
dependent on the  scientific objectives. A small part  of this type of equipment was designed for 
t h e  Skylab Program. The study of primates a s  part  of manned spaceflight will be accomplished 
for the  first  t ime  during the  Space Shuttle Program. The study of lower animals and plants, 
many for the  first time, will also be performed on the shuttle. 
Basic life support systems, including feeding and waste management systems, will be required 
in addition t o  measuring and recording equipment, probes, surgical tools, specimen containers, 
refrigeration equipment, and incubators for bacterial studies. 
Associated Hazards.- The hazards associated with the biomedical subsystem a re  contamination, 
electrical shock, explosion, fire, illness, and injury. Contamination hazards can be generated by 
uncontained waste mat te r  from biological experiments. Uncontained waste mat ter  can enter  
into equipment, become part  of the breathable atmosphere, or can generate bacteria harmful t o  
t h e  crew. Where possible, electrical shock hazards should be identified and eliminated from 
medical equipment by design. Life support systems containers designed for animals and plants 
should have emergency vent systems t o  avoid overpressurizations leading to  explosive hazards. 
Flammable fluids used in experiments should be  contained and should not be allowed t o  escape 
into t he  habitable areas. It is suggested tha t  experiments containing pathogens should provide a 
redundant means of containment. 
The following guidelines a r e  concerned with experiments involving humans, animals, and 
biological specimens. Section 3.4, ELECTRICAL, should be reviewed for additional guidelines 
applicable t o  medical experiments. 
Medical Experiments 
Electrical  Shock a. Medical equipment t o  accomplish or  support a crewman 
biological t e s t  in which electrical  power is used should be designed with 
redundant electrical  shock protection c i rcui ts  which remove t h e  input power 
t o  t h e  equipment when a leakage current level of 100 microamperes is 
Electrical  Shock b. Medical experiments such as t h e  ergometer  which utilizes a 
vectorcardiogram should be designed with electrically insulated restraints,  
shoes, seat ,  and handlebars t o  prevent parallel electrical  paths. 
d. Medical experiments which use flammable fluids, such a s  
methane  or alcohol, should be designed t o  prevent t h e  fluids f rom creat ing a 
contents  and use. 
f. Rotational medical equipment such as a rotating chair, requiring 
crewman participation, should be designed with a braking device for  quick 
stopping t o  release t h e  crewman under emergency conditions such as crew 
emergency egress. 
g. Equipment t o  accomplish medical experiments which encapsulate 
a crewman or use multiple s t raps  should be  designed for  quick release by t h e  
crewman under emergency egress (i.e., single release point). Devices which 
enclose a crewman and apply e i ther  positive or negative pressure should be  
designed for quick depressurization or  repressurization t o  allow t h e  crewman 
a rapid egress under emergency conditions. 
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Microbiology 
a. Experiments containing disease-producing bacteria and pathogens 
should be hermetically sealed and packaged in containers or compartments 
to isolate these experiments. Human contact with pathogens should be 
prevented during preflight preparation, flight operations, and postflight to 
preclude contamination of ground and flight crews. The payload contractor 
should develop and provide detailed procedures for handling, operating, 
storing, and disposing of microbiological experiments. 
b. Microbiological experiments requiring pressurized atmosphere 
should be designed with a self-contained system and should be completely 
isolated from the crew environmental control system to prevent contamina- 
tion. The design of the enclosure should allow for a lower internal pressure 
than the ambient. 
c. The packaging of hazardous micro-organism containers should be 
designed to withstand abort and crashlanding forces to protect the crew, 
ground personnel, and the general population from contamination. 
d. When biological organisms are to be used in experiments during 
on-orbit operations, bacteria agent control should be considered as part of 
the experiment design. The controls should be placed with the experiment 
organisms within the incubator. The bacteria agent control container should 
be designed to melt in overtemperature conditions, thereby releasing the 
controlling agents to destroy the biological organisms. Biological 
disinfectants such as lsopropyl alcohol, Phisohex, and Zyphrin chloride should 
be available for cleaning small spills. 
3.1.1.3 Biological Life Support Systems 
Contamination 
a. The design of biological experiments using plants, animals, or 
omer I we orga 
or elimination of odors generated by waste products. These provisions may 
be in addit ion to those of the crew environmental control system and should 
be designed to assure that the crew is protected from contamination by 
waste products. 
b. The design of the biological support system for primates, 
vertebrates, etc:, should provide for feeding and waste removal features to 
prevent contamination of the spacecraft environment. Operat ions with 
uncaged animals should be performed in a manner which does not create a 
crew hazard or potential danger to the spacecraft and systems. 
PAYLOAD SAFETY GU 
Contamination, 
Explosion 
Contaminat ion, 
Illness 
c. When biological subjects, such as animals, are to  be used in 
biomedical experiments, the design of the holding units (cages) should assure 
that the crew and spacecraft systems are protected from contamination. 
The holding unit environmental control system design should assure that the 
, crew is protected from contamination. Controlled emergency venting should 
I be provided for a malfunction contingency of the pressure regulator leading 
, to a buildup of excessive pressures. 
d. When designing biological experiments, provisions for preserving 
and storing dead specimens, plants, etc., should be considered to prevent 
contamination. 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
handling procedures should be provided. The biological experiment should be 
tested under the same tirneline and conditions expected during flight 
operations to uncover any hidden hazardous conditions. 
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3.2 CAUTION AND WARNING (HAZARD DETECTION AND SAFING) 
System Description.- The caution and warning system is the means used to  monitor parameters 
of f l iqht equipment functions that have the potential of endanqerinq fl iqht or qround crews. 
caution, wbrning, and emergency data signals from a payload t o  thk orbiter could be useful 
when a specific payload hazard is identified and has a reasonable probability of occurrence, and 
the crew is able to take corrective or protective action. The system wil l  consist of sensors to  
measure malfunctions or out-of-limit conditions, a power source and data transmission system, 
and a visual and audible signal i n  the orbiter cabin to alert the crew to an actual or impending 
hazardous situation. During launch or ground operations, caution and warning signals may also 
be displayed by the GSE (ground support equipment). Backup measurements and displays may be 
required for the crew t o  diagnose or interpret the caution and warning signals. 
The caution and warning system wil l  transmit emergency, warning, and caution type data. 
Those classifications are defined as follows: 
Emergency.- That condition or situation which creates an immediate crew hazard and which 
requires immediate, instinctive crew action. An example on other programs has been f i re or 
rapid loss o f  cabin pressure. 
Warning.- That hazardous condition which in and of itself can cause loss of vehicle or crew and 
which requires crew action. An example could be premature arming of solar panel deploy 
mechanisms. 
Caution.- That hazardous condition which, in combination with other system failures, may cause 
loss of vehicle or crew if uncorrected. 
The payload developer (subject to  review and concurrence by the STS operator) wi l l  determine 
when it is not feasible to eliminate a hazard by design. He wi l l  also be responsible for that 
portion of the caution and warning system on the payload side of the interface. This wi l l  
generally consist of the sensing or detecting devices used to measure safety cr i t ical parameters, 
the electrical circuitry for powering the measuring devices, and the circuitry for carrying the 
resulting signals to  the STS interface. The payload developer may also have responsibility for 
furnishing the controls for safing the payloads and command overrides for safety cr i t ical 
functions. 
Associated Hazards.- Design is the most desirable method to  eliminate or reduce hazards to 
acceptable levels. Where this is not possible, the next best measure is to provide the crew with 
a caution or warning to which a crew response is necessary i f  an out-of-tolerance condition 
exists or if a failure is imminent. Caution and warning systems of this type have been provided 
on previous manned space programs for use when immediate action is needed t o  correct a 
hazardous situation, to actuate emergency backup systems, or to permit escape f rom the 
vehicle. 
The guidelines listed in this section are suggested methods of assuring that the crew has 
adequate information to react to potentially hazardous situations. The guidelines, however, are 
not to be taken as NASA requirements. 
Safety cr i t ical conditions or potentially dangerous situations include the following examples: ( I )  
fire, smoke, or high temperature sources signaling impending fire; (2) overpressurization of 
pressure vessels signaling impending explosion or rupture; (3) the presence of toxic, corrosive, 
or explosive vapors; (4) leakage of radioactive materials; and (5) crit ical electric distribution 
points for detecting over or under voltage and current. The choice of a detector (measurement 
device) is primarily dependent on i ts ability to produce accurate and reliable information 
regarding real hazardous conditions with no false indications under any environmental 
conditions. 
3-2-3 
The cautiorl and warning guidelines contained in th is  seelion are limited t o  those  which a r e  the 
responsibib ity of t h e  pay load developer, it should be por"n$eb o u t  tha t  theze are ntin-rersus o ther  
design sa fe ty  crikeria for caution and warning e lements  and operations which are t h e  
responsibility of t h e  STS operator. Because of this dtiaf responsibility and the  cri t ical  na tu re  of 
Ihis subsystem in protecting t h e  crew and fEighf hardware, joint decisions will be required lo 
betermine type  and quantify of parameters  t o  be monitored and transmifted and f h e  sa fe ty  
controls and override provisions necessary for  particular pay loads, 
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3.2.1 Design 
3.2.1. I C&W (Caution and Warning) Elements 
a. The generation of erroneous signals should be minimized t o  
protect the crew from irritation and eventual lack of confidence in safety 
critical data. 
b. An inhibiting function capability should be provided in each 
sensor circuit t o  isolate a single malfunctioning sensor and permit normal 
operation of all other sensing units. 
c. Emergency controls used for shutdown, safing, alarm, or correc- 
t ive action should be clearly marked, visible, and readily accessible t o  
operating personnel. 
3.2.1.2 C&W Parameters 
a. Typical candidates for C&W parameters a r e  itemized as  follows. 
The list is not complete because there  is no universal list of C&W 
parameters for all payloads. It may, however, be of assistance t o  a payload 
developer who may have to  consider the inclusion of C&W a s  part  of his 
payload development. 
( I )  Atmospheric contamination - t o  detect  leakage, spillage, or 
release of toxic gases, fluids, or particulate matter.  
(2) Overpressurization of pressure vessels - t o  detect  potential 
rupture or explosion where practical by measurements of pressure, tempera- 
ture,  strain, or other means. 
(3) Thermal overheat - where potential overtemperature con- 
ditions and safe  limits are  exceeded in safety critical heaters, bearings, 
thermal insulation, thermal controls, etc. 
(4)  Radioactive or electromagnetic radiation leakage. 
(5) Other potentially hazardous elements or conditions which 
may be harmful t o  the  crew and a re  possible candidates for C&W parameters 
include: (a) critical electrical system over and under voltages and currents, 
and (b) inadvertent or incorrect operation of a laser system. 
3 . 2 2  Flight Operations 
The CAW systern should be active during those periods when the hazard 
pobet ia l  exists and the flight crew is in close proximiv to  the payload, 
3.2-5 
Ground Operat ions 
a. During ground operations, provisions should be made to  allow 
end-to-end checks of the C&W system's functional paths. I f  possible, the 
checkout capability should include sensor function, range, and sensitivity. 
b. The payload portion of the C&W system should be active during 
hazardous ground checkout involving personnel in the vicinity of the payload 
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3.3 CRYOGENICS 
.- The technology of cryogenics concerns itself with the processes and 
~henomena in the temperature reqion below - 1 0 0 ~ ~  (-150'~). Within this definition, there are 
'12 gases that liquefy 'in this temperature region; namely, oxygen, fluorine, nitroien, argon, 
helium, krypton, xenon, neon, methane, ethylene, ethane, and hydrogen. 
Cryogens may be required in the operation of various payload subsystems. They can be used as 
propellants in propulsion systems or attitude control systems, as reactants in fuel cells, and as 
pressurants and coolants in various applications for payload systems and experiments. 
System elements associated with the safe containment, delivery, and control of cryogens and 
that require special design and procedural considerat ions include pumps, storage vessels, 
transfer lines, seals, vent valves, relief valves, quick disconnects, and insulation. Important 
design considerations include materials compatibility, dimensional contraction, impact 
sensitivity, condensation accumulation, cleanliness requirements, purge procedures, disposal 
constraints, and chi1 ldown techniques. 
Associated Hazards.- The potential hazards affecting the design, handling, and operations of 
cryogenics systems may be divided into four general categories. These categories are: 
I. Personnel exposure to extreme cold or to toxic or inert gases.- Liquid or low temperature 
gas will produce effects on the skin similar to a burn. This will vary with temperature and 
exposure time, but the eyes can be damaged by very brief exposure to cold gases. Prolonged 
inhalation of cold gas, whether respirable or not, can produce serious lung disorders. Most 
liquefied gases have low toxicity, but adequate ventilation is essential because a small amount 
of liquid can rapidly convert to a large volume of gas depleting the normal oxygen content and 
can create a breathing hazard. In sudden asphyxia, such as from inhalation of pure nitrogen, 
unconsciousness is almost immediate. 
2. Reactivity of the particular cryogenic fluid.- An atmosphere containing more than the 
normal 21 percent oxygen by volume increases the hazard of fire. Combustion is the process of 
a fuel readting with a" oxidizer; any increase in the percentage of oxidizer increases the chance 
of a fire. It also increases the intensity of a f ire once it has started and can even involve 
materials normally regarded as being relatively nonflammable. The rapid expansion of 
cryogenic methane, ethylene, ethane, or hydrogen when released in the ambient atmosphere can 
quickly create an explosive situation. 
3. Low temperature environment effects on mechanisms and structural materials.- 
Water or moisture around cryogenic systems create special hazards. The moisture condensed 
from the atmosphere may freeze mechanisms and render them inoperable. Uninsulated vent 
lines can cause the formation of liauid air durina fi l l  o~erations with liauid hvdroaen. neon. or 
helium. This formation could preSent normal operati& of the vent sy'stemTby sagging ltnes 
- -  - 
with frozen air. Also of special concern are the effects of cryogenic temperatures on the 
physical properties of the materials of the cryogenic subsystem and other system elements that 
are in close proximity. Line and pressure vessel ruptures may result from embrittlement of 
materials at cryogenic temperatures. Leakage may result from dimensional contraction at 
flange and f i t t ing seals. 
4. .- Because of the 
qreat increase in volume of a cryogen as it vaporizes, it i s  necessary to provide pressure relief 
Galves at strategic points within the cryogenic system. Each pressure vessel or section of line, 
hose, or pipe that may become isolated and entrap cryogen gas11 iquids should be protected by a 
pressure re1 ief device. 
The safety guidelines contained in this section deal specifically with the elimination or control 
of cryogenic hazards. For broader guideline coverage, reference should be made to section 
3.1 1 ,  PRESSURE SYSTEMS, which covers the generic type safety guidelines relative to 
pressurized gases and liquids. 
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1 3.3*1*1 General 
a. Cryogenic pressure systems should be marked for easy and 
immediate identification. Procedures for sa fe  access, monitoring, servicing, 
and maintenance differ significantly, depending on the  chemical and physical 
characteristics of the  fluid. 
b. Tank outlet  and inlet markings should designate whether the  
working fluid is vapor or liquid. The hazard potential of opening the system 
will differ significantly for pressurized vapors and liquids. 
c. Payload cryogen tank thermal protection systems and tank 
overpressure vent capacities should be designed for maximum heat ra tes  
during ground tanked, in-flight operational, or STS orbit modes including the  
post abort  landing heat soak mode. 
d. Systems for cryogenics should be f ree  from dirt, lubes, metall ic 
debris, and impurities. System cleanliness is particularly important in 
cryogenic systems since impurities can become solidified, can cause 
clogging, or can reac t  chemically with the  cryogen. 
e. Cryogenic system designs should provide for contraction and 
expansion resulting from the  large temperature differentials experienced 
during system servicing and operations. 
f. Cryogenic s torage vessels should be  provided with sufficient 
redundancy to  prevent hazardous overpressurization. Failure of a single 
device could allow pressure t o  increase t o  a level tha t  would fail the  system 
structurally. 
g. Low points (traps) on cryogenic lines should be avoided to  
prevent accumulation of contaminants. If t raps a re  unavoidable, drains 
should be provided. 
h. Cryogenic fluorine is extremely hazardous. Particular ca re  in its 
use should be exercised. Primary safety considerations of any equipment 
used with fluorine a r e  materials compatibility and cleanliness because of the  
high reactivity of fluorine with most substances. (See paragraph 3.3.1.4.f 
for safety considerations). 
3,3,1.2 Storage Vessels 
a. The space between The inner and outer shells of cryogenic/ 
containers should be evacuated t o  maintain thermal isolation t o  prevent I bui Idup of pressure between she1 Is. Excessive annular pressure couidl 
coiiapse the inner shell or cause n rupture of '.he ou te r  si:eii, Any p;essuref 
may degrade the  insulating qualities of the two-shell design, resuiting in1 
excessive heat transfer and pressure buildup, 
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1 3.3.1.2 Storage Vessels (continued) 
b. The annular space should be designed with consideration t o  the 
hazardous e f fec t s  of potential leakage into the annulus. 
1 3.3.1.3 Venting and Relief 
a. A normal boiloff vent should be provided where practical on 
cryogenic equipment and should be  maintained a t  a positive (reference t o  
ambient) pressure t o  prevent moisture laden air  from backfilling and 
freezing in the  vent path. 
b. Cryogenic pressure vessels or tanks should be equipped with fail- 
sa fe  pressure relief capability t o  prevent tank failure. Typical devices 
providing this capability a r e  pressure relief valves and rupture discs. 
c. Pressure relief devices should be located so that  no section of 
t he  system can be isolated from a relief capability. 
Explosion 
Explosion, 
Fire 
e. Rupture disks should be selected with burst pressures, a t  
specified temperatures, within - +5 percent of the  desired relief pressure. 
d. Pressure relief disks should be located so that  debris fragments 
from the disks, if used, will not impinge on or obstruct adjacent plumbing, 
lines, tanks, cables, or primary structure. 
Explosion 
Explosion, 
Contamination 
g. Pressure relief discharge lines should be of sufficient size so tha t  
they do not restrict  the relieving capacity of the safety device. 
f. Relief valve outlets should be provided with protective devices 
t o  prevent the  entrance of contaminants. 
Fire, 
Contamination, 
Explosion, 
Corrosion 
h. Venting incompatible fluids through a common line could c rea te  
explosive, combustive, toxic, or corrosive conditions. An analysis should be 
conducted of the  potential effluents within a payload to  establish safe vent 
and re1 ief passages and procedures for nominal and contingency situations. 
Explosion, Fire, 
Loss of Entry 
Capability 
i. Relief devices should be far enough from the tank so that  they do 
not ice up, f reeze over, and become ineffective. 
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a. Materials that encounter cryogenic fluids should be selected to  
ensure against structural failure through extreme temperature changes and 
operating temperatures. 
b. Materials for cryogenic service should be selected for compat- 
ibi l i ty wi th the specific cryogen and its particular physical and chemical 
properties. 
c. Al l  materials used in liquid oxygen systems should be evaluated 
for impact sensitivity. MSFC-SPEC- 106, "Testing Compatibility of Mate- 
rials for Liquid Oxygen Systems," establishes acceptance cri ter ia of 
materials for use in liquid oxygen and provides a method to  be used in 
determining the impact sensitivity of such materials. Use of  organic 
1 materials should be eliminated or reduced to  a minimum. 
d. Transducers in contact with any cryogen should have damping 
oils omitted and should be calibrated as "drytt units. 
e. Fi l ter elements for use in liquid oxygen systems should be made 
of non-oil bearing bronze, Monel or other nonferrous materials t o  avoid f i re  
or explosion from hydrocarbon contaminants. 
f. I f  fluorine must be used because of some special property, the 
following safety considerations should be observed: 
( I )  The requirements of NASA C2-72064, "Fluorine System 
Handbook," should be followed. 
(2) Surfaces in  contact with fluorine should be free from 
foreign materials. 
(3) Welding processes should use inert gas shielding or electron 
beam techniques fo minimize contaminants. 
(4)  Silicone or hydrocarbon base oil f i l led differential pressure 
transducers should not be used because of the violent reaction with Fluorine 
if a seal failure occurs. 
(5) Reaction with frost a t  service points can be prevented by 
using an externsi shroud wif-h a continuous inertgas purge, 
( 6 )  Cor2trsls For pressurized fluorine systems should be by 
rernote rnecrns i.o protect %he operator, 
I 17) Speciai cure  si~ouid be token to avoid cunt~~rnina~ion of tile* 
I 1 akrnosjihere wi th the salts of riuorlne since these fine powders can be 
D 1 extrrernei y danger aus i f  ingested, 
, - -- - -  
(8) Fluorine should not be vented through the common STS 
3.3.1.5 Controls 
a. Manual control handles of cryogenic valves should be insulated so 
as not to be hazardous (e.g., frostburn or frostbite) to  an operator. 
b. Shutoff valves should not be installed in series with safety relief 
valves. An erroneously closed shutoff valve could prevent relief of 
hazardous pressures. 
c. Valve housing design should prevent vapor pressure buildup to  
dangerous levels as a result of cryogen leakage into the housing. 
d. When payload vent or dump is required, the valves should be 
remotely controlled from the orbiter or f rom the ground to  provide means of  
exhausting residual cryogens to vacuum prior to  retrieval by the orbiter. 
Flight Operations 
a. Components in liquid oxygen systems should be maintained a t  a 
cleanliness level acceptable for safety system operation. MSFC-SPEC- I 64, 
"Cleanliness of Components for use in Oxygen, Fuel, and Pneumatic 
Systems," is an example of  minimum cleanliness levels acceptable for LO2 
system operation. 
c. Special hazardous gas detection equipment may be necessary in 
habitable areas where there is a possibility of the accumulation of toxic, 
flammable, or corrosive cryogens. This equipment may be provided by the 
STS or in specific cases may be a payload developer responsibility. 
Ground Operations 
a. Liquid hydrogen should be stored in closed containers under 3 to  
I 0  psig pressure t o  prevent backf low of air into the system. 
b. Equipment that has contained liquid fluorine or any toxic or 
corrosive liquid should be purged with dry inert gas (helium preferred) and 
evacuated to  assure removal of the residual fluids. 
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3.3.3.1 General (continued) 
c. Dye penetrants should not be used for liquid fluorine tank 
inspect ion. 
d. Welding or any hot work should not be done on or near a system 
containing any of the  reactive cryogenics. 
e. Electrical equipment within 50 f e e t  of a reactive cryogenic 
facility should be explosion proof. 
f. Hazardous gas detection equipment should be used in areas  where 
there  is a possibility of f r ee  fuel or oxidizer accumulation. 
g. The discharge from vacuum pumps handling hydrogen should be 
ducted t o  suitable vents t o  preclude accumulation of combustible vapors. 
3.3.3.2 Test and Checkout 
a. The design and structural integrity of cryogenic pressure vessels 
and components should be  demonstrated sa fe  by pressure tests. 
b. Cryogenic systems should be  tested under operating environ- 
mental conditions for structural integrity and freedom from leakage. 
c. Testing systems with cryogenic fluids is extremely hazardous and 
should only be controlled and monitored remotely using precautions similar 
t o  those for gas leak and pressure testing. 
d. A post-test vacuum purge should be conducted t o  eliminate 
cryogenic fluid entrapment in valves and other system components, and the  
system should be filled with an inert gas a t  5 t o  I0 psig t o  preclude system 
contamination. 
e. Hydrostatic t es t  fluids for use in cryogenic oxidizer or other  
systems with LOX (liquid oxygen) clean requirements should pass the LOX 
impact sensitivity test. 
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3.4 ELECTRICAL 
.- The payload electrical  subsystem s t a r t s  a t  t h e  in terface  connector 
between t h e  experiment or  payload and t h e  orbiter  and includes all electrical/electronic 
components within t h a t  Unique port ions of t h e  electrical  sys tem such as pyrotechnic 
c i rcui ts  a r e  covered in t h e  pyrotechnics section, caution and warning has its own section, and 
controls and  displays a r e  found in t h e  human fac to rs  section. These electrical  subsystem 
components include connectors, batteries,  c i rcui t  breakers, cables and wiring, control c i rcui ts  
parts/components/elements, and power sys tems (including grounding and power distribution 
system). 
Components like cables  and wiring, batteries,  control circuits, etc., a r e  of concern t o  t h e  
developer only up t o  the  in terface  furnished by t h e  integrator. Interconnecting cables between 
payloads, bet  ween orbi ter  and t h e  payload, between IUS (interim upper s tage)  and payload, and 
between pallet  and payload a r e  furnished by t h e  integrator and a r e  controlled by t h e  ICD 
( interface  controlling document). In t h e  ear l ies t  s tages  of conceptual design, t h e  integrator will 
obtain information for payload electrical  in terface  definition t o  determine t h e  payload 
in terface  connector requirements, pin assignment, etc. This information will be pub1 ished in t h e  
electrical  ICD. Given this interface, the  developer also must design and manufacture  his 
instrument t o  be s a f e  in all environments t o  which it will be  subjected. The electrical  
relationship of one subsystem t o  another within a payload involves all c i rcui ts  (power, signal, 
command, etc.). Undesirable e f fec t s  on t h e  c i rcui ts  include EM1 (electromagnetic interfer-  
ence), magnetic,  and radiation. Diode isolation, line f i l ters,  wire shielding, twisted wiring pairs, 
and separation of signal wiring f rom command o r  power wiring a r e  typical good design pract ices  
used t o  minimize these effects.  
Interfaces external  t o  a payload a r e  also quite varied. All t h e  above mentioned fac to rs  exist  at  
each in te r face  (i.e., payload-to-payload, payload-to-pallet, payload-to-orbiter, etc.). Each 
payload, therefore ,  should be  in compliance with t h e  in terface  requirements of t h e  next higher 
assembly. Likewise, GSE should be  in compliance with applicable in terface  requirements. 
Associated Hazards.- The electrical  system can a f f e c t  a crewman directly by electrical  shock 
or  by burns in t h e  event of touching overheated wiring or  components. Indirectly, however, t h e  
electrical  sys tem can cause  all types of hazards. For example, a ba t t e ry  explosion could b e  
caused by an  internal short  or  excessive heating caused by failure of a charger t o  regula te  
properly. Ba t te r i es  contain explosive gases which a r e  caust ic  a s  well a s  toxic. F i r e  could 
readily result  f rom a failed or  improperly se lected c i rcui t  breaker. High temperature ,  e i ther  by 
equipment fai lure o r  inadequate design, could result  in toxic outgassing of materials. High 
t empera tu re  in wiring could mel t  insulation causing f i re  and/or circuit  crossover t o  pyrotechnic 
c i rcui ts  o r  ac tua to rs  resulting in untimely deployment o r  actuation. Such events  could damage 
t h e  orbiter ,  o the r  payloads or could injure personnel if they were  standing adjacent t o  such a 
mechanism. Radiation could become a hazard t o  a crewman if a laser were  turned on because 
of fai lure of interlock circuitry o r  a circuit  crossover. 
EM1 can  pene t ra te  cables leading t o  circuitry and  can  cause  resets,  inadvertent  s t a r t  of timing 
sequences, squib ignition, etc, The man-machine in terface  requires cer ta in  interlocks and 
safing devices specifically t o  prevent flight and ground crews from accidently or unknowingly 
initiating an  unwanted event.  EMI, which a payload may genera te  but be insensitive to, may be  
a significant hazard t o  other  payloads, t h e  pallet  or  module, and even t h e  orbiter  itself. 
The following electrical  guidelines a r e  provided t o  assist  t h e  payload developer in creating a n  
instrument a s  f r e e  from crew and ground handling hazards a s  possible. 
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1 3*4*1e1 Connectors 
a. Connectors which a r e  mismated in t h e  process of installation can 
cause  considerable damage t o  t h e  connector and t o  t h e  experiment which it 
powers. In t h e  act of mismating a connector, the re  is a possibility of 
unwanted actuat ion of au tomat ic  events,  firing pyrotechnics, etc., which in 
turn could result in damage t o  t h e  orbiter ,  injury t o  personnel, and other  
unwanted events. The following considerations a r e  presented t o  help 
el iminate t h e  more  common causes  of mismated connectors: 
(I ) Plugs and receptacles  should be  marked or  coded t o  prevent 
mating in t h e  wrong orientation. 
(2) Plugs and receptacles  should be shaped, keyed, or 
restrained so t h a t  it is physically impossible t o  mismate  with adjacent 
connectors. 
(3) Connector shells should have guides so  t h a t  alignment 
occurs without trial-and-error scraping of pins across t h e  female  con tac t  t o  
find t h e  alignment position. 
Electrical  Shoc b. Access t o  power should be only through female  con tac t s  or 
sockets; t h e  male  con tac t  or  pin should be  without power when unmated. 
Electrical  Shocl 
Electrical  Shocl 
Contamination 
Contamination, 
I.llness, Injury 
c. Connectors which a r e  scheduled t o  be  mated  o r  demated by the  
crew during normal in-flight operations should be provided with power 
removal capability when t h e  load is sufficient  t o  result in pin damage f rom 
arcing. 
9 d. Connectors a r e  susceptible t o  t h e  environment in many ways. 
Moisture, loose part icles and o ther  forms of contamination can bridge t h e  
small gap between pins in a connector if these  surfaces a r e  lef t  exposed. 
Corona can occur between connector pins at reduced atmospheric pressure. 
Wire flexing eventually can cause  a n  unrestrained connection t o  break a t  the  
connector pin. The following will help reduce t h e  occurrence of these  
hazard-producing failures: 
( I )  Connector back shells should be  environmentally sealed or 
potted with an  approved mater ia l  t o  avoid par t ic le  contamination or  
breakdown of dielectric due t o  moisture. Wires should be  strain-relieved t o  
avoid breakage due t o  flexing. 
(2) Connectors should have t e the red  caps, plugs, or  covers t o  
protect  against  contamination o r  damage when unmated. 
e. Connectors used within t h e  habitable a reas  of t h e  spacecraf t  
should have self-locking devices. The use of sa fe ty  wire is undesirable 
because of loose part icles and sharp wire ends. 
GUIDELINES 
f. Receptacles  whose mating plugs have locking fea tu res  requiring 
a twisting motion (bayonet or threaded types) should be positively keyed or  
pinned t o  their  mounting surfaces so t h a t  it is physically impossible for t h e  
receptacles  t o  turn during plug a t tachment .  
g. Power c i rcui ts  should be  designed so t h a t  power receptacles  and 
connectors located in or  used with equipment containing flammable vapor o r  
liquids should be  incapable of initiating a n  explosion by sparking or arcing. 
h. Payload connectors, internal or external  t o  t h e  orbiter ,  should be  
designed t o  el iminate t h e  possibility of potential  damage t o  crewman life 
support equipment because of s t ray  electrical  voltage or current.  
3.4.1.2 Bat ter ies  
a. The following a r e  typical bat tery  types for payload sources of 
o Carbon-zinc 
o Gelled e lect rolyte  
o Magnesium-air 
o Mercury-zinc 
o Nickel-cadmium 
o Nickel-hydrogen 
o Nickel-zinc 
o Silver-cadmium 
o Silver-zinc 
The list includes both wet  and dry cells, and sealed and vented type  
batteries. Many off-the-shelf bat ter ies  require additional enclosures, vents, 
connectors, and markings t o  make  them safe. Bat ter ies  should be selected,  
designed, or modified t o  be  fully qualified for t h e  environments t o  which 
they will be  exposed during their  intended missions. 
conditions can be overcome by incorporating t h e  necessary design features  
and close control of charging and discharging. Mixed hydrogen and oxygen 
t o  cer ta in  confined volumes and mixture ra t ios  in t h e  presence of an ignition 
source can result in an  explosion. Electrolyte is caust ic  and electrically 
conductive. Expulsion of e lect rolyte  can result in a short circuit  leading t o  
ba t t e ry  discharge and heating which could result in an  explosion. 
GUIDELINES 
The following sa fe ty  guidelines should be  considered in t h e  design of ba t t e ry  
cells and  ba t t e ry  cases: 
( I )  Cells should be designed t o  minimize t h e  probability of 
e lect rolyte  escaping. 
(2) Wet cell bat ter ies  should have positive pressure relief 
capability f o r  each cell. 
(3) Cells should contain t h e  minimum amount  of e lect rolyte  
leakage in zerogravity. 
(4) Cell cases  should b e  designed t o  avoid access of e lect rolyte  
t o  ven t  mechanisms t o  help prevent e lect rolyte  ejection. 
(5) Cell design should include analysis/tests t o  determine 
structural  capabilities. Annealing of molded plastic cases  may b e  required 
for s t ress  relief. 
(6)  An installed ba t t e ry  (single or  multiple celled) should be 
enclosed within a c a s e  which will prevent e lect rolyte  leakage into t h e  
surrounding a r e a  in t h e  event  of damage t o  any of t h e  ba t t e ry  cells. 
(7) Battery  cases  for vented cell systems should b e  designed t o  
contain all e lect rolyte  during overpressure conditions such as those caused 
by overload o r  internal shorts. 
(8) A bat tery  c a s e  const ructed of meta l  should be internally 
coa ted  t o  be  resistant  t o  e lect rolyte  a t t a c k  and t h e  coating should b e  
electrically nonconductive. If a vent  plug is installed, it should be 
electrically isolated from t h e  case  by use of an  insulating insert. 
( 9 )  Battery  cases  with vent plugs should incorporate provisions 
t o  help prevent ejection of accumulated electrolyte,  i.e., porous plug, 
(1 0) F r e e  volume within ba t t e ry  cases  should b e  decreased t o  a 
minimum t o  reduce t h e  accumulation of gas. 
(1 I) When ba t t e ry  case vents  a r e  used, they should be  located t o  
preclude damage t o  adjacent equipment or  injury t o  operating personnel. 
(12) Bat tery  cases  should not be vented into t h e  habitable a reas  
of t h e  spacecraft .  
(13) Exposed circuitry such as relay contacts  should not be used 
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1 3.4. 1.2 Bat ter ies  (continued) 
(1 4) Ba t te r i es  should be  designed t o  preclude polarity reversal 
when installing connecting terminals. Decals or markings should clearly 
indicate positive and negative terminals where lug and bolted terminal 
connections a r e  used. 
(15) Ba t te ry  connections t o  main busses should not be  of 
dissimilar metals  as corrosion between mating surfaces  would likely result. 
(16) Ba t te ry  connections t o  main busses should be  coa ted  or  
sealed t o  prevent exposure of terminals t o  ambient  environment t o  avoid t h e  
e f f e c t s  of moisture. 
(1 7) Ba t te r i es  should not be connected with a load applied as 
sparking and arcing could result. 
(18) Ba t te ry  cases  should be marked t o  indicate t h e  type  of 
e lect rolyte  and should refer t o  t h e  appropriate activation and sa fe ty  
procedures. 
3.4.1.3 Circuit  BreakersICircuit Protect ion Devices 
Temperature  a. A circuit  breaker or similar protect ive  device should be  provided 
Extremes,  Fire,  in each payload t o  prevent an overload in one payload f rom affect ing o ther  
Electrical  Shock payloads, interfacing equipment, o r  t h e  orbiter. 
Temperature  b. Circuit  breakers should be  sized (or se t )  t o  protect  t h e  smallest  
Extremes,  Fire,  wire within all branches of a circuit.  Adjustable type circuit  breaker 
Electrical  Shock sett ings should have tamperproof settings. 
Temperature  c.. Circuit  breakers should t r ip  and protect  t h e  circuit  even if t h e  
Extremes,  Fire,  switch lever is physically held in t h e  "ON" position. Circuit  breakers should 
Electrical  Shock provide a visual indication when tripped, 
Explosion d. Circuit  breakers located in o r  used with equipment containing 
flammable vapors or liquids should be sealed against  these e lements  t o  
qualify t h e  breakers a s  explosion proof. 
Temperature  e. A redundant circuit  should not share  t h e  same circuit  breaker 
Extremes,  with t h e  primary circuit.  
Explosion, 
Electrical  Shock 
Fire,  f. Circuit protection devices should be sized (or se t )  so  t h a t t h e  
Temperature  combination of current  and t ime  a t  which t h e  device operates  will not cause  
Extremes t h e  operation of protect ive  devices between t h e  circuit  breaker and power 
source. 
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3.4.1.4 (continued) 
(I) The use of a single or  multipoint shield ground based on t h e  
in terference signal frequencies, t h e  length of t h e  transmission line, and t h e  
re la t ive  sensitivity of t h e  circuit  t o  high o r  low impedance fields. 
(2) The use of single point shielding, which is e f fec t ive  for 
shor t  shield lengths. Multipoint shielding, in general, solves most shield 
grounding problems if the re  a r e  no large ground currents  present in t h e  
shield. 
(3) The use of twisted wire pairs t o  reduce magnet ic  coupline 
below 5 kHz (kiloHertz). A highly conductive copper braid shield should be  
added over t h e  twisted pair, and t h e  shielding should be terminated at  t h e  
potential of t h e  ground plane t o  reduce e lec t ros ta t i c  coupling. 
i. The communication subsystem components should be electrically 
shielded from t h e  electrical  power components t o  prevent electrical  
transients from inserting errors  into te lemetry  d a t a  leading t o  misinterpre- 
tat ion of pay load subsystem s ta tus ,  particularly on automated payloads ( f ree  
flyers). 
j. Power and signal (including command) wiring should not be 
routed through t h e  s a m e  cable, cable bundle or wiring harness. This pract ice  
may result in voltage induction into adjacent circuits. Induced voltage can  I b e  strong enough t o  f i r e  squibs, reset  circuit  logic, a c t u a t e  devices, etc. 
k. Shielding t o  protect  against .induced voltage for frequencies 
below 50 kHz should be  continuous through all connectors and should be 
grounded a t  only one end. Above 50 kHz, shielding should be  continuous 
through all connectors and should be  grounded at both ends. 
I . '  Wiring splices a r e  undesirable. Splicing allows an  unknown 
quanti ty of additional single point failures. If splices a r e  required, they 
should be witnessed, inspected, and recorded a s  specified in JSC Design 
Standard No. 88 o r  equivalent. 
m. When power o r  signal grounds a r e  connected t o  structures,  all 
grounds should b e  carried back t o  t h e  orbi ter  payload power in terface  point 
(see section 3.4.1 .6.k, Power Systems). 
n. Single strand solid wire should not be used in locations where it 
may be subjected t o  flexing as it could break. 
o. The use of wire smaller than 22 gauge should be  avoided because 
of i ts  susceptibility t o  breakage during handling and vibration. 
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1 3.4.1.3 Circuit Breakers/Circuit Protection Devices (continued) 
Fire, g. Circuit protection devices should be used in all GSE current- 
Temperature carrying conductors which connect to flight hardware (power, control, 
Extremes, signal, and returns). 
Electrical Shock 
1 3.4.1.4 Cables and Wiring 
Al l  
Contamination, 
Corrosion 
a. Wiring penetrations should be potted, sealed, or similarly 
protected against shorting by materials floating in zerogravity environment 
and against the effects of liquid leakage or condensation. 
b. Electrical wire or cable insulated or coated with Teflon TFE 
(polytetraf luoroethy lene) or FEP (fluorinated ethylene propylene) should be 
etched prior to potting to assure mechanical bond strength and environ- 
mental seal. Unetched TFE or FEP wire insulation will not bond properly, 
and moisture can penetrate within the connector causing dielectric 
breakdown between pins. 
Corrosion, c. Potting must be accomplished within 3 weeks after etching or 
Temperature the bond strength will deteriorate. 
Extremes, 
Electrical Shock 
Temperature d. When etching of insulation is required, the process specification 
Extremes, should specify that the bare conductor portion of the wire must not be 
Fire, Electrical exposed to the etchant and that there are no pinholes in the insulation. 
Shock 
Electrical Shock, e. Cabling and/or wiring exposed to the extreme temperature 
Temperature environment of space should be capable of being flexed without damage. 
Extremes 
Explosion, f. Cables and wiring should be configured, located, clamped, and 
Temperature supported to eliminate any possibility of mechanical stress on wires, wire 
Extremes, terminations and connectors, or contact with liquid lines and to remain clear 
Fire of sharp edges and moving parts. 
Temperature g. Wires and cables should not be identified or marked by hot 
Extremes, stamping directly onto the insulation as this may reduce the integrity of the 
Electrical Shock, insulation and cause embrittlement. 
Fire 
Collision, h. Critical and hazardous systems should be adequately shielded 
Explosion from RF radiation which can cause possible equipment malfunctions, can 
initiate ordnance devices, and can present vital communication functions. 
Design safety consideration should be given to: 
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Explosion 
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All 
All 
All 
Electrical  Shock 
All 
All 
All 
All 
3.4.1.4 Cables and Wiring (continued) 
p. Electrical cable  installations should be  designed with sufficient  
flexibility, length, and accessibility t o  permit  disconnection and 
reconnect  ion of connectors without damage. 
q. Electrical wiring insulation should m e e t  t h e  applicable 
environmental, flammability, and chemical compatibility requirements. 
Tef Ion TFE (per MIL-W-22759) and Kapton polyimide (per MIL-W-8 1 38  1 ) 
have been tes ted and found t o  m e e t  t h e  flammability requirements. 
Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) should not be used. 
r. Circuit  breakerlwire gauge size compatibility should be  
established by analysis. 
s. Precautions should be  taken in clamping, bending or otherwise 
stressing Teflon covered wire as shorting caused by insulation cold flow 
could result. 
3.4.1.5 Control Circuits  
a. When redundancy is required, the  redundant control c i rcui t  
components should be independent of those components used in t h e  primary 
control  circuit.  
b. When redundant control circuits  a r e  necessary, primary and 
redundant control circuit wiring should not be  routed through t h e  same cable  
or  connector. 
c. When redundant control circuits  a r e  necessary, primary and 
redundant circuits  should not be  supplied f rom t h e  same branch power bus o r  
c i rcui t  breaker. 
d. Electrical shock protection circuits  should be  provided where 
hardware operation requires electrical  in terface  with t h e  crewman. 
e. Redundancy should be considered where relays a r e  used in 
cr i t ica l  control systems. 
f. Self-test circuits  should indicate t h e  actual  sys tem response 
ra the r  than indicate only t h e  initiation of a command or  t e s t  signal. 
g. System indicators used t o  monitor sys tem s ta tus  should indicate 
t h e  actual  system response rather than indicate only t h e  initiation of a 
command or  application of power. 
h. Control circuits  should include an  in-flight checkout capability t o  
verify t h e  independent operation of each circuit.  
i. Redundant control circuits which control hazardous functions 
should include a self-test or checkout capability. 
j. Safety critical circuits, such as a heater circuit which could 
k. Equipment should revert to a safe configuration when an input 
power loss, overvoltage, or undervoltage condition occurs. 
I. When heating elements are incorporated in ovens or similar 
environmental chambers, consideration should be given to redundant 
automatic heater shutoff devices (independent of primary temperature 
controlling devices) that require manual reset. 
m. Equipment should be provided with an accessible single main 
power on-off switch which will remove all power (other than input power to 
the main switch) from the equipment when the switch is placed in the off 
n. Circuitry having capacitors which could discharge hazardous 
current levels should be provided with a bleed-down circuit. 
o. Redundant circuit protection devices should be used where 
opening of the primary device would result in a hazard. 
p. Circuits (including latching relay circuits) should be designed to 
preclude inadvertent operation due to voltage transients. 
q. When heaters are used primarily for temperature control of 
experiment components, consideration should be given to independent 
circuits for temperature sensing, control, and overtemperature protection. 
r. Electrical and electronic components located within consoles, 
panels or similar equipment enclosures containing or exposed to flammable 
gases, vapors, or liquids should be explosion proof. 
s. Circuit breakers or switches used to control equipment or 
circuitry intended for emergency purposes should have positive protection 
against inadvertent operation. 
t. Loss of control circuit power should not result in the loss of 
capability to determine the status of the payload. 
u. Operating range and performance limits for experiments should 
be specified in the design. 
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3.4.1.5 Control Circuits  (continued) 
v. Cleanliness level and contamination control requirements of 
electrical/electronics should be specified in t h e  design. 
w. Automatic relays in sa fe ty  cri t ical  c i rcui ts  for switching t o  
backup power should respond also t o  t h e  gradual loss of primary power. 
3.4.1.6 Power Systems 
a. Capability should be  provided t o  remove electrical  power f rom 
each experiment in terface  without af fect ing t h e  operation of o ther  
experiments o r  systems t o  permit  load selection during emergency 
conditions. 
b. The power sys tem overload protective devices should also pro- 
, t e c t  the  ground support equipment against damage resulting f rom a 
spacecra f t  power system malfunction. 
c. Redundant power distribution buses should not be routed through 
t h e  same connector as a single fai lure may cause a loss of both buses. 
I d. Barrier isolation and warning markings should be  provided for 
power sources. 
I e. A power removal interlock should be provided which is ac t iva ted  
by removal of access panels or covers  during servicing. 
f. Tes t  points should be  provided for sa fe  s t a tus  monitoring. 
I g. All external pa r t s  of t h e  R F  equipment, excluding t h e  driven 
e lements  of t h e  antenna and transmission lines, should be  a t  ground potential 
a t  all t imes  t o  prevent undesired radiation and injury t o  operating personnel 
f rom accumulated charges, accidental  connections, and s t ray potentials. 
h. Direct  current  returns should not be  disconnected or  isolated 
f rom t h e  single point ground connection t o  t h e  spacecraf t  s t ructure  during 
any mode of system, experiment,  or  o ther  payload operation a s  voltage 
transients, EMI, and electrical  shock a r e  a few of t h e  hazards which could 
occur. 
i. Module, experiment, and other  payload cases  should be electri-  
cally grounded so tha t  a faul t  current  (based on maximum short  circuit  
cu r ren t  t h a t  may result from availabte power wi"rhin individual equipment) 
may be safely returned t o  t h e  spacecraf t  single point ground, 
3.4.1.6 Power Systems (continued) 
Electrical Shock j. Negative control or switching in the power return leads of a 
component should not be used unless the positive lead is switched simulta- 
neously. An application of this would be reversal of a motor. 
k. Power and signal returns for fl ight systems, experiments, or 
other payloads should be isolated from the chassis and should be routed 
through connectors or terminals to a single point ground termination for 
interface with the spacecraft single point grounding system. 
I. To reduce EM1 problems caused by improper or inadequate 
grounding, the following practices are recommended: 
( I  ) Bare metal mating surfaces should be cleaned. 
( 2 )  Mating surfaces should be welded when possible; when not, 
bonding straps should be used to bridge between adjacent pieces of metal. 
(3) Where protective films or coatings are required, it should 
be ensured that the material is a good conductor. 
(4) The fastening method should be designed to exert sufficient 
pressure to hold the surfaces in contact in the presence of deforming 
stresses, shock, and vibrations associated with the equipment and i t s  
environment. 
(5) I f  the surfaces are not inert in their storage and operating 
environments, surface protection should be provided according to paragraph 
(3) preceding or other suitable measures should be taken to ensure the main- 
tenance of the bond for the service l i fe of the equipment. 
( 6 )  Paint should not be used to establish an electrical or RF 
(7 )  Threads of screws or bolts should not be used to establish 
(8) Ohmmeters should not be used to evaluate RF bonds or RF 
( 9 )  KF gaskets should be compressed. 
(10) A uniform grounding philosophy should be ensured. 
( I  I ) Ground loops, impedance coupling and floating grounds 
should be checked. 
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3.4.1.6 Power Systems (continued) 
(12) Good electrical bonding practices for ground terminations 
should be ensured. 
m. Plug-in tools for use in spaceflight should be compatible with the 
spacecraft electrical system single point ground (see ICD for details). 
A l l  
Corrosion, 
Electrical Shock 
Al l  
Al l  
Al l  
A l l  
Al l  
a. Conformal coatings which place stress on glass diodes should not 
be used. In other applications, the thickness of conformal coating should be 
closely controlled to prevent stress on components resulting from shrinkage. 
I 
b. Positive provisions should be specified in the design to preclude 
seepage of conformal coatings into electrical interfaces in stud-mounted 
semiconductor installations.. 
c. Circuit boards, terminal boards, switches, relays, and similar 
components should be potted, sealed, or similarly protected against the 
effects of liquid leakage or condensation and against shorting by materials 
floating in zerogravity environment. I i 
d. Electrolytic capacitors such as tantalum wet slug or aluminum/ 
paper should not be used in timing circuits or circuits where capacitance 
must remain stable with changing voltage. 
e. Electronic parts and leads should be configured to provide for 
relief of strain due to thermal expansion and contraction. 
f. . Point-contact, grown-junction or al loy-junction semiconductors 
should not be used. In general, semiconductors made prior to 1962 are of 
poor reliability because of physical internal construction, low temperature 
tolerance, high leakage currents, etc. I f  it is necessary to use any semi- 
conductors of this vintage, it should be demonstrated that crew safety wil l 
not be adversely affected by failure of these components. 
g. Component selection should be such that the setting, position, or 
adjustment of controls wil l  not be affected by shock, vibration, or accel- 
erat ion resulting from launch, separation, or on-orbit operations. 
h. Equipment requiring adjustment during operation should have 
external adjustment provisions. 
i. When ultrasonic vibration is  used for cleaning sensitive elec- 
tronic assemblies, consideration should be given to potential adverse effects. 
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1 3.4.1.7 Parts/Components/Elements (continued) 
j. Polyurethane conformal coatings containing solvents which 
dissolve polystyrene should not be used on circuit boards containing poly- 
styrene components. A solvent compatibility check should also be conducted 
to determine compatibility with the printed circuit board materials. 
k. Positive mechanical means should be specified in the design to 
ensure adequate contact pressure is maintained at stud-moun ted semi- 
conductor connections. 
I. CMOS (complementary metal oxide semiconductor) and other 
static sensitive circuit components should be avoided in safety critical 
circuits where static discharge, including lightning, i s  unavoidable. Such 
lightning conditions are common at KSC, and previous programs such as 
Viking have experienced a high mortality rate of installed and operating 
CMOS components because of lightning striking in the vicinity of buildings 
where the components were in operation. 
All  
Electrical Shock, 
Fire, 
Temperature 
Extremes 
Contamination 
m. Terminal lugs and insulated washers used with stud-mounted 
semiconductors should have sufficient matching surface area to ensure that 
the terminal lug will remain insulated from the mounting structure. 
Contamination 
Collision, Injury 
Temperature 
Extremes 
n. When electronic components which are sensitive to static 
discharge are prepared for shipment or environmental protection, caution 
should be used to avoid material which will induce static electricity. 
o. Previous experience has shown that sheeting and bagging 
materials used for protecting flight hardware are susceptible to outgassing 
of plasficisers at near room ambient conditions. A thorough understanding 
of the materials used will avoid the undesirable effect of outgassing. 
p. Care should be used in selecting an inert atmosphere for shipping 
and storing electronic components. Certain items such as video tubes will 
absorb helium through the vacuum seal and then not operate when they are 
to be depended upon. 
1 3.4.1.8 General 
When payloads require the use of magnets, the magnetic strength should be 
investigated for compatibility with orbiter/ payload systems. 
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Flight Operations 
Electrical  Shock 
Explosion, lnjury 
a. Connectors which a r e  scheduled t o  be  mated or  demated  by t h e  
c rew during normal in-flight operations should have power removed a t  t h e  
circuit  breaker panel or switch, and power removal should be  verified by 
positive means prior t o  demating or  mating. 
Electrical  Shock, 
Collision, 
Explosion 
Electrical  Shock I d. Solar panel connectors should not be mated  or demated until it is Explosion verified the re  is no load connected. 
b. Circuit  breakers for  a part icular sys tem should not be  engaged 
until t h e  system is needed o r  a s  late as possible. This reduces t h e  possibility 
of short  circuits, crew shock, inadvertent  actuation,  etc. 
Electrical  Shock, 
Injury 
1 3.4.3 Ground Operat  ions 
c. Connection and disconnection of solar panel connectors should 
not be  done when panels a r e  illuminated. Solar intensities can genera te  a 
high current level, and sparking and arcing could occur. 
Electrical  Shock I b. Solar panel connectors should not be mated  or demated unless it Explosion is verified the re  is no load connected. 
Electrical  Shock, 
Explosion 
All 
a. Connection and disconnection of solar panel connectors should 
not be done when panels a r e  illuminated. Some levels of art if icial  illumi- 
nation can cause  arcing at t h e  connector pins. 
c. Contemporary space a g e  e lect ronic  circuitry is very susceptible 
t o  burnout or  circuit  degradation f rom exposure t o  small e lec t ros ta t i c  
charges. These a r e  easily built up on plastics, insulation, clothing, paper, 
containers, packing material ,  etc. The e f f e c t  is fur ther  aggrevated by low 
humidity. Caution is necessary t o  prevent discharge of any of these  sources 
SECTION 
NUMBER 
INDEX 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL GUIDELINES 
SUBSYSTEM HAZARDS 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
Design 
General 
Thermal Insulation 
Heaters 
Thermal Control 
Flight Operations 
None 
Ground Operations 
3-5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
.- The environmen"r1 control consists of thermal insulation, heaters, 
furnaces, coolant loops, auPomclPic and manual temperature controls, and csslinq fans as needed 
for payidad thermal &ohtrol, It does not include the l i fe  support and waste maGgement system 
for "re habitable areas on the orbiter. 
The environmental control system will interface with pressure systems and electrical sub- 
systems when payloads require coolant loops, heat exchangers, refrigerants and their related 
controls. The environmental control system also interfaces directly with payload structures as 
the payload should not transfer heat into the orbiter structure. Payload equipment generating 
heat should also be insulated to prevent overheating of adjacent components and payload 
structures. Thermal measurement sensors may be necessary to  alert the crew of impending 
overtemperature conditions and the need for corrective action. 
Associated Hazards.- The hazards associated with the environmental control are contamination, 
corrosion, fire, illness, injury, and temperature extremes. Insulating materials which shed 
particles can cause contamination problems in equipment in zerogravity and wil l  contaminate 
the atmosphere in habitable areas. Leaks of toxic refrigerants into habitable areas can 
contaminate the atmosphere and lead t o  crew illness. Materials susceptible to moisture and 
high humidity may corrode, grow fungus, or cause electrical problems progressing to  equipment 
failures and crew hazards. Inadequate or lack of remote control capability of heaters can lead 
to fires or temperature extremes and failures of essential equipment. Furnaces must be 
adequately shielded to  protect personnel from burns and they should contain adequate controls 
for venting and emergency shutdown. Thermal insulation should be provided to  protect orbiter 
structure from temperature extremes caused by heat transfer from heat generating sources, 
This section includes guidelines for selection and use of materials or components in the use 
environment where high humidity, moisture, vibration, and shock wil l be encountered. Other 
sections which should be reviewed for additional information are sections 3.2, CAUTION AND 
WARNING, 3.1 I, PRESSURE SYSTEMS, and 3.15, STRUCTURES. 
GUIDELINES 
Contaminat ion, 
ll lness 
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Collision 
Design 
1 3.5.1.1 General 
a. Operating equipment such as pumps, fans, motors, gearing, 
actuators, and electrical components should not produce noise levels in 
habitable areas causing crew annoyance and discomfort. Excessive noise 
levels contribute to crew error or can cause permanent hearing loss. The 
maximum allowable noise levels of experiments should not exceed the noise 
criteria standards contained in "ManlSystem Design Criteria for Manned 
Orbiting Payloads" (MSFC-STD-5 12). 
b. Materials should be selected which are not nutrients for fungus. 
The Kennedy Space Center has a natural environment with favorable con- 
ditions for moisture and fungus growth. Experiments in habitable areas 
should not provide a source of fungi contamination. Materials which are 
nutrients to fungus should be hermetically sealed or treated to render the 
exposed surfaces fungus resistant. 
c. Materials sensitive to moisture which can induce corrosion or 
electrical problems should have adequate protective coatings. 
d. Payload equipment should b e  designed to withstand the use 
environment and should be subjected to simulated environmental tests. 
Shock mounts and vibration isolators should be provided as necessary. 1 3.5.1.2 Thermal Insulation I 
Temperature 
Extremes 
Temperature 
Extremes 
Temperature 
Extremes 
Contamination 
a. Thermal insulation may need to be provided on payload/orbiter 
physical interfaces to minimize heat transfer to orbiter structure. In areas 
where thermal insulation i s  necessary, thermal coating insulation should be 
used to 'minimize heat transfer. 
b. Insulation should be used on pallets to minimize heat transfer to 
the structure. This should be designed for ease of installation and removal 
to provide thermal control for the attached experiments. 
c. lnsulation should be used to protect flammable fluids from heat 
sources. They should also be used in areas where thermal conditions can 
heat surfaces to which the crew wil I be exposed or which provide sources of 
ignition. 
d. Materials selected for use as thermal insulation should not react 
chemically with fluids. They should be selected on the basis of their 
nonabsorbent, nonflammable, and nonshedding characteristics. 
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Heaters 
I Temperature Extremes, a. In equipment requiring heaters, consideration should be given to use of redundant control circuitry to prevent overtemperature. 
Temperature 
Extremes 
b. The design of equipment requiring automatic heater control 
should contain provisions for automatic shutoff for off-nominal high 
temperature conditions. I 
Temperature 
Extremes, Fire 
c. Temperature sensors should be provided as necessary to indicate / 
overtemperature conditions or when safe limits are exceeded. 
shutoff devices should be provided to shut off the input energy s o u ~ d m a t i c  1 
I 
Fire, 
Contamination, 
Temperature 
Extremes 
d. Equipment such as furnaces which must operate at high tempera- 
tures in the presence of flammable materials should be provided with 
purging and fire suppression devices. Purging provisions should vent 
combustion products and gases outside the habitable area. 
Fire, 
Temperature 
Extremes, 
Illness 
1 3.5.1.4 Thermal Control 
e, Incubators used for bacterial studies should be designed with the 
means to remove the power when temperature limits are exceeded. 
Mechanical or procedural controls should be available to prevent inadvertent I 
release of bacteria. I 
Contamination, 
I I I ness 
f. Materials selected for use in heaters, furnaces, and other 
thermal equipment should not emit toxic fumes or foul odors into the 
habitable area. 
Injury, 
Temperature 
Extremes 
a. In designing experiments to be installed in habitable areas for 
crew operations, the touch temperature of front panels and controls should 
not exceed 4 5 ' ~  ( I  13'~). 
Fire, 
Contamination 
b. In designing thermal controls using coolant loops, refrigerants 
should be selected which are nontoxic and nonflammable. Coolants should 
be selected for thermal and physical characteristics over the entire 
operating range and should be compatible with the metals and materials of 
heat exchangers, piping and pumps. 
Temperature 
Extremes 
c. Heat sensitive components should not be located in high tem- 
perature areas or adjacent to equipment radiating heat. 
Fire, Injury d. When fans are used to circulate coolant air, manual controls 
should be included to deenergize the fan for servicing and also for fire 
control. 
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Injury 
Injury, Fire 
Injury, 
Temperature 
Extremes 
Contamination 
Temperature 
Extremes, 
Contamination 
Temperature 
Extremes, 
Contamination 
Contamination 
GUIDELINES 
1 3.5.1.4 Thermal Control (continued) 
e. Equipment exposed to space environments in sealed canisters 
which will be retrieved should labeled with appropriate caution and warning. 
f. Cooling ducts, fans, cold plates or coolant loops should be 
located to provide uniform and adequate cooling without creating "hot spots" 
which can lead to fire hazards or potential crew injuries from burns. 
g. Debris guards, screens, f i I ters, and similar protective devices 
similar components to prevent clogging of these devices. 
i 
should be located at inlets to ducts, mounted fans, coolant pumps, and other 1 
h. Heat exchangers should be located outside habitable areas to 
minimize heat loads and to eliminate one source of potentially hazardous 
leakage of fluids. 
i. To minimize leakage, the use of B-nuts in fluid lines of thermal 
control equipment should be avoided. Maximum use of brazed or welded 
joints is preferred. 
j. Coolant loop connect and disconnect fittings should be keyed and 1 
marked to remove the possibility of incorrect line connect ions. 
Flight Operations 
None 
3.5.3 Ground Operations 
SECTION 
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Tools 
Flight Operations 
None 
Ground Operations 
None 
Al l  
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7 
3.6 I--1UMAN FACTORS 
.- Human factors  include those potential l y hazardous interfaces between 
man and machine. Human capabilities and limitations a r e  prime safe ty  considerations when 
evaluating the  design sa fe ty  of hardware which requires human operation or handling. Elements  
of payload equipment which require direct  human interfaces  a r e  represented by controls 
(switches, breakers, levers, knobs, etc.), displays (gages, meters ,  ca thode ray tubes, etc.), and 
equipment requiring ground and flight crew operations for maintenance, servicing, repair  o r  
replacement,  and normal operations. 
The human capabil i t ies and limitations which a r e  important f ac to rs  t o  be  considered in t h e  
design of s a f e  equipment involve t h e  senses of sight, hearing, and touch. Others  deal with 
human character is t ics  such as physical strength,  reach limits, manual dexterity, and react ion 
time. 
The environments in which human beings a r e  expected t o  opera te  must be considered for f a c t o r s  
which a f f e c t  human safety.  For example, adequate  lighting must be  provided for ef f ic ient  
visual perception. Noise levels must be minimized since high noise levels can reduce c r e w  
efficiency, can contr ibute  t o  performance errors, and can even cause  permanent loss of hearing. 
High frequency low amplitude vibration is of ten detrimental  t o  t h e  performance of mental  and 
physical tasks. The  unique e f fec t s  of weightlessness must always be considered during on-orbit 
operations. Various types of harmful radiation sources a lso  a f f e c t  human safety. Radiation 
sa fe ty  guidelines a r e  covered in detail in section 3.14 of th is  document. 
Associated Hazards.- The basic hazards associated with t h e  human interfaces with hardware  
involve c rew injury or  illness from electrical  shock, burns f rom con tac t  with exposed high 
t empera tu re  components, c u t s  and bruises from con tac t  with sharp edges or  moving. parts ,  and 
ingestion of small loose objects or space debris. Other  basic hazards such a s  fire, explosion, o r  
contamination c a n  b e  caused by human error  o r  by inadequate hardware design o r  operations 
which contr ibute  t o  human error. 
To minimize t h e  e f f e c t s  of these  human interface  hazards, t h e  following contributors t o  human 
e r ro r  must be  considered in t h e  design and operation of payload elements: 
a. Excessive physical demands. 
b. Unnecessary distractions. 
c. Inadequate or  unnecessary display of information. 
d. Difficult,  complicated, and dangerous tasks. 
e. Harsh o r  unpleasant working environment. 
The guidelines contained in this section outl ine various methods t o  avoid these  human interface  
type  hazards. They a r e  organized by payload hardware e lements  which a r e  directly operated,  
handled, or  in terfaced by t h e  crewmen. For fur ther  information regarding human capabil i t ies 
and their  influence on design safety,  reference should be made  t o  "Man/System Design Cr i t e r i a  
fo r  Manned Operating Payloads" (MSFC-STD-5 12) and "Human Engineering Guide for  Equipment 
Designers," Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 54-8698. 
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GUIDELINES 
I Design I 1 3 * 6 * 1 . 1  Controls and Displays 
Temperature  
Extremes 
Electrical  Shocl 
a. It is preferable not t o  use glass or  o ther  shat terable  mater ia ls  on 
manned spacecraft .  If these  materials  must be used in applications such as 
gages, indicator faces,  ca thode ray tubes, etc.,  they should be  covered with 
solid materials  such a s  Lexan polycarbonate t o  protect  t h e  crew f r o m  broken 
particles. 
b. Equipment which could cause  burns by inadvertent  personnel 
contact  should b e  shielded, isolated, oriented away f rom personnel, or 
labeled t o  warn them of t h e  danger. The continuous touch t e m p e r a t ~ r e ~ o f  
fro$ panels and controls requiring manual operation should not exceed 45 C 
(1 13 F). Equipment which may retain h e a t  in excess of this limit should not  
be  located where personnel con tac t  is possible or should be labeled t o  warn 
t h e  crew of this hazard. 
c. Electrical and electronic components located within consoles, 
panels, or similar enclosures containing or  exposed t o  f lammable vapors or  
liquids should be explosion proof. If any such flammable material  is allowed 
onboard t h e  manned spacecraft ,  it should be  contained in nonflammable 
equipment enclosures. 
d. Conductive surfaces of equipment touched by the  c rew (knobs, 
handles, levers, switches, panels, etc.) should be grounded and insulated t o  
preclude personnel shock or  burn. Also, such equipment should not be 
located close t o  high voltages. 
e. Viewfinders and similar crew sighting equipment should 
incorporate f i l ters or automat ic  aper tu re  controls t o  limit t h e  amount  and 
type of light seen by t h e  crewmen t o  avoid retinal damage. 
f .  Adequate lighting is essential for  t h e  eff ic ient  visual 
presentation of information and t o  ensure s a f e  task performance by c rew 
personnel. MSFC-STD-5 12 represents t h e  prime source of design and sa fe ty  
c r i t e r i a  for t h e  proper illumination of equipment and areas. 
g. Noise can cause  annoyance and discomfort, can reduce t h e  
efficiency of crew performance,  can contribute t o  c rew error,  and can  even 
cause  permanent hearing loss. The maximum allowable noise level of 
experiments and payload e lements  should not exceed t h e  noise c r i t e r i a  
standards contained in MSFC-STD-5 12. 
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ASSOCIATED 
HAZARD GUIDELINES 
Injuryll l lness 
All 
All 
All 
All 
3.6.1.1 ---- Controls and Displays (continued) 
h. Controls, indicators, and displays (especially emergency or  
contingency type controls for  safing, alarm, or correct ive  action) should be  
c lear ly  marked and labeled and should be readily accessible t o  operat ing 
1 personnel t o  indicate t h e  sys tem function for each switch position or  
I Operation* 
i. Any control function which could cause  personnel injury if I operated at t h e  wrong t i m e  should be identified in t h e  design, and 1 precautions should be taken t o  minimize this type  hazard. 
j. Identical controls, such a s  switches located on t h e  same panel, , should be  distinctly identified or specifically marked and should not be  located near each other  when these  controls perform different functions and 
improper switch selection could result  in a hazardous situation. 
k. Control switches requiring coverguards should have t h e  
coverguard designed or switch nomenclature located so t h a t  t h e  position of 
t h e  switch can be determined without moving t h e  coverguard. 
1. The use of switches which do not indicate their  on-off positions 
should be  avoided. An example of this type switch includes a self-latching 
function switch, such a s  a pushbutton switch, which may be operated without 
indicating t h e  switch position during t h e  power-off phase. Another type t o  
b e  avoided is a spring-loaded-to-center switch which controls latching 
relays. 
m. Payload controls which a r e  cri t ical  t o  crew or shut t le  sa fe ty  
should be shielded, guarded, or located s o  they cannot be  accidentally struck 
o r  moved. 
n. The size, shape, spacing, and location of control switches, 
handles, levers, etc., should a1 low for human capabilities and limitations 
when operating these devices. For example, if a crewman is wearing a 
spacesuit  and gloves a t  t h e  t ime, allowances should be made for his 
res t r ic ted movements and limited dexteri ty in manipulating control devices. 
o. The setting, position or  adjustment of controls should not be  
a f fec ted  by shock, vibration, or acceleration resulting f rom space vehicle 
launch, docking operations, deployment handling or  deorbi ting and landing. 
Methods t o  accomplish this could include t h e  use of detents,  keyed shafts ,  
locking devices, tension springs and switch guards. 
p. Handles, knobs, and levers on rotary controls should be keyed or  
shaped t o  prevent turning on their  shafts. Also each rotary control assembly 
should be keyed or pinned t o  i t s  mounting surface  t o  prevent simultaneous 
rotation of t h e  handle, shaft ,  and control assembly. 
GUIDELINES 
Controls and Displays (continued) 
q. Handles, knobs, latches, levers, etc., requiring alignment o r  
adjustment should have alignment indices or visible markings t o  ensure  
proper alignment and adjustment including realignment in flight. The 
alignment markings should be  visible without removal of any component. 
r. Washers or  spacers  used in conjunction with knobs, handles, 
locking pins, and similar devices should be designed t o  prevent unintentional 
removal. The presence of debris in zerogravity can c r e a t e  a hazard ranging 
f rom minor irr i tat ion t o  a crewman t o  failure of an  orbiter  sys tem function 
due t o  jamming or  in terference with i t s  component parts  (ingestion into 
rota t ing machinery). 
s. Redundant au tomat ic  shutoff devices should be  provided for 
equipment where t h e  buildup of energy could result in a catas t rophic  
situation. Examples of such equipment a r e  turbines which could run away, 
ovens, or similar environmental chambers incorporating heating e lements  
and pressurization systems. 
t.  As a design goal, d i rect  pressure readout gages should not be 
used. A rupture or fai lure of t h e  gage or feedlines would release t h e  
measured fluid or  gas  into t h e  a r e a  under full-line pressure, and  t h e  
operating personnel could sustain injury f rom flying objects released f rom 
t h e  failed gage. Pressure transducers a r e  an  excel lent replacement for 
d i rec t  readout gages. 
u. If t h e  use of d i rect  pressure readout gages is unavoidable, these  
gages should incorporate proper sized blowout plugs. The blowout plug 
should be positioned so  t h a t  t h e  direction of discharge will not injure 
personnel or damage adjacent equipment. To prevent contamination of t h e  
a rea ,  a pressure relief valve, instead of t h e  blowout plug, could be installed 
a t  t h e  gage and an overboard drain line connected to  t h e  relief valve. Also, 
t h e  panel p la te  or bracket used t o  mount d i rec t  pressure readout gages 
should not in terfere  with t h e  operation of the  blowout plug. 
Controls and Displays (continued) 
w. Pressure gages, t empera tu re  gages, and simi lar readout devices 
should indicate normal system operating conditions in t h e  cen te r  50 percent  
of t h e  total  range of t h e  g a g e  or  device. 
x. System indicators used t o  monitor s t a tus  should indicate t h e  
actual  system response ra ther  than t h e  initiation of t h e  command or t h e  
application of power. An example  of this could be  t h e  indication of actual  
extension of an antenna ra the r  than just t h e  command t o  extend. 
y. The identification and marking of payload components should 
include color coding t o  indicate marginal or  hazardous range limits. 
Accepted orbiter  standards for  color coding a r e  MIL-STD-1247B for flight 
equipment, MIL-STD-IOIB for ground equipment, and MIL-STD-1472 fo r  
orbiter  cabin equipment. 
z. To assist the  operating personnel in cor rec t  interpretation of 
information, all control and display nomenclature should use standardized 
words, abbreviations, symbols, and acronyms which a r e  commonly 
understood throughout t h e  Space Shutt le Program. 
aa. Containers such a s  film containers which may be pressurized 
(usually with inert gas) should have a positive pressure indicating device. 
Opening containers which a r e  under positive pressure could result in injury 
f rom flying covers or doors. Also, a device should be  provided t o  sense 
leakage of an appreciable amount of inert  gas  into an  inhabited a r e a  t o  a v e r t  
possible hypoxia problems. 
bb. Caution and warning placards, labels, decals, and t ape  should b e  
properly positioned, plainly visible, and should display t h e  necessary 
information t o  protect  t h e  c rew from impending hazardous situations. The 
following caution and warning aids should be  considered: 
(1) Labels and placards should be plainly visible under both 
light and dark conditions. 
(2) Caution and warning indicator lights should be  located t o  
be  readily visible t o  crew members  at  their  stations. 
(3) Alarms should be  located so they can be heard directly by 
t h e  crewmen. 
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1 3.6.1.1 Controls and Displays (continued) 
(4)  Examples of parameters and elements on which placards or 
labels are necessary include high voltage sources, rotating machinery, 
pressurized containers, explosives, flammable materials, critical operations 
which should or should not be performed, load limits, etc. 1 3.6.1.2 Other Equipment Interfaces 
Injury/II Iness 
Contamination 
Fire 
Injury/ll lness 
a. The use of ductile materials, energy absorbing devices, shields, 
rounded corners, and flush mounted features is recommended to eliminate or 
prevent accidental contact with sharp surfaces or protrusions. Sharp 
surfaces or protrusions include edges, crevices, points, burrs, wire ends, 
screw heads, corners, brackets, rivets, braided cable, cable swages, cable 
strands, clamps, pins, latches, lap joints, bolt ends, lock nuts, etc., which i f  
contacted, could injure the crew. Areas where exposed surfaces or 
protrusions can be especially hazardous are the inhabited areas of the space 
vehicle, transfer tunnels, hatchways, and the areas of the payload bay when 
extravehicular activities will be performed. 
b. I f  protruding equipment such as hoses, wave guides, cables, 
brackets, etc., cannot be eliminated, it should be made to be removable 
during service or maintenance functions. 
c. When not in use or during temporary removal, loose objects such 
as caps, screws, access doors, tools, locking pins, knobs, handles, lens covers, 
and similar devices should be contained or restrained. It is also 
recommended that these items be tethered or held captive to the equipment 
with which they are used. 
d. Chains, beaded links or similarly segmented devices are not 
recommended for use as tethers or restraints since they add to the potential 
for debris and loose objects. 
e. Drawers should be equipped with restraining devices and stops to 
prevent accidental opening or removal of the drawer. 
f. As a fire suppression measure, payload equipment which is to be 
installed in manned compartments should be accessible to manual f i re 
extinguishers. 
g. Openings (slotted or otherwise) in cabinets, covers, and similar 
enclosures through which f ire extinguisher nozzles, levers, shafts, and other 
controls operate should be provided with nonflammable protective covers, 
boots, or sliding plates to prevent injury or equipment damage resulting from 
inadvertent insertion or entry of foreign objects. I f  ventilation holes are 
used in equipment housing covers, they should be screened or caged to 
preclude inadvertent insertion of any object which might touch high voltage 
sources or moving parts. 
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HUMAN FACTORS 
I 1 3.6.1.2 Other Equipment Interfaces (continued) 
Injury/lllness h. Handles, controls, and fasteners for mechanisms such as hatches, 
access doors, folding platforms, or legs should be designed with sufficient 
clearances to prevent injury to fingers and hands. Allowances should be 
made for a crewman wearing gloves or a spacesuit -(see MSFC-STD-5 12). 
Injury/ll lness i. Wherever possible, equipment requiring adjustment during i t s  
operation should have external adjustment provisions. 
Electrical Shock j. The sizes and shapes of equipment enclosing covers or cases 
should be carefully considered to preclude damage to wiring and other 
components when the cases are removed or replaced. Wire damage could 
result in short circuits and possible shock hazards to the crew. 
Electrical Shock k. Racks, chassis, and compartments which contain exposed termi- 
nals and similar components should be clearly marked or placarded to 
indicate the highest operating voltage potential present. 
Contaminat ion I. Any equipment which supplies or releases a gas which can be 
inhaled should include a f i l ter as the last component in the line. The 
breathable atmosphere should be free from particulate matter to preclude 
possible ingestion of such matter. 
Injury/lllness m. Alignment guide pins or slides should be located on panel, 
drawer, and chassis subassemblies to prevent their contact with exposed 
terminals during instal lation and removal operations. 
Injury/ll lness n. The use of friction-type locking pins should be avoided in 
applications where repeated cycling could degrade their locking capabilities. 
Injury/lllness 0.. Moving parts such as fans, belt drives, turbine wheels and similar 
components that could cause personnel injury or equipment damage due to 
inadvertent contact or entrapment of floating objects should be provided 
with guards or other protective devices. 
Injury/lllness p. Pressure vessels, pressure lines and other hazardous equipment or 
components should be protected from damage by dropped tools, sl ipping 
wrenches, dril Is, or over length bolts and screws. 
Injury/ll lness q. Installed assemblies (black boxes, etc.) should be provided with 
debris shields to prevent entrapment of small pieces of equipment or debris 
behind the assemblies. 
lnjury/ll lness r. Guards or covers should be provided over all termination points 
where voltage potentials exist in excess of 35 volts rms or dc with respect to 
ground i f  access is possible with voltage applied. 
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Tools 
Injury/ll lness a. Payload servicing, maintenance,  or  repair tools should mee t  t h e  
following cr i ter ia  t o  minimize t h e  possibility of crew injury o r  adjacent 
equipment damage. 
( I )  Common commercial  tools should be used whenever pos- 
sible. Complex tools should be avoided. It is an  STS design goal t o  provide 
commonality of tools for all elements. 
(2 )  Temporary res t ra ints  should be  used for individual tools t o  
prevent misplacement or loss in a weightless environment. Only essential 
tool accessories should be  specified s ince  i tems such a s  ra tchets ,  extensions, 
pins, etc., a r e  easily lost. 
(3) The torque values for  all threaded fas teners  and fi t t ings 
should be specified in t h e  design, and assembly, installation, and test 
personnel should be  well trained t o  follow these  requirements. 
(4) For spares replacement and contingency mainTenance, 
s torage bags, restraining straps, instructional decals, tape,  spa re  nuts and 
bolts, fasteners,  sealants, etc.,  should b e  provided. 
I I 3'6'2 Flight Operations I None 1 3.6.3 Ground Operations 
None 
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3.7 HYDRAULICS 
System Description.- Hydraulic systems consist primarily of pumps, actuators,  reservoirs, 
control valves, f i l ters,  lines, connectors, and hydraulic fluid. The sa fe ty  guide1 ines in th is  
section cover generally only these component types  which a r e  unique t o  hydraulic systems. 
The choice  of hydraulic fluid for a part icular application should be  carefully made s ince  it will 
influence the  design and operational character is t ics  of t h e  system which in turn will a f f e c t  
sys tem safety. For example, some fluids a r e  f i r e  resistant  while o thers  a r e  not. Some fluids 
work well at low temperatures  but not at e levated temperatures.  Others  may have toxic or 
corrosive properties. These and other  properties of various hydraulic fluids a r e  shown in Table 
3.7-1. These character is t ics  may be useful t o  t h e  payload designer in selection of hydraulic 
fluids. 
Associated Hazards.- The primary hazards associated with hydraulic systems involve t h e  
unplanned release of pressurized fluids by leakage or rupture and by fa i lure ,  or inadvertent  
response t o  commands due t o  system deficiencies o r  malfunctions. Misoperation during test and 
checkout or maintenance,  due t o  operator er ror  or  inadequate procedures, can also be hazardous 
and can result in injury t o  personnel or damage t o  equipment. 
Leakage o r  rupture of a hydraulic sys tem may init iate a chain of events  resulting in loss of a 
cri t ical  control function such as may be  required t o  r e t r a c t  a payload e lement  back into t h e  
orbi ter  payload bay. It could result in a f i re  if t h e  leaking or  lost fluid is flammable and 
con tac t s  an  ignition source in t h e  sensible atmosphere. If a system bursts or an explosion 
occurs, metal  f ragments  may s t r ike  and injure crewmen o r  may damage a cri t ical  STS 
component which may compound the  failure. The release of hydraulic fluid may result  in 
e lect r ica l  malfunctions due t o  shorting of con tac t s  o r  connectors. The fluid may have toxic 
properties and a f f e c t  exposed personnel t o  respiratory, eye, or skin irritation, or  burns. 
Internal fai lure of a hydraulic system may be  caused by unchecked contamination because of 
clogged or  mislocated filters. Bubbles may fo rm in t h e  fluid lines because of poor sealing, or  
components may seize. The results of these  malfunctions may cause  e r r a t i c  response of servo 
devices o r  control valves which could fu r the r  result in system failure t o  perform some cri t ical  
function. 
The following guidelines indicate how such hydraulic system hazards may be  eliminated o r  
reduced t o  acceptable  levels. 
The design, tes t ,  and operational requirements of hydraulic systems, and the  various properties 
and qualities of hydraulic fluids a r e  covered in detail by MIL-H-5440F. The orbiter  baseline 
hydraulic fluid specified in MIL-H-83282A is also recommended for use on payload applications. 
For  more  complete  guideline coverage, reference should be made  t o  section 3.11, PRESSURE 
SYSTEMS, which covers all generic-type sa fe ty  guidelines relat ive t o  any pressurized system. 
TABLE 3,7-1, - HYDRAULlC FLUID CHARACTERISTICS 
(FROM AFSC DH1-6 DESIGN NOTE 4C2)  
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Contamination, 
Corrosion 
Fire, 
Explosion 
Fire, 
Explosion, 
Contamination 
Fire, 
Explosion, 
3.7.1 Design 
3.7.1.1 General 
a. Hydraulics system components should operate safely when 
subjected to  the simultaneous extremes of temperature, pressure, vibration 
shock loading, and other environmental conditions which wi l l  be experienced 
during all phases of an operational mission. 
b. Hydraulic systems should be integrated wi th other systems to  
minimize hazards caused by proximity to  combustible gases, heat sources, 
electrical equipment, etc. A single failure in any such adjacent system 
should not cause a hydraulic system fire. 
c. Redundant hydraulic components or subsystems should be physi- 
cally separated for maximum safety against damage from fire, rupture, 
shock, or any hazard which could af fect  both segments. 
d. Hydraulic lines, drains, and vents should be separated from other 
high energy sources including heat, gases, electrical current, and chemicals. 
e. The choice of which hydraulic f luid to  use in a particular 
hydraulic system wil l  affect all elements of design and can be highly 
important from a safety standpoint. The orbiter baseline hydraulic f luid is 
specified by MIL-H-83282A, and the various design and operating require- 
ments for hydraulic fluids are specified in MIL-H-5440F. The following 
hydraulic f luid characteristics should be considered t o  assure compatibility 
with system design and operations: 
( I  ) F i re resistance. 
(2) Compatibility with seals, gaskets, fittings, hoses, etc. 
(3) Temperature range for effective operation. 
(4) Lubricating compatibility with moving parts. 
(5) Corrosive properties. 
(6) Stability. 
f. Parts of a hydraulic system or attached subsystems that operate 
on pressures lower than the ful l  system pressure should withstand ful l  system 
pressure. If this is not practical, relief valves should be added for protection 
of such components. 
g. Peak pressures (surges, spikes, ripples) should not be allowed to 
exceed 135 percent of the main system's operating pressure (unless program 
requirements specify otherwise). 
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Fire  will have on the  selection of critical components such a s  hydraulic fluid, 
pressurizing gas if used, oil coolers, gaskets, seals, valves, and servos. 
Embrittlement of seals, errat ic  valve and servo operation and deterioration 
of t he  hydraulic fluid are  examples of hazardous interactions caused by 
excessive temperatures. 
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i. Hydraulic equipment or lines should not be located within 
inhabited areas  of the  space vehicle. 
j. Hydraulic system components and lines should be electrically 
bonded t o  metallic structure. 
1 3.7.1.2 Pumps and Actuators 
a. Hydraulic pumps should be protected from damage by the use of 
overload devices, bypass relief devices, vibration sensitive cutoff switches, 
pump suction pressure interlocks, and overload controls. 
b. Other safety oriented features which should be considered t o  
prevent damage t o  hydraulic pumps with consequent danger t o  the  crew or 
STS elements include: 
(I)  Use of adequately sized bearings t o  withstand axial and 
side loading. 
(2) Protection of pump from contamination by installation of 
correctly sized filter elements. 
(3) Protection of the  pump from cavitation because of low 
fluid levels or leakage. 
c. Design of lock valves used on hydraulic actuating cylinders 
should allow for fluid expansion throughout the anticipated temperature 
range. 
1 3.7.1.3 Tubing, Lines, and Hoses 
a. Aluminum alloy, stainless steel, and titanium a r e  prime materials 
for use as  hydraulic system tubing and piping. Work hardening of aluminum, 
however, should be guarded against. Copper is not recommended because of 
possible chemical reactions. Galvanized piping is not recommended because 
of t he  flaking properties of galvanized material. Lines exposed t o  heat or 
abrasion should be fabricated from stainless steel. 
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3.7.1.3 Tubing,Lines ,andHoses  (continued) 
b. Straight lines between t h e  two  rigid connection points should be  
avoided. Semiloops or  f lex hoses should be  used t o  ease alignment stresses. 
c. Flex hose should be used between any two connections where 
relat ive motion can  be  expected t o  fa t igue metal  tubing. 
d. Materials  used in flex hose construction should be  compatible 
with t h e  part icular hydraulic fluid used and with t h e  environment. 
e. Flex hose installations should be made t o  avoid abrasive con tac t  
with adjacent s t ruc tu re  o r  moving parts. Rigid supports should not be  used 
on flex hose. 
f. Teflon is preferred over rubber for construction of hydraulic 
hose. The advantages of Teflon include: 
( I )  Much be t t e r  compatibility with t h e  hydraulic fluids cur- 
rently in use. 
( 2 )  Chemically inert and anti-adhesive properties. 
(3) A wider operating t empera tu re  range. 
3.7.1.4 Connectors 
a. To minimize leakage of potentially hazardous fluids, all tube 
fittings, except  where system entry  points a r e  needed, should be  perma- 
nently joined. Welded o r  brazed construction is preferred over threaded o r  
f lared assembly. 
b. Friction-type locking devices should be avoided in safe ty  cri t ical  
applications. Safety  wiring and self-locking nuts a r e  examples of s a f e  
design; s t a r  washers and jam nuts a r e  examples of poor design. 
c. Reta iner  or  snap rings should not be  used in hydraulic systems 
where a "blow apar t"  fai lure would result. 
3.7.1.5 Fi l ters  
a. Circulating hydraulic fluid should be  f i l tered on t h e  downstream 
side of t h e  pressure pump. Fi l ters  should not be  installed in t h e  suction side 
of pumps unless test d a t a  show t h a t  pressure drops will not  in terfere  with 
sys tem operations. 
b. Pump case drain fluid should be f i l tered before it is allowed t o  
en te r  t h e  return side of t h e  system. 
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3.7.1.5 Fi l ters  (continued) 
c. Test  points o r  vents a r e  prime sources for sys tem contamination 
and should be  protected by downstream filters. 
d. Standard sa fe ty  c r i t e r i a  s t a t e  t h a t  cri t ical  hydraulic systems 
should be essentially f r e e  f rom contaminants of larger par t ic le  s i ze  than will 
pass through a 10 micron fi l ter .  Crit ical  hydraulic systems would include 
those used t o  extend, r e t rac t ,  or deploy payloads beyond t h e  payload bay 
moldline. Failure of such a system could a f f e c t  the  orbiter's capability t o  
re turn  t o  Earth. /' 
3.7.1.6 Seals and Gaskets 
The hydraulic system's sealing mater ia ls  should be  se lected on t h e  basis of 
t h e  type of hydraulic fluid used, i t s  t empera tu re  and pressure, and t h e  type 
motions required of t h e  seal. 
3.7.1.7 Reservoirs 
a. Hydraulic fluid reservoirs should be  operable in a weightless 
environment and should not rely on gravity feed. The reservoirs should be  
equipped with shutoff valves which a r e  operable from a s a f e  distance in t h e  
event  of a hydraulic system emergency. The reservoirs should be  designed 
so t h a t  they do not become overpressurized. 
~ b. Hydraulic fluid reservoirs should be  isolated from heat  sources 
and  f rom other  potentially high-energy sources such a s  pressure vessels. The 
intent  is t o  minimize personnel injury o r  material  damage in t h e  event  of a 
rupture. 
I 
c. Hydraulic reservoir a i r  pressurization lines should include a i r  
f i l ters  located t o  protect  t h e  pressure regulating equipment f rom 
contamination. Other  sa fe ty  or iented considerations t o  minimize t h e  
possibility of contamination include: 
( I )  Use of a fluid f i l ter  a t  reservoir filler openings. 
I ( 2 )  Use of tight-fitting filler caps. I 
1 (3) Avoidance of dip st icks for measuring remaining fluid. 
1 a. Components of sa fe ty  cri t ical  systems such a s  one-way restr ic-  
tors, flow regulators, and f i l ters  should be  permanently placarded t o  indicate 
t h e  cor rec t  direction of installation. Arrows on connecting lines a r e  not 
considered sufficient identification for this purpose. 
b. The direction of restricted and unrestricted flows should be 
indicated directly on restrictor valves. 
c. Warning placards, safety tape, color-coded labels and similar 
d. Safety cr i t ical test information such as pressure limits, hydraulic 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
Test and Checkout 
a. Hydraulic systems should be proof-pressure tested as part of 
acceptance for f l ight use. No part of a hydraulic system should fail, take a 
permanent set, or be damaged in any manner when subjected to  proof 
testing. Proof-pressure levels are established by design specification and 
wil l generally be a t  least 1.5 times the maximum operating pressure for a 
particular system. 
b. Hydraulic systems and components should withstand fl ight 
loading and should retain their capabilities to perform in the operational 
environments. 
Contamination c. Test points should be provided so that disassembly for test is not 
required. The test points should be easily accessible for the attachment of 
ground test equipment. The test connectors should be configured to  prevent 
cross connection. 
d. Externally installed test circuits used during onboard checkout of 
hydraulic systems should not bypass system pressure relief devices. 
Contamination e. Where necessary, hydraulic system components should contain 
isolation provision to facil itate independent functional and leak checks of 
such components without disturbing the total system. 
f. Hydraulic systems should have pressure indicating equipment 
marked to show safe upper and lower l imits of system pressure. The 
pressure indicators should be easily visible to  the operating crew. 
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3.7.3.2 Servicing 
a. Self-sealing couplings should be provided on installations which 
require frequent disassembly. 
b. Ground test and servicing ports not required to function in flight 
should be designed to eliminate leakage during the flight phase. 
c. Safety critical hydraulic systems should not require the use of 
special tools for removal/replacement of components unless the use of such 
special tools is unavoidable. 
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3.8 MATERIALS 
System Description.- Although the material section does not constitute a functional subsystem, 
it is a convenient way to  group the guidelines for selections and uses of payload materials. The 
guidelines discourage the use of certain metals and nonmetals in payload equipment if they a r e  
to  be stowed in habitable areas  or if  failure can propagate to  shuttle systems. Also contained 
herein a r e  guidelines developed to  control the  use of materials possessing hazardous properties 
or characteristics in manned spaceflight operations. 
In the confinement of spaceflight habitable areas, toxic products emitted from offgassing 
materials can readily contaminate the limited atmospheric system and can pose serious th rea t s  
t o  personnel. Gaseous products from fabrics, insulation and adhesives can create  nauseating and 
irritating odors. Unrestricted uses of flammable materials also c rea te  potential f ire hazards. 
When payload equipment is t o  be stowed in the orbiter cabin, it must receive the same type 
material controls a s  those imposed on cabin materials as specified in NHB 8060.IA, 
"Flammability, Odor, and Offgassing Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in 
Environments That Support Combustion." The cabin serves a s  the  living quarters and safe  haven 
for the crew. The spacelab and payload bay a re  not considered safe  havens nor a re  they of 
equal importance t o  the  orbiter cabin from a materials flammability and toxicity standpoint. 
Careful consideration, however, should still be given t o  the characteristics of materials t o  be 
located in these payload areas; i.e., offgassing, odor, and flammability. 
Integrated payloads will contain fuels, oxidizers, and ignition sources, the three elements for 
combustion. Flame retardant materials should be selected, if possible, and the location of 
flammable materials controlled, t o  maintain the maximum separation for preventing f lame 
propagation. Flammable materials must be prevented from contacting ignition sources by 
selecting specific locations in the  payload, where possible (i.e., separation of oxidizers from 
fuels, and oxidizers and fuels from propulsive units or electrical circuitry). Efforts should be 
expended t o  select materials which a r e  compatible t o  prevent chemical reactions which may 
lead to  a chance occurrence of fire. 
Associated Hazards.- In manned spacecraft operat ions, hazards associated with payload 
materials a r e  contamination of the  atmosphere from material offgassing; the use of flammable 
materials leading to  f i re  or explosion; and in case of metals, corrosive problems. (Metal 
corrosive problems a re  discussed in section 3.15, STRUCTURES.) Toxic fumes generated by 
offgassing payload materials located in habitable areas  can present serious hazards t o  personnel. 
Material offgassing depositions of contaminants on thermal control surfaces can change the  
thermal characteristics leading to  overheating and subsequent component failures. Offgassed 
material condensing on cold surfaces form conductive paths t o  other components which may 
induce subsequent equipment failures. Offgassed contaminants can fog sensitive optical 
surfaces and can interfere with the operation of interfacing experiments. Use of materials with 
low f i re  resistant properties for gaskets, seals, lubricants, coverings, insulation, hoses, etc.  
should be avoided a s  they present fire hazards in manned spaceflight operations, particularly in 
the  crew areas  where ignition sources and oxygen augment combustion. 
The following guidelines have been developed t o  identify hazards associated with materials. 
The guidelines are divided into two groups, metallic and nonmetallic materials. The metall ic 
group includes metals which have been found t o  be hazardous in manned flight operations. The 
nonmetallic materials group includes elastomers, adhesives, lubricants, insulating materials, 
chemicals, cleaning fluids, and solvents. In both groups, the  guidelines constrain materials for 
use in t he  habitable areas. Data on nonmetallic materials which have been tested on previous 
programs is documented in JSC 0268 1 ,  "Nonmetallic Materials Design and Test Data Handbook," 
GUIDELINES 
Metallic Materials 
a. Aluminum. When selecting aluminum alloys for use with 
cryogenic fluids or gases, oxidizers, or fuels, considerat ion should be given 
t o  alloys whose heat t reatments  and coatings minimize the  susceptibility t o  
general corrosion, pitting, and intergranular or stress corrosion. Candidate 
aluminum alloys should be  reviewed for compatibility with fluids and gases 
in the  use condition and operating environment. 
b. Barium. When barium or its compounds a r e  selected for 
Contamination c. Beryllium. 
(I )  Unalloyed beryllium should not be used in equipment 
carried in habitable areas unless it is suitably coated t o  prevent erosion or 
formation of salts or oxides. Mist, dust, or fumes containing beryllium a r e  
extremely toxic. Uncoated alloys containing 4 percent or less beryllium can 
( 2 )  If coated beryllium is used in the  habitable areas, outgas- 
sing tests under use conditions should be conducted t o  verify that  the  
coating provides satisfactory protection for the beryllium surface. 
Contamination d. Cadmium. The use of cadmium and cadmium-plated parts in 
contact  with breathing gas or in any low atmospheric pressure environment 
should be avoided. Cadmium will vaporize rapidly a t  combinations of 
temperature and pressures encountered in spaceflight applications. 
Overheating of cadmium or cadmium-plated parts can severely contaminate 
the  atmosphere with toxic fumes. Organic-based paint should not be used as  
an overcoating barrier for cadmium surfaces because of the porosity of the  
coating and the possibility of overcoating damage. Cadmium should not be 
allowed t o  contact  titanium a t  any temperature because embritt lement can 
e. Magnesium. Magnesium alloys should not be used except in areas  
where no exposure t o  corrosive environments can be expected, and 
protection systems can be maintained with ease. Their uses should be 
avoided in areas  subjected t o  wear, handling abuse, foreign object damage, 
abrasion, erosion, or in areas  where fluid or moisture entrapment is possible. 
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f. Mercury. Mercury should not be  used in equipment instru- 
mentation, testing, or calibration of components in habitable areas  since it 
is extremely toxic. Mercury and its compounds can  acce le ra te  s t ress  
corrosion of aluminum and t i tanium alloys. When mercury is required, t h e  
following information should be  documented: 
GUIDELINES 
( I )  A list of equipment containing mercury t o  be  used with 
justification for  each  use. 
r 
( 2 )  The amount of mercury contained in t h e  equipment. 
I I (3) How t h e  equipment is protected t o  prevent release of t h e  I 
mercury. 
(4)  A defined plan t o  accomplish decontamination if mercury is 
released. 
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g. Molybdenum. Molybdenum in alloys in excess of 0.05 percent 
should b e  avoided for use with fluid and gas  systems. The alloys can r e a c t  
violently in con tac t  with hydrazine and amine-based propellants when t h e  
fluid boiling point temperature  is exceeded. Without exception, material  
compatibility investigations of these  alloys should be  performed prior t o  use. 
I 
h. Titanium. Titanium or its alloys should not be  used where they 
can be exposed t o  liquid or gaseous oxygen exceeding two  atmospheres of 
absolute pressure because a violent reaction is possible. Titanium o r  i ts  
alloys should not be  used where they can come in con tac t  with methanol. 
(Methanol may reac t  with t i tanium and lead t o  s t ress  corrosion.) Titanium 
should not be  allowed t o  come in con tac t  with nitrogen tetroxide with wa te r  
content  in excess of 2.5 percent, or  a nitr ic oxide content  less than 0.4 
percent '  as intergranu lar corrosion can b e  accelera ted and in pressurized 
systems can undergo catastrophic failures. 
Titanium should not be used in con tac t  with cadmium since embrit t le-  
ment  may ensue. Each environment contact ing t i tanium should be analyzed 
t o  be ce r ta in  t h a t  it and t i tanium a r e  truly compatible. 
i. Any materials  under s t ress  whose failure can be catas t rophic  
materials. For example, the  fabrication of tanks for t h e  s torage of fluids 
should have tes ts  run using f rac tu re  mechanics cr i ter ia  and techniques t o  
assure t h a t  it is truly compatible under all anticipated s torage or  use 
conditions and environments. High performance materials  of ten may be  t h e  
poorest choices for pressurized hydrogen tanks. Only in cases  where the re  is 
documented evidence of fluid-material compatibility should the re  not be 
f rac tu re  mechanics evaluation of t h e  application intended for newly 
fabr icated materials. Fracture  mechanics t e s t s  should be  performed when 
documented evidence or da ta  showing fluid-material compatibility does not 
Contamination a. To prevent material failures, elastomer, rubber, and adhesive 
materials should be selected for compatibility with the use environments of 
temperature extremes, resistance to heat aging, polymer reversion, and 
compatibility with the working fluid. 
Contaminat ion b. Materials requiring age control, such as the natural rubbers and 
some of the polyester urethanes, should be avoided. Their uses may be 
considered where their service l i fe is equal to the service l i fe of the 
equipment, or age control is such that replacement is readily accomplished 
during routine servicing. 
c. Elastomer materials such as Viton and Fluorel should be selected 
f ~r use as molding compounds, conformal coatings, sprayable coatings, and 
sponge materials. These elastomers are flame resistant and maintain their 
elasticity in the space environment. 
d. In safety critical circuits such as pyrotechnics, the use of 
polyurethane conformal coatings containing solvents which dissolve poly-- 
styrene compounds and other materials used on'electrical circuit boards 
should be avoided. Also, the use of conformal coatings which can 
mechanically overstress components such as glass diodes on safety critical 
circuit boards should be avoided. In general, caution should be exercised in 
the selection of conformal coating materials for safety critical wiring 
boards. Conventional thickness coatings (10-15 mils) (.25-.375 mm) have 
resulted in damage to components and solder connections (use thin coatings 
of 2-4 mils (.05-. 1 mm) when considered appropriate). 
e. For electronic packages, silicone sealants should be selected 
which will not react with atmospheric moisture to release acetic acid that 
can cause corrosion. 
Contamination f. CNR (carboxy nitroso rubber) should not be used as a payload 
material as it liberates appreciable quanti* of toxic products when 
exposed to temperatures exceeding 500 '~  (260 C). 
Contamination g. When using RTV (room temperature vulcanizing) silicone seal- 
ants, and adhesives in electronic packaging, adequate cure time should be 
specified to prevent liberation of acids during operation. Nonflammable 
sealants and adhesives should be selected for use on equipment to be located 
in habitable areas. 
Contamination h. Extreme care should be used in specifying O-rings and similar 
seals for dynamic applications in cryogenic environments. The use of 
silicone rubber materials should be avoided as they generally become brittle 
at temperatures in the neighborhood of -1 8 4 ' ~  (-1 20'~). Many generic 
classes of rubber materials become brittle at even higher temperatures. 
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3.8.1.2 Nonmetallic Materials (continued) 
i. Silicone elastomer material  should b e  avoided for use with liquid 
or gaseous oxygen since t h e  elastomer acts a s  a fuel in pure oxygen. 
Materials  which contain oil or carbon content  should be  avoided for use in 
oxygen systems. Chlorinated polyether resins or  polyformaldehyde mater ia ls  
should also be  avoided for use in oxygen systems. 
j. In selecting nonmetallic mater ia ls  t o  be used a s  gaskets, seals, 
O-rings, and packing for oxidizers, propellants, gases and chemicals, these  
mater ia ls  should be investigated thoroughly for  compatibility t o  prevent 
mater ia l  degradation, chemical disassociation, or  violent reactions with t h e  
working fluid. 
Contamination k. Materials  for  seals, gaskets, and O-rings should not cold-flow in 
t h e  use environment which may produce leaks of hazardous fluids. 
Contaminat  ion I. Lubricants should be  se lected for use with materials  on t h e  basis 
of valid test results  confirming the  suitability of t h e  composition and t h e  
performance character is t ics  for e a c h  specific application including 
compatibility with t h e  anticipated environment. 
Explosion m. Petroleum based lubricants should not be used in liquid oxygen 
systems as they reac t  violently. 
Explosion n. Chlorinated fluorocarbon lubricants should not be used in 
applications where they may come in c o n t a c t  with aluminum or  aluminum 
powder as violent reactions result. 
Contamination o. Lubricants t o  be used with O-rings o r  seals, should be se lected on 
t h e  basis of compatibility with t h e  composition of t h e  elastomer in t h e  0- 
rings or  seals, and with t h e  fluid being sealed. 
Contamination p. Minimal and nonirritating offgassing properties should be con- 
sidered when selecting materials  for sealants,  gaskets, O-rings, hoses, 
lubricants, insulation, and adhesives for  use in habitable areas. In t h e  
design, mater ia ls  which have t o  be subjected t o  offgassing t e s t s  should b e  
specified. 
Contamination q. For equipment t o  be used in habitable areas,  wire insulation, ties, 
identification markers, and protective coverings should be  se lected t h a t  a r e  
nonflammable and will not generate  toxic  fumes when overheated f rom 
electrical  malfunctions. 
Contamination r. The use of PVC (polyvinyl chloride) should be avoided. Outgas- 
sing products of PVC a r e  hazardous and generate  products of hydrochloric 
acid, phosgene, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, chlorine monoxide, and 
acidic carbonaceous coke. The plastic has a low ignition point; in vacuum, it 
loses plasticizers and becomes brittle. 
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3.8.1.2 Nonmetallic Materials (continued) 
s. When Teflon is used on experiments to  be located in the 
habitable areas, it should be assured that no organic materials such as 
pigments have been added which can cause Teflon to  burn. Flammability 
tests should be required when an untested pigment is added to Teflon. 
t. Hoses made wi th dichloroethane should not be used in habitable 
areas where l ithium hydroxide is used for C02 control. Dichloroethane 
mixed wi th l i thium hydroxide generates acetylene which is highly flam- 
mable. 
u. Highly reactive chemical fluids which can produce toxic fumes or 
are flammable should not be used in the habitable areas. If use of these 
materials is unavoidable, they should be stored in containers capable of 
withstanding operational conditions without rupture or emitt ing fumes, 
smoke, or gas. The containers must be adequately labeled wi th placards 
describing the hazardous content. Procedures for safe handling in al l  
operations should also be provided. 
v. Nonmetallic materials for use with fluorine should be carefully 
selected as they are generally incompatible with fluorine and react 
violently. 
w. Nontoxic and nonflammable hygroscopic materials should be used 
for moisture or humidity control in experiment canisters. 
x. Paints or coatings should not be used which can degrade in the 
use environment and can chip or flake o f f  producing floating particles in the 
zerogravity environment. 
y.. Paints or coatings which contain carbon black should not be used 
on equipment to be located in habitable areas. Carbon black wi l l  offgas 
toxic carbon monoxide. 
z. Photographic f i lm  and recording tapes should be selected which 
are nonhazardous in their use environments. 
aa. Printing inks should be selected which wi l l  not release toxic 
fumes in the habitable areas. Suitable containers should be provided (no 
glass) for storage of these inks in the operating environment. 
bb. Flight data files, records, procedures, and checklists to be used 
during fl ight operations in habitable areas should be printed on f i re  resistant 
paper. 
cc. Particular care should be given to  the static electricity 
generation and discharge properties of nonmetallic materials, 
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3.8.1.2 Nonmetallic Materials (continued) 
dd. Asbestos should be avoided in spacecraft use since it produces 
fibers that are hazardous to  personnel and hardware. Where practicable, 
other materials should be used in lieu of asbestos. 
3.8.2 Flight Operations 
a. When toxic, corrosive, and/or flammable materials are t o  be 
handled during fl ight in habitable areas, safety procedures and safe handling 
equipment should be provided. The materials should be stored so that failure 
of the containers wi l l  not release the material into the atmosphere. 
Provisions should be specified for the safe collection and storage of used or 
spent materials. Their possible chemical or physical interaction should be 
considered when collected and stored together. 
b. The location of flammable, explosive, or gas generating mate- 
rials should be carefully selected and adequate separation of these materials 
maintained to  prevent ignition and flame propagation. 
c. Flammable, explosive, or gas generating maferials should not be 
located in the vicinity of the entrance to  habitable areas. 
3.8.3 Ground Operat ions 
a. When specifying materials to be used for packaging components 
or to  be used to maintain cleanliness level requirements in clean room 
applications, compatible materials should be selected for the use environ- 
ment. 
b. Polyethylene type material should not be used t o  package 
components in gaseous or liquid oxygen systems. Polyethylene sloughs 
particles which are pure hydrocarbon. It can be used as an outer wrapping as 
it provides good resistance to  external f luid contamination provided 
antistatic type is used. 
c. Nylon should be used for the inner wrapping of components 
requiring high cleanliness levels with the exception of those for liquid 
oxygen or gaseous oxygen systems as nylon tends to slough particles. 
Migrating particles in liquid oxygen or gaseous systems present f i re hazards. 
FEP (florinated ethylene propylene) Teflon is a material that can be used to  
wrap liquid oxygen or gaseous oxygen components, Caution should be used 
in selection of these materials as some may be electrostatic generators 
depending on the material manufacturing specification, 
d. When specifying cleaning agents for system fluids, adequate 
information should be provided on the chemical reaction between the 
cleaning fluid and the system fluids. Certain cleaning agenfs sand strong 
oxidizers are known to  react explosively. For example, strict control and 
instruct ions should be provided for the use of halogenated hydrocarbons and 
nitrogen tetroxide. 
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3.8.3 Ground Operations (continued) 
e, For oxidizer systems which must be serviced, complete removal 
of  cleaning agents by flushing oxidizer systems with nonreact ing agents 
should be specified before the oxidizer is reintroduced. 
f. Fluorinated hydrocarbon solvents should not be used in high 
pressure or liquid oxygen systems as they may react violently. 
g, I f  spillage of mercury has occurred during handling operations 
wi th experiments, the equipment should be tested for mercury contamina- 
tion. If mercury is detected, the source should be isolated, corrective action 
taken, and the equipment retested and verified free from mercury 
contamination before release for flight. 
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3.9 MECHANICAL 
.- The mechanical subsystem is composed of rotating machinery such as 
pumps, compressors, turbines, centrifuges, gyroscopes, fasteners,  lock pins, guide pins, booms, 
antennas,  doors, covers, screens, actuating mechanisms, gear trains, and mechan icai restraining 
aids. It includes shipping containers, cradles, slings, do1 l ies, tracks, and similar equipment 
which is specifically designed t o  transport  and handle payloads during ground operations. 
Mechanical hardware is an  integral par t  of subsystems covered in this handbook. It can be  piece 
pa r t s  of assemblies of flight sys tems as well a s  complete  units. 
Associated Hazards.- The prime hazards t o  be eliminated or  controlled by the  application of 
these  widel ines  a r e  collision, contamination, explosion, illness or  injury t o  t h e  crew and loss of 
. . 
orbite; ent ry  capability. collision hazards can readily.be generated if equipment is improperly 
located and insecurely a t t ached  t o  t h e  payload structure.  During launch, entry, or crashlanding 
conditions, components can break loose and become projecti les which can enter  t h e  c r e w  
compartment.  Loose par ts  can collide with flight controls and can c r e a t e  injury potentials  
during extravehicular activities. Explosive hazards c r e a t e d  by runaway or overspeeding rotary  
equipment should be eliminated by incorporation of protect ive  devices. If material  f rac tu res  
occur,  f ragments  should be contained by screens, guards, or  covers t o  prevent damage o r  
contamination of peripheral equipment and injuries t o  personnel. Telescoping booms and 
extending and re t ract ing mechanisms must be designed with redundant re t ract ion or  a jettison 
capability t o  assure payload bay door closure in t h e  even t  of mechanism malfunctions. Payload 
bay door closure is mandatory for orbiter  entry capability. Industrial safe ty  features  should b e  
considered in t h e  design of ground handling equipment t o  prevent hazards t o  personnel. 
Sa fe  orbital payload operation and ground processing of payloads will depend on t h e  selection of 
hazard-free hardware. In past  manned programs, a number of hazards have been identified 
which a r e  associated with t h e  use of mechanical type hardware. The payload safe ty  guidelines 
a r e  based on this experience. 
Suggestions a r e  included for selection of fasteners, locks, guides, and shear pins used for  t h e  
mechanical integrity of assembled components. Safety  recommendations a r e  listed for 
consideration in t h e  design of extending and re t ract ing devices, telescoping booms, and 
actuat ing mechanisms and ground handling equipment. 
Since t h e  mechanical subsystem -overlaps in a reas  associated with structures,  section 3.15, 
STRUCTURES, should also be reviewed. 
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Explosion a. Pumps, compressors, turbines, centrifuges, and similar types of 
high speed rotating equipment should be provided with protective devices 
such as thermal overload sensors, bearing temperature sensors, pressure 
relief devices, vibration sensors, pump suction pressure interlocks, and 
overspeed controls to  prevent bearing and material failures which could 
result ir; fragmentation. 
b. High speed rotating components such as pumps, compressors, 
turbines, centrifuges, and gyroscopes should be shielded sufficiently to  
contain any wheel systems or failed parts. Rotating machinery should 
contain protective devices such as screens or covers to prevent accidental 
human contact with rotating members. Debris guards, screens, filters, and 
similar devices should be provided to contain potential floating objects in 
the zerogravi t y  environment. 
c. Where access to  rotating members and operating equipment is 
necessary, power lockout and safety interlocks should be provided t o  prevent 
inadvertent operation. 
d. Pumps, compressors, turbines, fan blades, and similar rotating 
mechanisms should contain protective devices such as shear pins, friction 
clutches, magnetic clutches, or similar devices to  protect the drive 
mechanism. Jammed rotating members can cause overheating , bearing, and 
material failures. 
e. In fluid systems, filters, strainers, and traps should be provided 
to  contain residual debris which could threaten crit ical mechanical or 
electrical components. Debris or particle contamination from interfacing 
equipment can readily degrade cri t ical mechanical i tems. 
Injury 
Explosion 
Contamination 
I 3.9.1.2 Gyroscopes 
Collision 
Collision 
/ Collision 
a, Gyroscopes should include provisions for verification of rota- 
tional speed, lncorrect gyroscope rotational speed could result in erroneous 
or loss of payload attitude control. I f  occurring in a free flying payload, this 
problem could create a possible collision hazard. 
b. Gyroscopes and accelerometers should be positively keyed to 
prevent interchanging or erroneous instal lation. lncorrect instal lation wil I 
result in erroneous attitude orienlat ion on automated payloads which may 
lead to collision hazards. 
c, When selecting gyroscopes for payload equipment, consideration 
should be given to  their bearing temperatures, lubrication, and operational 
chcrracteristics for the use environment, 
PAYLOAD SAFETY GU 
SECTION NO. - 3.9 
ASSOCIATED 
HAZARD GUIDELINES 
lnjury 
lnjury 
Corrosion 
Contamination 
lnjury 
Contamination 
Contamination 
lnjury 
lnjury 
3.9.1.3 Fasteners 
a. The torque value of bolts, connectors, and similar threaded 
fasteners should be specified in the design and should require the use of 
proper wrenching devices for assembly as opposed to  using knurled knobs, 
wing nuts, etc. Properly torqued fasteners are essential to equipment 
operat ion. 
b. The use of similar type mechanical fasteners for different 
applications close to each other should be avoided to prevent inadvertent 
interchanges of these fasteners (e.g., threaded fasteners o f  the same 
diameter and the same grip length but different shank length or those having 
the same shank length but different grip length). In assembly or service, 
interchanges of the fasteners can lead to operational failures creating 
hazardous conditions and endangering personnel safety. 
c. The use of metal fasteners in contact with a dissimilar type 
metal should be avoided. If unavoidable, specify the protection of the 
fastener by barrier material such as sealant, tape, primer, or suitable 
coating. Dissimilar metals can create electrocouples and can lead to  
galvanic corrosion. 
d. The use of captive type fasteners, sucn as bolts or nuts, should be 
specified in the design to prevent dropping such items and damaging 
equipment (e.g., internal securing of electronic parts such as circuit  boards). 
e. The correct bolt lengths should be specified to  avoid interference 
wi th piece parts which can lead to subsystem failures and create hazardous 
conditions t o  personnel. 
f .  Self-tapping screws which generate metall ic particles should not 
be used.on electronic assemblies. Particles can cause electrical failures and 
contamination problems in the zerogravity environment. 
g. Calfax type fasteners should be considered for use in closing 
access panels in lieu of slotted or Phillips Screws. Such single force 
fasteners aid maintenance and reduce generation of metallic particles which 
can contaminate subsystem elements. 
h. In the design of subsystem elements, standardized fasteners 
should be used to the maximum extent practical. This wil l tend to reduce 
maintenance downtime and wil l  eliminate substitution of "I ike" type 
fasteners which can result in equipment failures and can intensify 
probabi l i t y  of hazards. 
i. Access to mechanical fasteners should adhere to  MSFC-STD-5 12 
for both IVA (intravehicular activity) and EVA (extravehicular activity) 
operat ions. 
GUIDELINES 
a. Black box designs should provide for use of guide pins or slide 
panels on drawers, and chassis subassemblies t o  align location of this 
equipment during installation. The guide pins and slides prevent c o n t a c t  of 
panels, chassis, o r  drawers with exposed equipment terminals and minimize 
connector failures, electrical  malfunctions, etc. 
Contaminat  ion b. When pins a r e  t o  be used, t h e  design should include s towage 
location for  the  insertion of these  locking pins o r  similar devices. If locking 
pins o r  similar devices, such a s  knobs, handles, caps, plugs, etc., a r e  t o  be  
removed during flight operation, tether-l ike devices should be provided t o  
hold these  par ts  capt ive  and prevent loose objects in t h e  zerogravity 
environment. 
c. Friction-type locking pins o r  devices should not be used where  
Contaminat ion d. In t h e  design of equipment which will require service  and 
maintenance, associated washers or spacers  installed with knobs, handles, 
locking pins, and similar devices should b e  adequately secured t o  prevent t h e  
unintentional removal of these  pa r t s  with resultant  floating objects  in t h e  
zerogravity environment. 
3.9.1.5 Booms 
a. in t h e  design of booms which a r e  t o  extend through airlocks, t h e  
b.. Equipment which is mounted externally t o  t h e  payload s t ruc tu re  
should be constrained so  tha t  under normal landing o r  crash load conditions, 
t h e  equipment will not break loose, become a projecti le and endanger t h e  
c. Payload o r  payload components which a r e  t o  be deployed on 
extendible booms should be  designed t o  withstand loads associated with 
deployment and flight operations. During on-orbit operations, t h e  payload or  
payload components should not break loose and endanger t h e  c rew by 
possible equipment coll isions. 
d. The design of all t h e  extension rod segments o r  extension 
mechanisms should contain sa fe ty  latches o r  similar type devices t o  prevent 
ejection of equipment by inadvertent  disconnections during t h e  operations of 
extending t h e  boom. 
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3.9.1.6 Doors, Covers, Windows 
a. In the design of access doors, equipment covers, or hatches which 
are not to  be removed, self-supporting features should be provided when 
they are to be opened during operational conditions to prevent hand injuries 
f rom unanticipated closures. 
lnjury 
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b. Laser windows should be provided with covers t o  protect the 
window when not in use during f l ight and ground operations t o  prevent 
particle contamination leading to  spurious laser reflections. 
c. Payloads which wi l l  require direct interface with windows that 
form part o f  the pressure integrity of habitable areas of the STS should be 
designed t o  avoid any possible damage to  the windows (i.e., scratches, 
cracks, etc.). 1 3.9.1.7 Actuating Mechanisms 
a. When designing and locating movable, actuating, or similar 
mechanical devices, adequate clearance should be provided to  prevent ( I )  
interference with structure; (2) puncture of f luid lines, valves, and tanks; 
and (3) contact with electrical wiring and components or other subsystem 
components. Mechanical stops should be provided to  l imi t  the motion a t  
travel extremes to  the maximum position for proper functioning of the 
actuated i tem preventing interference wi th interfacing equipment. The 
mechanical stops should be designed to absorb the impact resulting from 
actuating forces and inertia a t  the travel extremes. 
b. Right-hand and left-hand parts should not be used in the design 
o f  actuating mechanisms. Similar mechanical parts and assemblies should be 
designed for interchangeability and reversibility. Those parts which are not 
interchangeable or reversible should be designed so that inadvertent 
interchange is not possible. 
c. Rotational type mechanistns such as bell cranks and torque tubes 
should be designed to  preclude incorrect installation on shafts (multiple 
keying is a preferred method). In routing torque tubes, structural deflection 
and i ts effect on tube functions should be considered. 
d. Components which wi l l  require mechanical adjustments or 
a1 ignment should be located where these adjustments can be made without 
excessive removals or disassembly of equipment. Adjustable mechanical 
devices should not be used where improper adjustment can lead to cr i t ical 
subsystem hazards. 
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3.9.1.7 Actuating Mechanisms (continued) 
e. The design of foldaway or  foldover type latching mechanisms 
t h a t  must be in t h e  folded position t o  assure positive locking should b e  spring 
loaded o r  pinned in t h e  folded position t o  prevent inadvertent opening by 
vibration or shock under operating conditions. The foldout s t ruc tu re  o r  
mechanism should be designed and installed s o  t h a t  par ts  and wiring will not  
be  damaged when the  s t ruc tu re  is opened o r  closed. 
f. Locking o r  latching mechanisms should be designed t o  be  
operable by a single control and should provide a c lear  visual indication of 
whether t h e  latch position is opened or  closed. Posit ive indications of 
latching mechanisms a r e  necessary t o  prevent c rew injuries when these  
mechanisms a r e  actuated.  
g. Rotational equipment within enclosures requiring periodic access 
should be designed with positive manual loading devices. Equipment such a s  
motor driven canis ters  containing photographic equipment or  telescopes 
should have access door interlocks on t h e  drive mechanism. Crew protect  ion 
should be  considered in f i lm retrieval  and component replacement activities. 
h. The design of panels which will contain replaceable indicator 
lights should allow for replacement of t h e  lights f rom t h e  f ront  of t h e  panel 
t o  minimize injuries t o  maintenance and flight personnel. 
1 3.9.1.8 Mechanical Rest ra ints  
a. Restraining aids, such as handles, rails, and footholds, should be  
designed into large payloads for e a s e  of movement of suited personnel during 
servicing, repair, o r  retr ieval  of equipment during EVA operations. 
b, If an on-orbit maintenance requirement exists, design fea tu res  
should be included in mechanical e lements  t o  faci l i ta te  equipment fai lure 
detection,  isolation, correct ive  action, and verification of repair. 
Allowances should be made for special tools, spares, maintenance equip- 
ment,  and t h e  required space for orbit operations. Accessibility t o  
equipment a t tachment ,  electrical  connections, and equipment plumbing will 
be necessary. On-orbit maintenance fea tu res  should be  designed t o  assist a 
suited crew member t o  perform t h e  needed correct ive  action. 
1 3.9.1.9 Antennas I 
a. Antennas which a r e  designed with electromechanical  drive 
mechanisms t o  permit  scanning should include a positive locking device  t o  
prevent t h e  antennas from inadvertent  rotation and personnel con tac t  during 
flight or ground operations. 
3.9.1.9 Antennas (continued) 
b. To prevent rotating antennas from contacting adjacent 
subsystem equipment, the required antenna envelope should be specified in 
interface documents and on interface drawings. Interface drawings should 
also specify the look angles of signal detectors, sensors, and transducers 
which may be shadowed by a rotating antenna. 
Loss of Orbiter c. As an additional safety measure in the design of extendable 
cargo bay by an EVA crewman. 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
a. Vehicles designed to transport equipment should contain 
permanently attached safety chains capable of holding the vehicle if the 
towbar or hitch attachment fails. Hinge-type towbars should have positive 
locking devices for stowage in the raised position with stops to prevent 
contact or collision with the load on the vehicles. 
b. Transportation devices should have tiedown provisions for posi- 
tive servicing of equipment. The devices should contain reusable placards 
showing load limits. The tiedown devices should be provided with positive 
locking devices including tension and torque values on visible placards to 
prevent damage to the equipment and impact hazards to ground handling 
personnel. Attach points for the tiedowns should be clearly marked to avoid 
possible confusion in the use of the equipment. "No-step" marking should be 
included as needed on payload equipment installed in transportation devices 
to prevent injury to ground personnel. 
c. Casters used on transportation devices should have self- 
contained wheel locking devices to avoid slipping or runaway creating 
collision hazards with ground personnel or damage to peripheral equipment. 
d. Braking and wheel locking device controls on towed 
transportation equipment should be protected against inadvertent operation. 
e. The design of shipping containers should permit the safe packing 
and unpacking of equipment without functional damage to any specially-built 
containers, fixtures, or equipment from handling or static electrical 
discharge. Materials used for packing should be nonflammable 
commensurate with the container's use and exposure. 
Transportat  ion (continued) 
f. Cradles or  support devices should b e  designed t o  support t h e  
equipment adequately and t o  conform t o  t h e  shape, size, and contour of t h e  
payload. The cradle  and support devices should be designed with tiedown 
a t t achments  for securing t h e  payload equipment t o  prevent slipping and 
dropping. The cradles and support devices should also have tiedown 
provisions f o r  securing t h e  cradles or support devices t o  t h e  transporting 
equipment. Hoist points should be  readily visible on t h e  cradles or  
supporting devices. 
g. Load bearing surfaces  of t h e  cradles o r  support devices should 
have sufficient  bearing a r e a  t o  support t h e  equipment and padding t o  protect  
t h e  equipment f rom damage. The cen te r  of gravity of these  devices should 
be  conspicuously identified. Grounding provisions should be provided and 
utilized t o  bleed off any accumulated charge. 
h. The design of shipping containers should allow for payload ca rgo  
removal in a vert ical  direction t o  minimize dropping equipment hazards. 
The handling and lifting (removal of payloads f rom containers) should be  
included in program reviews t o  assure  proper handting at launch facilities. 
Pract ica l  design fea tu res  should be included t o  fac i l i t a t e  s a f e  
handling of bulky i tems during instal lation, maintenance, or  replacement.  
j. Special payload dollies, trucks, and transporters which contain 
internal combustion engines and a r e  t o  be operated in propellant t ransfer  
a r e a s  should b e  equipped with spark arres tors  and carburetor f l ame  arres tors  
(authorized a i r  cleaners) t o  prevent introducing ignition sources. (Vehicles 
containing ca ta ly t i c  conver ters  will be  excluded f rom operating in space- 
c r a f t  use areas.) 
k. Special payload t rucks  or  dollies used for moving sensitive 
equipment, such as guidance and pyrotechnics, should be  provided with shock 
mounts, dessicants, and other  protect ive  devices t o  prevent damage t o  
cr i t ica l  pa r t s  whose failures during orbital operations can introduce hazards 
t o  c r e w  personnel. 
I. Payload suppliers furnishing ground handling equipment should 
provide procedures and historical record fi les for periodic proof load test ing 
data.  The following information should b e  included in t h e  file. 
( I )  Drawing number and par t  number of t h e  device. 
(2) Manufacturer. 
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3.9.3.1 Transportat ion (continued) 
(3) Fabrication date. 
(4) Date of last proof load test. 
(5) Date of rework or repair. 
(6)  Date of magnaflux, X-ray, or penetrant dye check. 
(7) Quality control verif ication inspection. 
(8) Maximum safe working load. 
Payload equipment used and proof tested a t  other than the supplier's faci l i ty 
may be used without further proof tests if test documentation is available; if 
records show that proof testing meets minimum conditions; and i f  inspection 
o f  the equipment shows no damage or deterioration. 
Test and Checkout 
a. Payload equipment which must be ground tested and can expose 
personnel to  surface temperatures above the threshold o f  pain (1 25'~) 
(52'~) or in the range of cryogens should be provided wi th adequate ground 
handling fixtures to prevent inadvertent contact by personnel. 
b. Components or mechanisms which wil l require operations or 
adjustments during ground operations should be designed to accommodate 
the personnel who wil l be responsible for performing these functions. Al l  
controls which should not be operated during ground operations should be 
marked with clearly visible placards or labels. 
c. Payload equipment which is to  be hand-carried should not exceed 
45 kg ( I  00 Ib) mass provided the center of mass is within 35 cm ( 14 in) of the 
handhold. Equipment exceeding these l imits should be transported on ground 
handling equipment. 
d. Payloads containing pressurized fluids or gas in containers in 
which a rupture could result in uncontrolled motion of the experiment or can 
release toxic fumes requiring immediate evacuation of the area should not 
be hand-carried. Handling equipment containing handles, lids, and covers 
should be provided for hazardous materials. Easy to recognize markings 
should identify contents, state antidote information, or special handling 
instructions. 
e. Equipment to  be serviced, maintained, and repaired by com- 
ponent replacement should be designed for ease of access without requiring 
the removal of other equipment, wire bundles, and fluid lines. Components 
should be designed with features that contribute to the ease and rapidity of 
maintenance. 
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3.9.3.2 Test  and Checkout (continued) 
f. Nozzles and vents should be  protected by readily visible covers 
or  protect ive  inserts t o  prevent en t rance  of moisture, debris, o r  o ther  con- 
taminants  prior t o  launch. 
g. P ro tec t ive  covers designed for t h e  protection of f l ight equipment 
should offer  maximum practical  protection against fire. 
Assembly, Installation, Service I 
a. Payload equipment requiring blankets a s  thermal controls in high 
t ra f f i c  a reas  of t h e  payload bay should be  designed for easy installation and 
removal. 
b. Mechanical locking fea tu res  should b e  provided on lifting devices 
t o  prevent inadvertent lowering of t h e  equipment if t h e  lifting mechanism 
fails. 
c. To minimize equipment damage and potential injury hazards t o  
personnel in handling payload equipment, fixtures, cradles, or  similar devices 
should b e  provided a s  needed. 
d. Readily visible and t e the red  connector caps, plugs, or  covers 
should be  provided as protection against  damage and contamination a t  
electrical  and fluid outlets. 
e. The design of sling cables for use on payloads should be of 
sufficient  length so  t h a t  t h e  angle formed by t h e  cables at t h e  point of t h e  
a t t achment  t o  t h e  lifting device should not exceed 45 degrees. 
f. The design specifications of payloads should include location of 
lift points, a t t ach  points, cen te r  of gravity, and gross weight for which 
lifting, hoisting, or  handling fixtures may be  required. 
g. Payload equipment which will require lifting or  moving during 
ground operations should contain temporary or  permanent installation of 
a t t a c h  points, lifting eyes, tiedowns, and similar hardware for positive 
a t t achment  of slings, cable locks, and similar devices, If cradles or  support 
devices a r e  used, they should have provisions for lifting equipment (e.g., 
sling eyes). 
h, All platforms, handrails, booms, boom extension devices, and 
similar installations which a r e  not designed for use in a one gravity environ- 
ment  should contain placards with ground operating load limits. Adequate 
protect  ion must be provided during ground handl ing t o  prevent damage t o  
these devices and resultant  malfunctions during operating conditions. 
i. All work stands should have adequate railings around their 
platforms. If these stands are mounted on casters, some positive means of 
locking these or transferring the load to separate support pads must be 
provided and utilized. 
j. Slings, handling fixtures, and other support equipment requiring 
periodic proof load testing should have some means of assuring that pins, 
devices, cables, etc., that may readily be disassembled cannot be 
inadvertently changed out with similar pieces that were not part of the 
whole assembly when it was last proof tested. 
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3.10 OPTICAL 
tion.- Optical instruments wi l l  comprise a high percentage of the payloads 
carried by the STS, These instruments are of two types: data gathering and data transmitting. 
These data are l imited to light which wi l l  pass through a lens or wil l ref lect from a f i rs t  surface 
grating or mirror. Such light ranges f rom 100 angstroms for extreme ultraviolet to 300 microns 
for infrared depending on intensity of the l ight and the density of the media in the path of the 
beam. The optical elements are generally metal or glass and are either transmissive or 
reflective. Typical optical components include f irst surface mirrors and gratings (flat, 
parabolic or concentric), lenses (concave or convex), flats and beam splitters (coated and 
uncoated), and prisms (coated and uncoated). Other devices and components related to optical 
instruments are apertures, slits, fiducials, baffles, light tubes, covers, and doors. Data may be 
obtained electronically, photographically, or visually. 
Typical interfaces wi th optical instruments are visual, mechanical, electrical, and spatial. Few 
systems wil l  use direct viewing for data retrieval. If a crewman is required or able to  view 
potentially hazardous intensities and wavelengths, however, these guidelines should be utilized. 
Ground support interfaces include optical, electronic and radiation from sources such as lasers, 
mercury vapor discharge tubes, carbon arc sources, etc., for sensor excitation, calibration or 
al ignment. 
Associated Hazards.- The potential hazards which must be considered in design, handling, and 
operations of optical equipment and associated energy sources may be grouped into four general 
categories defined as follows: 
I. Personnel exposure to dangerous light radiation. High power and focused low power lasers 
can cause lesions of the skin. Most lasers can damaqe the eye to some extent, and reflected 
laser energy in some cases is sufficient to do serious damdge. There are lasers that operate 
in UV (ultraviolet) and IR (infrared) wavelengths besides the visible wavelengths. These two 
categories are especially hazardous as their beams and reflections are invisible regardless of the 
energy level. Certain CO lasers, operating in IR, are capable of extreme beam temperatures 2 
and wil l  ignite some target materials. 
Other dangerous sources of light radiation are mercury vapor lamps, high intensity carbon arc, 
and solar radiation. Solar radiation a t  ground level ranges from about 2800 angstroms for UV to  
about 300 microns for IR due to  the atmospheric cutoff. This atmospheric cutoff is due in a 
large part to the ozone layer (40,000 to 100,000 feet) (1 2,000 to 30,000 meters) which fi l ters 
much of the sun's dangerous radiation. This f i l ter ing process wi l l  not exist during on-orbit 
operations and solar radiation through a spacelab mounted quartz window may be as low as 1850 
angstroms which is hazardous to personnel. 
The primary hazard concerning carbon arc and mercury vapor lamps is eye damage from sus- 
tained observation of these light sources. A carbon arc is very uncomfortable to look a t  
because o f  i ts extreme intensity. A mercury lamp, however, is relatively dim. This is deceiving 
and individuals have sustained partial loss o f  vision from looking at these sources for a sustained 
period o f  time. 
2. . High temperatures involved with the various 
light radiation sources can cause toxic outgassing or combustion byproducts. Certain paints, 
when heated by radiation sources, give of f  toxic gases even though they may be acceptable for 
Plight use a t  ambient temperature and pressure, baser welding or material testing can result in 
toxic fumes which could be hazardous to the crew in a self-contained environment such as -the 
STS. 
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3.10. I. I General 
a. Unfiltered grating systems for UV, IR, or visible light application 
all have a zero order which contains all wavelengths which the grating sees. 
Thus, the zero order wi l l  have from about 2800 angstroms to  about 20 
microns when in direct sunlight a t  sea level. The same zero order could 
contain as low as 1850 angstroms in a man-made environment such as from a 
mercury vapor lamp onboard the spacelab or in any laboratory at close range 
t o  the light source. Optical instruments should be designed to  trap this 
beam so that it cannot be viewed by operating personnel. 
b. Quartz windows, apertures, or envelopes should not be used wi th 
dangerous wavelengths unless suitable measures are taken to protect 
personnel from UV and/or IR burns. 
c. High energy laser systems, pulsed or otherwise, should not be 
used with optical experiments unless interlocks are provided to  prevent al l  
laser light, even reflections, from escaping the experiment housing and 
d. Light intensities and spectral wavelengths a t  the eyepiece of 
direct viewing optical systems should be l imited to  a safe range to avoid 
damage to  the eye. 
e. In the design of direct viewing telescopes, consideration should 
be given t o  automatic means to  protect the viewer's eyes i f  the field of view 
is inadvertently exposed to direct or reflected sunlight. 
Injury, Radiation f. In the design of optical systems which require crew viewing 
consideration should be given to  incorporating baffles and interlocks t o  
preclude inadvertent exposure to  focused energy of a damaging or hazardous 
g. Enough space should be provided at the viewing end of a tele- 
h. Glass and similar shatterable material should be covered or 
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3.10.1.2 Lasers 
a. Limit stops, interlocks, and shields should be  provided t o  ensure 
tha t  a laser beam cannot b e  misdirected toward personnel, adjacent equip- 
ment,  or  structure.  
b. Power lockouts o r  interrupter devices should be  provided on laser 
devices t o  protect  flight personnel during maintenance or  EVA operations. 
c. Power interruption capability should be  provided whenever a 
laser is removed from its mount. 
d. Posit ive locking fea tu res  should be  provided on all laser 
ref lectors  t o  preclude focus changes due t o  vibration (such a s  during launch) 
or by inadvertent  con tac t  during maintenance or general EVA operations. 
e. Lasers should b e  designed and constructed so  t h a t  all external  
parts ,  surfaces,  and shields a r e  at ground potential at all times. 
f. Laser systems should use only those mater ia ls  which can  with- 
s tand t h e  stresses caused by repet i t ive  pulsing of flashlamps for long 
periods. 
g. Laser reflector mirrors should safely withstand t h e  thermal 
s t resses  of reflecting t h e  laser beam. It is recommended t h a t  external  
mirrors be  covered when not in use t o  keep them clean and thus minimize 
thermal '  absorption rates. 
I h. The use of quar tz  is not recommended for flash tubes. If 
required, however, a suitable shield of plast ic or nonshatterable glass should 
be used t o  absorb t h e  undesirable UV radiation. Such tubes should be dis- 
abled when t h e  cavity is open for maintenance. 
i. A shut ter  sys tem should be included t o  prevent t h e  laser f rom 
being f i red inadvertently. 
j. Provisions should be  made s o  t h a t  power output  measurements 
can be made with t h e  beam totally enclosed t o  prevent specular reflections 
which could be  hazardous t o  t h e  viewer or  could even ignite combustibles a t  
ce r ta in  wavelengths. 
3.10.1.2 Lasers (continued) 
k. Laser systems should be designed to  enable as many adjustments 
and system checks as possible to be made without the laser transmitting to  
reduce the radiation hazard potential to personnel. 
I. Laseropticalsystemsshouldbeenvironmentallysealedwhenever 
possible to prevent moisture buildup in the path of the beam. Spurious 
m. Opticalcoatingsof thehardestpract ical materialshouldbeused 
wi th laser systems. Internal reflections caused by degraded coatings can 
cause heating and possible melting of the lens surface. These conditions can 
cause mu1 t iple hazards. 
n. Laser systems should be designed so that no field adjustments or 
maintenance are required that would expose optics to contamination when 
power levels are such that contamination could cause potential hazards. 
o. Laser systems should be designed so that during boresighting or 
power measurement operations the laser beam is totally enclosed and 
inaccessible to  the eye. 
p. Laser sighting eyepieces should be f i t ted wi th fi l ters for the 
wavelength a t  which the laser is operating. 
q. There should be ample capacity in laser operating subsystem 
elements such as power handling capacity of storage capacitors or cooling 
capacities of mirrors. 
r. Mirrors in high powered laser systems should be designed f irst 
surface to prevent spurious reflections and to  reduce heat absorption. 
s. Laser power supplies wi th 15,000 volts and above should be 
marked to show the amount of X-radiation and microwave radiation 
generated when shields are removed. 
u. A laser beam should be terminated wi th target material that is 
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1 3.10. I .2 Lasers (continued) 
v. Alignment of target ,  optics, filters, etc. should be accomplished 
with low powered lasers such as helium-neon. 
w. When necessary t o  view t h e  t a rge t  or beam while a laser is 
energized, it should be viewed through a closed circuit  television or  an 
optical comparator  with appropriate filter. 
x. Because of their  higher power output (megawat t  and gigawatt  
range), solid s t a t e  lasers such as ruby-pulsed devices should be operated by 
remote  control firing where feasible. Television monitoring eliminates t h e  
requirement for personnel t o  be in t h e  proximity with t h e  laser. An 
a l ternat ive  is t o  enclose t h e  laser and beam with a light-tight box. 
y. Since damage t o  mater ia ls  from laser energy is caused by direct  
radiative heating and resonance conditions at wavelengths equal t o  absorp- 
tion lines of t h e  materials, t h e  ignition temperature  and absorption bands 
a r e  necessary parameters  in selecting a sa fe  t a rge t  material. 
z. The unused secondary laser beam emerging f rom the  rear  
aper tu re  of a laser should be capped. Likewise, t h e  unused beam resulting 
f rom use of beam spli t ters should be  terminated. When using optical 
gratings with lasers t h e  ze ro  order,  blazed order, and several orders above 
and below t h e  blazed order can have dangerous beam intensities radiating 
around t h e  Rowland circle. These should be blocked f rom view of operating 
personnel. 
aa.  Safety  provisions such as interlocks a t  the  en t rance  of t h e  laser 
facility should be installed and constructed so tha t  unauthorized or transient 
personnel a r e  denied access  t o  t h e  facil i ty while t h e  laser power supply is 
charged and capable of firing. 
bb. Higher-power (wat t  range) IR lasers such a s  t h e  C 0 2  laser (I 0 
micron wavelength) should be used with t h e  u h o s t  precaution because of an 
invisible beam and t h e  associated f i r e  hazard, A sufficient  thickness of 
material  s u i k b l e  for terminating t h e  laser beam should be provided as a 
bacl<stop for the  beam, 
cc, Reflections of t h e  IR beam should be a t t enua ted  by enclosure of 
t h e  beam and ta rge t  a rea  or al ternatively by eyewear ccnstructed of a 
material  opaque t o  the  CQ2 wavelength, such as Plexiglas. 
3.10.1.2 Lasers (continued) 
dd. Laser installations should incorporate adequate  means t o  prevent 
This can become a n  explosion or  f i r e  hazard. (See sect ion 3.3, 
CRYOGENICS.) 
Injury, Radiation ee. Caution should be  taken when operating lasers of subthreshold 
intensities. Current  sa fe ty  cr i ter ia  assume tha t  laser damage occurs on an  
all-or-none basis. Recen t  research by Lt.Col. G. L. M. Gibson, U. S. Air 
Force  School of Aerospace Medicine has proven t h a t  single subthreshold 
exposures which a r e  less than half of a threshold dose a r e  cumulative and 
therefore  each subthreshold exposure must damage, or  in some manner 
increase, t h e  ret inal  susceptibility t o  subsequent exposures. 
Flight Operations 
Laser experiments involving potential l y dangerous hea t  sources or  toxic  
materials  should be  performed in a reas  where personnel access can  be  
limited, and where adequate  ventilation and f i r e  protect  ion a r e  provided. 
Ground Operat  ions 
a. Most gas discharge tubes a r e  made of quartz. C a r e  should be 
exercised in using these, especially mercury vapor, as UV down t o  about  
1850 angstroms is possible. Eye and skin protection should be  utilized. 
b. Suitable sa fe ty  measures should be  taken when operating dis- 
charge tubes which require microwave cavi t ies  and corner reflectors. (See 
section 3.14, RADIATION.) 
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3.1 I PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
.- Payload pressure systems consist of pressure vessels, lines and hoses, 
support members, connections, valves, regulators, filters, seals, instrumentation, and all other 
hardware containing liquids or gases under pressure greater than ambient. The fluids and gases 
may be inert or chemically active and may be used over a wide range of temperatures. Special 
considerations for unique fluid and gas systems such as cryogenics, propulsion, hydraulics, and 
environmental controls are covered separately in this document under their respectively t i t led 
guide1 ine sections. 
L ike similar STS pressure systems, payload pressurized gas or f luid systems will be normally 
located away from inhabited areas. Where practical, they should also be separated from each 
other and from crit ical payloads or orbiter systems. Shields or structures should be used as 
added precautions against sympathetic explosion, f i re propagation, or damage due to  schrapnel. 
Payload pressure systems wil l  generally be subjected t o  the same fl ight environments as similar 
STS hardware. These systems should withstand, without damage or failure, the loads induced by 
STS vibration and accelerations at the temperatures and pressures that wil l be experienced in 
the STS environment. 
Special attention must be given to  the design and test of pressure vessels and related control 
devices to  prevent the possibility of explosion. For example, each pressure vessel should 
satisfactorily meet the requirements of NSS/HP- 1740.1 "Aerospace Pressure Vessel Fracture 
Control," and JSC 07700, Volume XIV, "Space Shuttle Payload Accommodations" to  accom- 
modate the most severe combination of environmental and pressure conditions expected in use. 
Fracture mechanics analysis is performed on aerospace pressure vessels to  determine flaw 
growth, stress corrosion, failure modes and other characteristics of  materials used for pressure 
vessels. Each type pressure vessel should successfully pass qualification tests to demonstrate 
compliance wi th design requirements. Each pressure vessel accepted for operational use must 
also pass acceptance tests to  prove its f l ight acceptability. 
Associated Hazards.- The primary hazard associated with pressure systems is explosion. Risk 
of explosion wi l l  depend on system variables such as pressure, volume, materials, wall thickness, 
shelf'life, and enviionment.' The degree of hazard to  be controlled "nder any barticular set of 
conditions is generally proportional to  the system pressure and volume of pressure vessels. For 
example, a low pressure high volume pressure system may contain as much explosive energy as a 
high pressure low volume system. The results of a pressure system explosion include fire; crew 
or equipment contamination due t o  release of toxic or corrosive fluids and gases; and crew 
injury or equipment damage from high velocity flying fragments or blast overpressure. 
Pressure systems need not explode t o  be hazardous. A tank or line rupture, a failed connector 
or f lex hose, or a broken seal could allow the leakage of toxic, corrosive, or flammable 
materials into occupied areas resulting in potential f i re or contamination hazards. Rupture of a 
length of tubing or flex hose could result in a violent whipping action of the i tem and could 
damage adjacent equipment or structure. 
Fire, contamination, explosion, and other hazards can also be caused by the improper selection, 
location, setting, and shielding of pressure system control devices. For example, pressure 
regulators can fail open because of excessive vibration; relief valves can fail t o  open when 
necessary to protect a pressure vessel; a vent valve may be designed to allow corrosive gas to 
impinge on sensitive equipment, and may create sufficient thrust I o  disrupt stability control of 
a deployed payload or even the STS. 
The following guidelines cover the various pressure system elements which may cause or be 
affected by these hazards and discuss the criteria for safe operation of fluid or gas systems. 
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3.1 1 . 1  Design 
3.1 I .  I .  l General 
a. The p i g n a t i o n  of pressure levels can vary betw7en low (0-500 
psi) (0-35 kglcm ), medium (.4ll-3000 psi) (35.2-2 10.9 kg/cm 1, high (3001 - 
1 0,0002 psi) (2 1 1-703.1 kg/cm ), and ultra high (above 10,000 psi) (703.1 
kg/cm ). Extreme c a r e  should be exercised in t h e  design and operation of 
all pressure systems t o  minimize t h e  potential hazard of leakage, component 
rupture, or  explosive disintegration with accompanying shock waves and 
fragmentation. The primary method for controlling pressure system hazards 
is by "design t o  contain." 
b. The design of pressure systems should include t h e  capability of 
returning t h e  system t o  a sa fe  condition at anyt ime during ground or  flight 
operations if an equipment fai lure o r  malfunction or  a procedural e r ro r  
occurs. Methods for accomplishing this could include: 
( I )  Provisions t o  bleed or  vent t h e  subsystem as protection 
against  overpressure rupturing or  bursting of sys tem elements. 
(2) Provisions for isolating portions of t h e  sys tem t o  preclude 
shutdown of t h e  en t i re  system. 
c. If a t  all possible, pressure systems should be  located outside 
inhabited a reas  of t h e  shut t le  vehicle. Also, they should not be located in 
proximity t o  other  sources of high energy such as heat ,  power, and pressure 
unless adequate  shielding has been provided. 
d ,  Payload pressure systems should withstand all shut t le  initiated 
structural  loads, acceleration,  shock, or o ther  loads while under operating 
pressure conditions and maximum operating t empera tu re  without suffering 
permanent set, s t ress  damage or leakage. A complete  structural  analysis 
should therefore  b e  conducted on all high pressure systems. This would 
include t h e  worst-case consideration of vibration induced stress, surge and 
shock stress, acceleration loading, and thermal degradation of s t rength ,  a s  
applicable. 
e. Nonpropulsive venting of fluids and gases has been incorporated 
on previous manned space programs and is also t o  be accomplished on t h e  
shut t le  program. The payload designer should also s t r ive  t o  provide 
nonpropulsive venting and pressure re1 ief, because significant unvented 
thrust  can be generated a t  t h e  open end of small lines, even under low 
pressu2e' For example, a I-inch (2.54 cm)  line charged t o  200 psi (14 
kg/cm ) can develop approximately 180 pounds (82 kg) of thrust. 
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3.1 1.1.1  General (continued) 
f. Pumps, valves, regulators, lines and hoses, and all such 
prefabricated components of a pressure system should have an authenticated 
pressure and service rating equal t o  or greater than the maximum allowable 
pressure for those components. 
g. To minimize leakage and possible overstress conditions, pressure 
system lines and component joints should be of welded or brazed construc- 
tion. Solder joints are more susceptible to  leakage and should be avoided. 
h. Dissimilar metals should not be used in coolant system compo- 
nents if a galvanic circuit is thereby established with the coolant acting as 
the electrolyte. 
i. Design provisions should be made to  relieve atmospheric pressure 
from payloads so that during the mission ascent phase there wil l be no 
possibility of pressurization beyond structural l imits of the payload. 
Conversely, during the mission descent phase, payloads should also be 
provided the capability to relieve vacuum conditions because of outside 
ambient pressure. 
j. Shock waves can be generated within a pressure system because 
of sudden changes in gas flow. Those shock waves can generate pressure 
spikes far in excess of the system's design operating limits. Sudden changes 
in valve settings, rapid directional changes, or close-ended T-joints shoutd be 
avoided in the design of pressure system components. 
k. Pressure systems for oxidizers and fuels and other safety cr i t ical 
pressurizing systems should be free from dirt, lubricants, metallic debris, 
and organic matter which may combine with the propellants to cause f i re  or 
explosion. 
1. Accurate sensors should be incorporated to  ensure that the 
pressure is totally relieved prior to opening the system for maintenance, 
replacement, checkout, or other reasons. Opening a pressure system prior t o  
total depressurization could create a hazard to  personnel or equipment in 
the vicinity. It could also damage equipment from explosive decompression. 
Pressure Vessels 
a. Payload pressure vessel structural retention devices/ brackets 
should be capable of withstanding the 9 g crash load l imit established for 
orbiter structure. Failure of pressure vessel retention mechanisms could 
result in failure which may be catastrophic t o  the shuttle and its crew at  
this cr i t ical time. 
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3.1 1.1.2 Pressure Vessels (continued) 
b. It is highly desirable that all pressure vessels be designed so that 
failure due to  overpressure or to  material properties wi l l  not produce 
shrapnel. Methods to minimize this hazard include: 
( I  ) Use of appropriate safety factors in tank design. 
(2) Use of fiberglass wound tanks. 
(3) Use of pressure relief devices t o  eliminate overpressure 
conditions. 
(4) Use of fracture mechanics analyses for each pressure 
vessel material used and application desired. 
(5) Reduction of stress concentration as a factor in tank 
design. 
( 6 )  Assurance that fabrication materials of a pressure vessel 
are metallurgically compatible with the contents. 
(7) Qualification tests to  verify design of a particular pressure 
vessel and acceptance testing to  identify random manufacturing defects. 
(8) Use of  shrapnel proof barriers or remotely located tank 
installation points to prevent propagation of an explosion from one tank t o  
another and to  protect the orbiter crew and other cr i t ical equipment. 
(9) It is recommended that the requirements of NSSIHP- 
1 740.1, "Aerospace Pressure Vessel Fracture Control," be satisfied for the 
design, test, and operation of lightweight metall ic pressure vessels and 
systems. 
c. Pressure vessels should normally be installed outside the STS 
manned or pressurized compartments to protect the crew and the pressure 
integrity of the compartment. Small pressure vessels may be permitted 
inside the pressurized compartment (cabin) provided they do not have 
credible failure modes and their failures wil l not expose the crew or vehicle 
t o  hazards. 
d. Double containment is highly recommended whenever toxic, 
flammable, or corrosive fluid can create an immediate hazard i f  inadver- 
tently released into a habitable area, Venting i f  provided should be t o  space 
or to  another onboard container. 
e. Pressure vessels should be protected against failure by implosion 
as a result of inadequate inflow of  ullage gas or pressurants as the tank 
content is drained. Protective devices would include the use of pressure 
relief valves and special procedures for prevention of tank draining without 
acceptable inflow of ullage gas. 
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Explosion, 
Collision 
f. The location of pressure vessels within an assembly or as 
installed on the shuttle must consider the possibility of  tank failure caused 
by impact wi th adjacent hardware. Tank mounting designs should allow for 
structural distortions due to internal pressure, aerodynamic forces, vibra- 
tion, and sustained acceleration loading. 
Collision, Loss o I g. Pressurized gas vessels must be f i rmly secured by their mounting Entry Capability brackets to  prevent a vessel from becoming a projectile from the thrust of the contained gas i f  a line or connector failure occurs. 
Contaminat ion, h. The structural stability of a pressure vessel or its surrounding 
Fire, Explosion payload structure should not be dependent on the tank's being pressurized. If 
tank structural stability is independent of tank pressurization, then safety 
wil l be enhanced by: 
( I  ) Precluding. the necessity for transporting, testing, and 
installing the payload (tank) in its pressurized mode. 
( 2 )  Allowing tank pressurization a t  the latest time possible in 
launch preparation. 
(3) Eliminating the possibility of tank collapse by accidental 
depressurization. 
(4) Dumping of tank contents under abort conditions and 
landing loads without collapsing the tank. (Emergency landing with a 
pressure vessel fully tanked and pressurized is undesirable.) 
Contamination i. Pressure vessels and reservoirs should have isolation shutoff 
valves installed as close as possible to the downstream exit of the pressure 
vessel but below the pressure relief device if one is used. 
Contamination j. Provisions should be made to  drain liquid from pressure vessels t o  
enhance safety during maintenance or replacement of components. 
Explosion k. Pressurized gases should be isolated from heat sources, be cooled 
by refrigeration, or be insulated to  prevent excessive pressure buildup. 
Explosion, 1. Pressure vessels should be clearly marked or labeled t o  identify 
Collision, Fire operating pressure, type of content, and capacity. 
Loss of Entry m, The gaseous quantity capacity of pressure vessels should be 
Capability l imited or a flow restrictor added so that a failure causing rapid expansion 
into the orbiter cargo bay wil l  not result in overpressurization of the bay. 
This would be a concern only when the cargo bay doors are closed (i.e., 
during launch preparation, launch, entry, and landing phases). 
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3.1 1.1.2 Pressure Vessels (continued) 
n. Each pressurized gas source or line within a manned 
compartment (spacelab, orbiter cabin), which could release gas into the 
compartment at  a greater rate than the compartment pressure relief and 
vent system can discharge it, should have a flow restriction device at the 
pressure source to reduce the flow of gas to  a level which can be handled by 
the manned compartment relief system. 
o. Venting of inert or nonhazardous gases into the orbiter payload 
bay should be minimized at all times but should be further restricted during 
periods when the payload bay doors are closed (i.e., during prelaunch, launch, 
entry, and landing phases). 
p. Hazardous gases or liquids (toxic, corrosive, flammable, 
radioactive) should not be vented into the payload bay. Safety should be 
achieved by "design to contain." 
q. Payload vents should not be propulsive. The location of vent 
ports should be located away from hot spots and should not impinge on any 
surface which may be sensitive to  the venting material. 
Lines, Tubing, and Hoses 
a. It is important that all pressure lines (fixed or flexible) be 
properly clamped and supported to minimize flexing, chafing, abrasion, and 
strain which could lead to line leakage or rupture and to  restrain the line if 
rupture does occur. 
The following criteria for clamping and supporting pressure lines or hoses 
should be considered for applicability to individual designs: 
( I )  System components should be supported by f i rm structure 
rather than by connecting tubing. 
(2) A l l  lines used infixedapplicationsshouldbeindependenJ.ly 
clamped or supported. 
(3) Clampsand supportsshouldnot restr ictthermal expansion 
and contraction of the lines and should protect against damage from 
mechanical stress and vibration. 
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3.1 1.1.3 Lines, Tubing, and Hoses 
(4) All rigid lines should be  supported a s  close a s  possible t o  
each bend in t h e  line. 
(5) Flexible hoses should have a maximum slack allowance of 5 
percent  of t h e  to ta l  length. 
(6) Flexible hoses should have hose restraints connected across  
t h e  hose connections and should be  secured t o  t h e  structural  members. 
(7) Flexible hose res t ra ints  should b e  a t  least  50 percent  
stronger than t h e  calculated impact fo rce  on an open line (under maximum 
operating pressure) moving through t h e  flexure distance of t h e  restraint. 
(8) A protective coating should be  provided as  an  integral par t  
of each  flexible hose t o  preclude damage f rom abrasion or  chafing. 
( 9 )  Welds and wall thicknesses should be  verified for require- 
ment  compliance by nondestructive tests. 
Contamination, b. When routing pressure lines, t h e  following safe ty  considerations 
Fire,  Injury should be  observed: 
( I )  High pressure lines should not be routed through manned 
compartments.  If this is unavoidable, a shutoff valve should be located in 
t h e  line immediatley a f t e r  it enters  t h e  compartment.  
(2) Where redundant fluid o r  gas lines a r e  used, t h e  redundant 
line should b e  separated as f a r  a s  practical  f rom t h e  primary line. 
(3) Vent lines and pressure relief lines should be located s o  
tha t  escaping gas or liquid will not be  hazardous t o  personnel or o ther  
equipment. 
( 4 )  Fluid lines should be  protected f rom freezing because of 
proximity t o  cryogenics or exposure t o  space. A thermostatically controlled 
heater  is one  method of protecting fluid lines from clogging. 
(5) Plumbing lines should not be  routed over sensitive equip- 
ment  t o  protect  this  equipment f rom leaks or condensed moisture during 
ground operat  ions. 
(6) Locations of service points for  filling, draining, purging, or  
bleeding pressure systems during ground operations should be external  t o  t h e  
shut t le  vehicle where practical and when t h e  sys tem contents const i tu te  a 
hazard. 
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3.1 1.1.3 Lines, Tubing, and Hoses (continued) 
c. Pressure lines and flexible hoses should be shielded, located or  
otherwise protected t o  preclude use a s  hand-holds or foot-holds during 
ground or  flight operations. 
d. It is usually advantageous f rom design, weight, and sa fe ty  
standpoints t o  use rigid type tubing in all applications except  when 
vibration, re la t ive  motion, contraction, o r  expansion properties a r e  unusually 
severe. Only in such cases  should flexible hose construction be  considered. 
e. All lines, including flexible hoses, should b e c l e a r l y  m a r k e d o r  
coded t o  identify content,  capacity,  operating pressure, direction of flow, 
d a t e  of last proof tes t ,  and t h e  required r e t e s t  interval. 
f. In t h e  design of f lex hose routing, sharp bends or twists  should be 
avoided. A minimum of f ive t imes  t h e  outside diameter  of t h e  hose is 
considered acceptable  as a bend radius. 
g. In a complex plumbing installation, it is sometimes difficult  for  
fabrication, assembly, and t es t  personnel t o  know t h e  direction of flow. It 
is, therefore,  important t o  el iminate installation errors  of fluid line 
components whose function is dependent on direction of flow. To minimize 
this possibility, t h e  following design sa fe ty  fea tu res  should be  considered. 
( I )  When feasible, the  design of direction sensitive fluid line 
components should incorporate end f i t t ings  or connections whose dimensions 
or configurations will not permit  incorrect  assembly/installation. 
(2) Where feasible, flow checks should be made a f t e r  each 
installation or change. 
(3) The direction of fluid flow should be clearly indicated with 
permanent markings on t h e  exterior of t h e  various components and mating 
I ines. 
( 4 )  Staggered fi t t ings and di f ferent  d iameter  lines a r e  recom- 
mended ways t o  prevent cross-connecting lines. 
h. Lines, piping and components within each payload subsystem 
should be  electrically bonded across each connection and should be grounded 
t o  reduce static electrical  potential. 
i. When insulating liquid-carrying pressure lines, t h e  insulating 
material  should be nonabsorbent. 
j. A positive sealing capability should be provided a t  t h e  quick 
disconnect in pressurized fluid and gas  lines when these lines a r e  
disconnected. 
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3.1 1.1.3 Lines, Tubing, and Hoses (continued) 
k. Transfer lines, including double-wal led lines, should be  purged 
a f t e r  t h e  transfer of hazardous fluids and before breaking plumbing 
connections. 
I. Fluid lines tha t  will be  required t o  be disconnected o r  severed 
during payload deployment or  separation f rom t h e  spacecraf t  should include 
a check valve or  shutoff valve on both sides of t h e  severed point t o  prevent 
loss of fluid a f t e r  disconnection has been made. The system should also be  
designed so  tha t  any line breakage resulting f rom failure of t h e  disconnec- 
t ing device t o  function will occur on t h e  discarded side of the  disconnect. 
m. In t h e  design of liquid and gas  systems, consideration should be  
given t o  leak test ing a f t e r  installation of t h e  system has been completed. 
3.1 1.1.4 Connectors and Fit t ings 
a. Connectors should be keyed, sized, or located so they cannot be 
cross-connected thereby minimizing t h e  possibility of connecting incompat- 
ible gases, fluids or  pressure levels. 
b. Connectors and fi t t ings which will be  disconnected e i ther  during 
ground or flight operations should be provided with te thered end plates, 
caps, plugs, or covers t o  protect  t h e  sys tem from contamination o r  damage 
when not in use. 
c. Brazed and welded joints a r e  preferred for joining pressure lines 
s ince  these  type joints a r e  less susceptible t o  leakage problems. Brazed 
joints were  successfully used on t h e  Skylab Program. 
d.. Cr i ter ia  for t h e  choice of metall ic fittings, sleeves, and 
connectors should include s t ress  corrosion resistance properties. 
e. Torque values for all threaded fi t t ings and components should be  
clearly specified in t h e  design, and special c a r e  should be  taken t o  assure  
t h a t  assembly and installation personnel use these  values. 
f. B-nuts and sleeves made f rom 2014, 2017, 2024, and 7075 
aluminum alloys in t h e  T4 or T6 tempers,  or  type 303 stainless steel, should 
not be used because of susceptibility t o  s t ress  corrosion and leakage. 
3.11.1.5 Fil ters 
a. Orifices, close tolerance valves, and contamination sensitive 
equipment in fluid systems should be  adequately protected from contami- 
nants. If t h e  system is designed for periodic flow reversal or t h e  possibility 
exists  t h a t  flow reversal could occur, both sides of these  i tems should be  
protected.  The use of properly sized and located fi l ters is recommended for 
these  applications. 
3*!  I - !  I 
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3.1 1 SUBSYSTEM PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
CUiDELlPdES 
3.1 I .  1.5 Filters (continued) 
b. Fi l ter design should consider the peculiar demands imposed by 
orbital operations to remove weightless debris which under normal ground 
operations would natural1 y separate and be retained in sumps. 
c. Filters should be installed in pumps and compressor inlet lines to  
protect delicate or close tolerance components from contaminants. A 
differential pressure gage should be installed across such fi l ters when an 
increase in pressure could become a hazard. 
d. As a cleanliness measure, all ground support equipment supplying 
liquids or gases to fl ight systems should have fi l ters installed as the last 
components in each supply line. 
e. Where very close control is required or where a very low 
contamination level is to be maintained, fi l ters should be placed downstream 
of each disconnect. 
f. Fi l ter housings which must be removed from the system to  
replace Filters are not recommended. This procedure merely adds to the 
possibility of further contamination and f i l ter  malfunction. 
g. Extreme care should be exercised by assembly, test, or f l ight 
personnel during any operation requiring opening a line between a device and 
its protective f i l ter  to  ensure that additional contamination is not 
introduced. 
3.1 1.1.6 Seals and Gaskets 
a. The materials used for seals, gaskets, fittings, and lubricants 
should be compatible wi th the fluids and gases wi th which they wi l l  be used 
and should meet the clean1 iness and contamination requirements of the 
system. (See section 3.8, MATERIALS, for materials selection guidelines). 
b, Where extra protection against leakage is desired or where seal 
damage or wear can be expected, the use of double seals should be 
considered i f  each seal can be verified separately and the seal material i s  
compatible with the medium. It may also be desirable to provide seal 
replacement capability for such applications. 
c, Any deployable type payload using a fluid system f i l l  and drain 
urnhif ical should incorporate a positive - seal when the lines are disconnected 
during the deployment operafions, I he seal could be provided by a shutoff 
valve located inboard of the payload disconnect, This would prevent 
draining or backflow of f l r~ids into the payload bay once the line disconnect 
has been made. 
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Valves - General 
a, Valves for high pressure oxygen systems (3000 psi range) (21 1 
kg/cm2) should be slow opening and closing types. Fast operating valves in 
such high pressure oxygen systems could possibly result in the ignition of 
contaminants that may be present in the oxygen or trapped a t  the valve. 
Also valve components such as seats and seals should not contribute to the 
contaminat ion of these high pressure systems. 
b. It is not advisable to use soft-seated hand valves, especially 
upstream of regulators, or other contamination sensitive components in f luid 
systems. The tendency to overtorque valves by operating personnel could 
cause the soft seat to rupture, disintegrate, and contaminate downstream 
component devices. 
c. It is recommended that f low restrictors, orifices, and similar 
flow limiting devices be installed immediately downstream of any 
component which could fai l  open and exceed the flow or relief capacity of 
downstream elements or compartments. An example on Apollo was the 
placement of a flow restrictor downstream of the high pressure oxygen 
regulator valve to protect the crew cabin from overpressurization should the 
regulator fail open. It is also recommended that f low restrictors or orifices 
should not be located in a system vent or pressure relief line. 
d. Restriction orifices should only be used for pressure regulation 
under dynamic flow conditions since under static flow conditions the 
pressure would be equal across the orifice, and the downstream system 
would no longer be protected from the source pressure. 
e. Valves should be designed t o  minimize the generation of shock 
waves and sudden pressure surges or sudden changes in flow. 
f. Valves or similar components that could be operated out of 
sequence should be provided with interlocks so that flammable or toxic 
fluids cannot be introduced into a habitable area of the spacecraft. 
g. To prevent inadvertent operation of hand operated valves, 
locking pins or similar devices should be included in the design of these type 
valves. In addition, manually operated valves should not be used to bypass 
pressure regulators or other flow control devices. 
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a. Pressure relief valves should be designed to  protect against a 
pressure regulator's being stuck or failed in the ful l  open position. The 
particular relief valve should be sized to exceed the maximum flow 
capabil t iy  of its upstream pressure regulator, This capacity is necessary t o  
protect the overall pressure system from further malfunction, system 
overpressure and possible rupture. 
b. To protect the low side of a pressure system from the effects of 
pressure regulation malfunction, the following relief valve settings should be 
maintained: 
( I )  The init ial opening of system relief valves should be set in 
accordance with the hazard potential of the pressurized system. I 
(2) Any relief valve init ial opening setting should never be 
higher than the proof pressure level of the protected system. 
c. In the design of sealed panels, consoles, or similar enclosures 
which contain liquid or gas system components, consideration should be 
given t o  the use of pressure relief devices. 
d. Where relief valves and burst discs are used in combination, the 
relief valves should be located upstream of burst discs. 
e. System relief devices should be clearly marked to  indicate 
system function, flow direction, operating pressure setting, latest test data 
and retest requirement interval. 
f ;  When pressure vessels are protected by pressure relief devices, 
flow restrictors should be used when the rate of pressure relief constitutes a 
potential hazard. 
I 1 3.1 1.1.9 Pressure Regulators I 
Contamination, 
Explosion 
Explosion, 
Contaminat ion 
a. It is recommended that pressure regulators for step regulation be 
sized to operate in the center 50 percent of their total ranges. Regulators 
operating at the extreme ends of their operating ranges tend to  creep and 
become inaccurate. 
b. The maximum operating pressure setting of a regulator should 
not be greater than 75 percent of its maximum pressure regulation 
capabi I i ty. 
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3.1 1.1.9 Pressure Regulators (continued) 
c. If regulator input and output  gages a r e  used, they should be 
located a s  close a s  possible t o  t h e  regulator for accuracy. 
d. Adjustable pressure regulation devices should be plainly marked 
t o  indicate t h e  direction of pressure increase and decrease  adjustment, t h e  
range of pressure control, la tes t  test data ,  and re tes t  requirement interval. 
e. The operating charac te r  istics of pressure regulator valves should 
consider t h e  pressure sensitivity of t h e  downstream components t o  
f luctuation or  interruption of flow. 
1 3.1 1.1.10 Shutoff Valves 
a. Isolation shutoff valves should be  installed in each leg of multiple 
systems, experiments, or payloads which a r e  supplied f rom a common liquid 
or gas pressure source. In this way, any branch of t h e  overall manifolded 
pressure supply system can be isolated f rom t h e  others if a fai lure in t h a t  
branch occurs. These valves could also be used for independent control over 
liquids, gases or vacuum being supplied t o  each experiment or subsystem 
during test and checkout operations, 
b. Shutoff valves should never be used in series with relief valves 
unless a burst disc or  some other  positive relief device is installed t o  bypass 
t h e  shutoff valve. 
c. Shutoff valves should be  used a t  reservoirs and s torage vessels if 
maintenance is required. 
/ 3.1 1 . 1 . 1  I Check Valves I 
a. Check valves a r e  not intended t o  be used a s  shutoff valves and 
should not be considered as sa fe ty  protection against t h e  migration of 
hazardous vapors or  gases. 
b. Check valves with sof t  s e a t s  should not be t e s ted  t o  higher 
pressures than the  intended design pressure. The s e a t  could later  crack 
and/or disintegrate and could contaminate  sys tem elements  or  destroy t h e  
design purpose of t h e  valve. 
1 3.1 1.1.12 Pressure Sensing and Monitoring 
a. A pressure sensing device should be installed on the  low side of 
pressure regulators, a t  pressure vessels, and a t  any point in a pressurized 
system where an upstream overpressure malfunction could exceed the  
maximum allowable system pressure. 
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b. I f  a pressure regulation failure or malfunction can be injurious to 
the crew or the mission, the payload designer should ensure that a pressure 
readout is readily visible to  the crew. An audible warning device should also 
be provided which wil l  actuate at  a predetermined pressure level allowing 
t ime for corrective action. 
c. Direct readout pressure gages should be avoided since it is 
undesirable to route pressurized lines inside inhabited areas. Pressure 
transducers or other electrical devices should be used for pressure 
instrumentat ion. 
d. One consideration in the design of pressure systems is the 
arrangement of components to allow operation and surveillance from a 
common point that is relatively safe for personnel. For example, an 
operator of  a high pressure system should not have to leave a remote control 
station to observe and monitor the system pressures. Valves should be 
remotely controlled where possible, and maintenance should not be required 
when the system is pressurized, 
3.1 1.2 Flight Operations 
None 
3.1 1.3 Ground Operations 
I 1 3.1 1.3.1 Test and Checkout I 
Explosion, 
Collision 
Explosion, 
Collision, Injury 
Explosion, 
ConbaminaPion 
a. Prior to installation in a system, pressure vessels, accumulators, 
fabricated tubing, valves, flexible hoses, and fi l ters should be proof tested to 
ensure .their withstanding internal test pressures higher than design 
operating pressures without failure or structural deformation. Test fluids 
should be analyzed for compatibility with the pressure vessel materials used. 
For example, some fluids can accelerate stress corrosion. 
b. Hydrostatic testing is a relatively safer and more reliable 
method of system testing than pneumatic proof testing because of the higher 
stored energy contained in a compressed gas. Even though liquids are 
generally considered noneompressible and are safer I-o handle than gases, 
they do store up energy; therefore, hydrostatic tests must also be considered 
hazardous. 
c, Pressure sys-kern elements that have been modified, damaged, / 
repaired, or disturbed should be retested and/or requalified as applicable, 1 
3.1 1.3.1 Test  and Checkout (continued) 
of proof tests would const i tu te  fa t igue cycling which could seriously a f f e c t  
t h e  sa fe ty  and service l ife of these  pressure vessels. 
should be  measured during these  tests for  assurance against abrasive chafing 
of such pressure vessels and plumbing against adjacent s t ructure  during la ter  
ground and flight operations. 
f. Components t h a t  have been pressurized a t  or  near their  
calculated burst or u l t imate  pressure limits should have no subsequent use 
other  than test .  These components should be marked conspicuously and 
permanently t o  warn of explosion hazards if pressurized. 
Contamination g. Payload pressurized systems containing hazardous fluids should 
have an inert  gas leak check, under full operating pressure, prior t o  
installation into t h e  orbiter  payload bay. Consideration should be  given t o  
performing a helium gas low pressure leak t es t  a f t e r  installation in t h e  
payload bay and before propellant loading of t h e  shut t le  or  o ther  STS 
elements. This check will assure t h a t  leakage ra tes  a r e  acceptable  a f t e r  
transport  and installation operations. 
h. All hazardous payload eff luents  vented during ground servicing or  
deservicing should be contained at t h e  shu t t l e  vehicle and la ter  returned t o  a 
sa fe  facility disposal area. The presence of f r e e  combustibles or  oxidizer 
vapors in t h e  vicinity of t h e  shut t le  vehicle and launch pad could c r e a t e  a 
f i r e  o r  explosion hazard. 
3.1 1.3.2 Transfer and Transport 
a. The handling and t ransfer  of mutually reactive or incompatible 
( I )  React ive  fluids should not be handled or  transferred 
simultaneously, or t h e  en t i re  system should be  completely separated t o  
prevent accidental mixing. 
(2) After  fluid transfer,  t h e  transfer lines should be  purged t o  
neutralize t h e  potentially hazardous e f f e c t s  of trapped or residual fluids. 
(3) Design of fluid sys tems should prevent t h e  possibility of 
interconnecting incompatible systems. 
3.1 1-17 
3.1 1 $3.2 Transfer and Transport (continued) 
(4) Procedures should b e  developed t o  purge cleaning agents  
from t h e  fluid system. 
(5) Cleaning agents must be  compatible with t h e  fluid sys tem 
with which they a r e  used. 
( 6 )  Fluid systems should b e  identified by function, commodity, 
pressure limits, and direction of flow. 
(7) Paramete rs  such a s  pressure and temperature  should be  
monitored throughout fluid transfer or  transportation periods. 
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3.1% PROPULSION 
.- On certain deployed payloads, propulsion systems are required. The 
propulsion system functions would include thrust for translation of the payload into orbit that 
. . 
the STS cannot attain, attitude control, scientific platform stabilization or rotation for pointing 
control, and translation maneuvers to accomplish rendezvous during retrieval operations. The 
types of propulsion systems (liquid or solid), the propellant combinations (mono-, hypergol, 
cryogen, etc.), the propellant feed pressure system, the start system (cartridge, tank head, or 
pressure bottle) are tailored to the particular mission requirements to accomplish scientific 
objectives. Other influencing factors in the selection of propulsion systems are performance, 
safety, cost, and compatibility with the STS. 
The hardware elements of liquid or solid propulsion systems are designed to contain, pressurize, 
relieve, deliver, mix, and exhaust the propellants in a controlled manner to produce thrust. 
In addition to  controls and monitoring electronic equipment, propulsion system elements wil l  
general l y include: 
Liquid Propulsion Solid Propulsion 
Injector and manifold 
Combustion chamber 
Gimbals and actuators 
Nozzle and extension 
Turbopumps 
Gas generator 
Start cartridge 
Propel lant tanks 
Control valves and plumbing 
Motor case 
Nozzle and extension 
Gimbals and actuators 
Propellant grain 
Ignitor/initiator 
Thrust termination devices 
Associated Hazards.- The hazards of transporting propulsion systems in the cargo bay of the 
orbiter are primarily associated with the propellants and pressurants since these are the primary 
. . 
sources of energy for these systems. The main concern is  the potential for ignition o f  free 
propellants in  the orbiter bay and the resultant damage that would be sustained from f i re  or 
explosion. Contamination, toxicity, and corrosion are also items of concern for some 
propellarits even i f  ignition does not occur. 
The safety emphasis i s  to assure that propulsion system propellants do not leak and are not 
ejected or vented from their containers into the payload bay. It i s  also important to avoid the 
presence of ignition sources in the payload bay if propellants do escape. The inert nitrogen gas 
purge of the cargo bay while the orbiter and payloads are on the launch pad in a serviced 
condition wil l  l imi t  f i re and explosion potentials. The safety of ground personnel i s  also a 
concern during the handling, servicing, and installation activities of ground operations 
associated with payloads with propulsion systems. Flammability and toxicity properties of some 
propellants are presented in table 3.12-11. 
The following safety guidelines can be tailored for specific payload propulsion system 
applications and indicate possible ways to eliminate or minimize the effects of the hazards. 
These guidelines generally cover those design and operational elements which are unique to 
propulsion. Other subsystem guideline sections which are related to propulsion and which should 
be reviewed for additional safety criteria applicable to propulsion systems include sections 3.13, 
PYROTECHNICS, and 3.1 I, PRESSURE SYSTEMS. 
TABLE 3-1 2-11.- FLAMMABl LlTY AND TOXICITY PROPERTIES OF PROPELLANTS 
PAYLOAD SAFETY GU 
13.12.1 Design 
I 1 3.12.1.1 SRP (Solid Rocket Propulsion) 
Collision, a. Safe and arm devices used on SRP should be equipped with 
Explosion, Fire positive safing capabilities during all installation and checkout operations. 
Collision, b. After an SRP system is installed in the orbiter payload bay, 
Explosion, Fire status of safety critical functions should be displayed to provide warning of 
unsafe conditions. 
Collision, c. Certain weather seals are removed prior to launch while others 
Explosion, Fire are left in place at motor ignition. Seals which are not removed should be 
designed so that they will rupture at motor ignition without leaving 
remnants that affect flow or pressure. 
Explosion, Fire d. The SRP should be grounded to all other related spacecraft 
hardware to prevent electrostatic charge buildup or a difference in potential 
for any reason. 
I ( 3.12.1.2 Liquid Rocket Propulsion 
Explosion 
Explosion 
a. Cleanliness requirements for propulsion propellant lines should be 
established, monitored, and control led. Some propellants react explosively 
with contaminants. 
b. Closed systems and compartments containing propel lants should 
be capable of in-flight venting through use of the orbiter-provided vent 
system or should be designed to withstand maximum allowable system 
pressure. 
Explosion, c: Construction materials for payload propulsion systems should be 
Corrosion, Fire compatible with the type of propellant used. 
Fire, d. Nonabsorbent insulation should be used where propellant systems 
Contamination require thermal protection from engine heat or cold environment. 
Fire, e. Insulation should be inspected for presence of absorbed propel- 
Contamination lants or other system fluids, and the payload should not be installed in the 
orbiter i f  vapors are detected. 
Explosion, Fire, a. Pressurizationof propellantsshouldbeaccomplishedas lateas 
Corrosion possible (i.e., after deployment where practical) to maintain the payload 
propulsion system in a relatively passive state while in the orbiter cargo bay. 
Explosion, Fire, b, Tank filler openings should be located so that when in a one 
Contamination gravity environment, leaking, loose, or unfastened caps will not allow 
propellants to drain into the cargo compartment. 
structural collapse of a propellant tank in the orbiter payload bay could be 
d. Common bulkheads between fuel and oxidizer tanks of hypergolic 
propellants should be avoided. Also, hypergolic fuels and oxidizers should 
not be separated by a single weld. 
e. Payload propellant tanks should be oriented within the cargo bay 
for maximum protection from rupture during a crashlanding of the orbiter. 
3.12.1.4 Plumbing (Fill, Drain, Vent) 
a. Dumping, venting, and relief of payload propellants and 
pressurants should be thrust neutralized to preclude rotational or 
translational velocities of the payload while in the vicinity of the orbiter. 
b. Propellant or pressurant lines should not be used to  support other 
d. The payload propellant fill, drain, and vent interface with the 
orbiter should permit main propulsion system propellant loading and 
replenishing, venting, and emergency detanking with the cargo bay doors 
closed and latched in a safe mode for launch. 
e. Payload propellant lines should be protected from excessive 
deflection due to the vibrations or accelerations of the space shuttle. 
f. Absorbent insulative materials should not be used on lines and 
g. Mutually reactive fluids and vapors should not be vented or 
relieved through the same exhaust ducts. 
Fluid systems should be identified by function, fluid, pressure, 
servicing actions. 
GUlDEblPdES 
3.12.1.5 Control and Monitor 
a. No single valve operation should result in flow of propellant 
b. A minimum of two discrete and separate command and control 
events should be provided to init iate opening of propellant flow control 
d. Payload valve actuation should not be initiated by fl ight or 
crashlanding loads. 
e. I f  common bulkheads are necessary, simultaneous pressurization 
f. During on-orbi t operations, propellant pressurization of the 
payload propulsion systems should be accomplished after deployment. 
g. Gimbal positions should be monitored and interlocks provided to 
inhibit f i r ing of a hard-over gimballed engine. 
h. Consideration should be given to instrumenting payload 
propulsion systems to indicate when established system parameters l imits 
have been exceeded. 
i. Sequential commands for payload attitude hold and main engine 
ignition should be remotely controlled by the orbiter crew or ground control. 
Interlocks should be provided to prevent out-of-sequence operation. 
j. Payload propulsion system electronic equipment that wi l l  be 
k. Payloads with thrusting capability should be designed with 
positive engine isolation capability to insure that "failed-on" or leaking 
engines can be isolated. 
a. Equipment, tanks, t ransfer  lines, and other  equipment which can 
transmit  sparks or generate  s t a t i c  e lect r ic i ty  charges should b e  properly 
grounded t o  prevent t h e  ignition of fuel/ propellant. 
t ransfer without excessive pressure loss. Construction materials ,  fabrica- 
tion methods, and cleaning procedures should be  adequate for extended 
service with t h e  specific propellant. System components should be 
adequately and rigidly supported with allowance for temperature  changes. 
(I ) Threshold limits of toxicity (maximum a1 lowable 
(2 )  Degree of toxicity and irritation. 
(3) Flammability limits in air. 
(4) F i re  extinguishing agents. 
(5) Decontamination agen t s  and procedures. 
( 6 )  Symptoms of exposure. 
(7) Initial countermeasures and first  aid for exposure. 
(8) Sensitivity t o  shock and heat. 
(9) Reaction sensitivity t o  contamination. 
(1 0) Purge gases and procedures. 
preventive design cr i ter ia  t h a t  should be  incorporated into t h e  sys tem are: 
( I )  Only construction mater ia ls  known t o  be  compatible with 
t h e  propellant should be  employed. 
( 2 )  The number of mechanical joints should be  reduced t o  a 
minimum t o  reduce t h e  probability of propellant or pressurant leakage. 
PAYLOAD SAFETY GU 
PROPULSION 
ASSOCIATED I HAZARD I 
3.12.1.6 Liquid Propellants (continued) 
(3) The system should be  designed t o  withstand safely the  
maximum operating pressures plus a sa fe ty  margin. 
I I ( 4 )  The transfer lines should be  f r e e  f rom liquid traps. 
(5) An inert  gas  system should be  provided t o  purge and drain 
t h e  transfer system without t h e  necessity of dumping residual propellant o r  
disconnecting any system joints. 
( 6 )  The valves, gaskets, and instruments used on t h e  sys tem 
should be reliable, compatible with t h e  propellant, and should be properly 
serviced. 
(7)  Sufficient control equipment should be  provided t o  isolate 
portions of t h e  system and t o  secure  transfer equipment for  emergencies o r  
component replacement. Remotely control led equipment should b e  designed 
t o  be fail-safe. 
(8) An inert gaseous blanketing system should be provided t o  
prevent a i r  from contacting propellant. 
(9) The t ransfer  and s torage system should be grounded t o  
prevent t h e  buildup of s t a t i c  electricity. 
I 1 3.12.2 Flight Operations 
Col I ision, 
Explosion, F i re  
Collision, 
Explosion 
Explosion, Fire,  
Contamination 
Contamination,  
Fire, Explosion 
a. The payload propulsion system should not be  electrically enabled 
o r  mechanically a rmed  while in t h e  orbiter  payload bay. 
b.. A payload propulsion system (excluding a t t i tude  control) should 
be enabled or a rmed  by R F  or  onboard computer command a f t e r  a "safe 
distance" from t h e  orbiter  has been achieved. Safe  distance should be 
computed so t h a t  no inadvertent  or  off-nominal operation or  fai lure of t h e  
propulsion s tage  would result in collision with t h e  orbiter  or  i t s  being struck 
by t h e  debris of an explosion. 
c. Where practical, propulsion payloads should be oriented,  
mounted, and secured in t h e  cargo bay in a manner t o  minimize orbiter-  
induced shock and vibration tha t  could init iate propellant flow or engine 
s tar t .  
d. Hot gas  propulsion and a t t i tude  control should not be used for the  
initial separation of t h e  payload t o  a sa fe  distance from the  orbiter. 
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3.12.2 Flight Operations (continued) 
Explosion, Fire, e. Propellant system safety cr i t ical functions should be rendered 
Contamination, safe before recovery of a deployed payload is attempted. This should 
Collision, include remotely commanding all safe and arm devices to  "safe," removing 
Corrosion power from electrical systems serving safety cr i t ical functions or removing 
power from electrical circuits in the upper stage. 
3.12.3 Ground Operations 
1 3.12.3.1 General 
Explosion, Fire, a. Properly trained personnel are required to  handle propellants 
Contamination safely. Operating personnel should be thoroughly fami liar wi th the 
following: 
( I )  The properties of the propellant. 
I (2) Operation of the transfer and storage system. I (3) Toxicity and physiological effects of the propellant. 
(4)  Operation and use of the safety equipment. 
I (5) Fire and spill prevention techniques. I ( 6 )  Fire and spill control measures. 
Explosion, Fire, b. Detailed procedures with "Caution" and "Warning" notations for 
Contamination, loading, handling, and draining propellants should be provided for prelaunch 
Corrosion and post landing activities. 
Collision, c. Solid rocket propulsion initiator and ignitor items should not be 
Explosion, installed during ground handling, transport, and storage operations. 
Fire, Injury Installation should be at  the latest feasible point during ground preparations 
for launch. 
Explosion, Fire d. The propellant system should be provided with static electricity 
protection during ground servicing. 
Explosion e. Buildings which house equipment for handling propellants should 
be well ventilated to prevent accumulation of vapors. 
Collision, Injury F. Consideration should be given to the use of thrust neutralizers 
during hazardous ground handling, transporting, and storage of SRP systems. 
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3.12.3.2 Test and Checkout 
a. Adequate proof pressure and leak testing of payload propulsion 
systems and their ground servicing equipment should be conducted before 
servicing operations at the launch site are performed. 
b. An inert gas low pressure leak check of payload propulsion fluid 
systems should be conducted after payload installation into the cargo bay 
and before propellant loading. 
c. Safe pressures, temperatures, and other parameters which 
indicate the status of hazardous payload fluids should be verified before 
handling, transport, or installation and checkout operations begin. 
d. Periodic proof-load certification of slings, hoists, l i f t ing and 
handling fixtures, and transporting equipment should be conducted to  assure 
the equipment i s  in safe operating order. 
SECTION 
NUMBER 
INDEX 
PYROTECHNIC GUIDELINES 
SUBSYSTEM 
PYROTECHNICS 
Design 
General 
Destruct 
Safe and Arm 
Electrical Circuitry 
Initiator Characteristics 
Propellants 
Explosives 
Flight Operations 
Ground Operations 
General 
Installation 
Test 
HAZARD 
.- Aerospace pyrotechnic devices consist of gas generators, detonators, start 
cartridges, explosive or frangible bolts and nuts, rocket motors, destruct systems, control 
elements, emergency flow control valves, etc. Functional applications for pyrotechnic devices 
continue to evolve. Payloads wi l l  have many applications for pyrotechnics. Some of the more 
obvious are tank pressurization valves, emergency dump valves, separation systems, and gas- 
operated deployment, retrieval and tiedown mechanisms. 
Pyrotechnic systems contain many elements that control and monitor the functional devices, 
Control elements include switches, initiators, ignitors, logic circuits, f i r ing circuits, and power 
supplies (usually separate dedicated batteries) with armldisarm capability, and safe and arm 
mechanisms. Monitor elements include circuit continuity test capability, safe and arm 
mechanism position indicators, safety pin streamers, and payload system measured parameters 
that indicate the functional status of the device. 
Pyrotechnics are initiated by activation of a f i re switch after al l  prerequisite event interlock 
contacts have been closed and the necessary mechanical and electrical arming events have been 
accomplished. A t  f i re switch activation, a low level electrical pulse progresses from the 
electrical power source through the f ir ing circuit to  the initiator bridgewire. The bridgewire 
heats and initiates the explosive train. There are many types of explosive trains. A common 
type uses explosives of progressively higher thermal energy output to reach the ignition 
temperature of the final pyrotechnic charge. This final charge is designed to  accomplish the 
pyrotechnic function, whether it is ignition of a solid rocket motor, extension of a solar array 
by a gas-driven actuator, or separation of  a bolt by explosion. 
Payload pyrotechnic functions wil l  normally be controlled through an electrical interface with 
the STS or directly from ground control. Firing commands and measurements may be 
telemetered from and to the STS or ground control, and they may be hardwired from and to the 
orbiter payload control console and caution and warning system i f  provided. The sensitivity of 
payload pyrotechnic devices t o  stray electrical energy, temperature, vibration, and shock of the 
STS environment should also be a design consideration. 
Pyrotechnic devices may control structural, electrical, or f luid interfaces between payloads 
and the STS. Tiedowns may be severed by explosive bolts in an emergency mode (i.e., backup to  
electromechanical separation). Electrical interfaces may be guillotined. Fluid interfaces may 
be opened for emergency dumping or may be shutoff and severed for payload jettisoning. 
To take advantage of previous experience, JSC 08060A, "Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic 
Specification," has been established and applies to all pyrotechnics in the space shuttle, to all 
NASA Centers with shuttle responsibilities, and their contractors or suppliers. JSC 08060A 
contains a "Shuttle Preferred Pyrotechnic Items Listtt which describes specific devices that have 
proven successful in previous programs. These devices meet the current shuttle requirements. 
The NSI (NASA standard initiator) which is a new designator for the earlier SBASl (single 
bridgewire Apollo standard initiator) used on the Apollo and Skylab Programs and Apollo Soyuz 
Test Project wil l be supplied as GFE (Government-furnished equipment) by NASA JSC to al l  STS 
users. NASA has concluded that the NSI can satisfy 90 to  95 percent of the STS requirements. 
In addition, the PIC (pyrotechnic initiator controller) used to  safe, arm, and f i re the NSI has 
been standardized throughout the shuttle vehicle and should be used for payload applications 
where practicable. 
There are two GSE (ground support equipment) items that are common and wil l be supplied as 
GFE by NASA JSC. These items are ( I )  the NSI f ir inq unit which simulates the f ir ing of the PIC 
and (2 )  the initiator resistance measuring equipment which is a special digital ohmmeter used 
for NSI acceptance and preinstal lation tests. 
Associated Hazards.- The general hazards associated with t h e  accidental  release of t h e  
explosive, propulsive, o r  thermal energy of pyrotechnic devices a r e  we1 l recoqnized, Individual 
sa fe ty  aialyses a r e  required t o  determine the  hazards of premature  pyrotechnic events during 
progressive phases of t h e  mission or t h e  e f f e c t s  of fai lure t o  function when required. 
P r e m a t u r e  performance o r  nonperformance of pyrotechnic functions can be  cri t ical  t o  personnel 
survival and t h e  preservation of the  system. 
P r e m a t u r e  extension of a payload antenna or  solar ar ray in t h e  cargo bay of t h e  orbiter  could 
injure personnel during ground operations. While on orbit,  premature  extension could inflict 
sufficient  damage t o  t h e  orbiter  cargo door o r  t h e  thermal protection system t o  render t h e  
orbi ter  unsafe for entry.  
Failure of a propellant dump system t o  function in an  emergency could increase t h e  hazard of 
an  a b o r t  or  crashlanding because of t h e  retention of significant amounts of propellants onboard 
during t h e  emergency. 
Most hazards  of premature  o r  accidental activation a r e  c rea ted  by procedural or  human error,  
s t ray e lect romagnet ic  energy f rom peripheral equipment, or  t h e  environment. Sequential event  
interlocks, electrical  armldisarm firing circuit  interrupts, and mechanical s a f e  and a r m  devices 
can  b e  used t o  preclude a single failure f rom inadvertently initiating pyrotechnic events. 
The evolution of pyrotechnic device design, manufacturing, and test ing pract ices  has resulted in 
exceptional reliability of pyrotechnic systems t o  function when commanded. When t h e  
redundancies usually incorporated in aerospace pyrotechnic sys tems a r e  included, t h e  
probability of their  performing when required has been historically high. When a nonignition 
failure does occur, it can  usually b e  t raced t o  fai lure t o  receive an e lect r ica l  command. Lesser 
contributors t o  nonperformance of qualified pyrotechnic i tems a r e  out-of-control processing or 
excessive environmental exposure. 
The following section presents pyrotechnic sa fe ty  design and operational guidelines t h a t  have 
been developed during years  of aerospace experience. It is also suggested t h a t  t h e  JSC listing 
of NASA-preferred pyrotechnic devices t h a t  a r e  qualified for certain applications b e  reviewed 
by payload designers. This review could identify off-the-shelf devices for some payload 
applications t h a t  a r e  already designed and qualified. 
3.13-4 
3.13. I. I General 
a. Safety crit ical pyrotechnic functions should have redundant 
sequence logic and firing circuits through dual initiators so that no single 
electrical, mechanical, or chemical failure would prevent circuit operation. 
b. Pyrotechnic device installations should be designed for ease of 
access, arming, safing, and removal. 
c. Pyrotechnic devices should be located within the system away 
from thermal zones that may approach the devices' safe-temperature limits. 
Where avoidance of excessive temperature zones i s  impossible, thermal 
insulation and heat sinks should be used to control the temperature within 
safe limits for the pyrotechnic device. 
d. Pyrotechnic devices should be designed so that the metal 
exterior can be electrically bonded to vehicle structure. 
e. Pyrotechnic units that are not intended for flight use should be 
color coded for conspicuous identification. 
f. The access, electrical circuitry, and test points of pyrotechnic 
units should be clearly marked in a distinctive manner. 
g. Pyrotechnic device explosive or propellant fi l led volumes should 
be designed to allow verification of content by neutron ray inspection or by 
other nondestructive test methods. 
h. Pyrotechnic devices should be hermetically sealed to protect the 
i. Al l  pyrotechnic system threaded connections should be designed 
for positive locking for fl ight operations. 
j. Pyrotechnic device housings should be designed to prevent debris 
damage to interfacing equipment from fragments created by an explosion. 
k. Pyrotechnic exhaust products should be contained or controlled 
I. Magnesium should not be used in the fabrication of pyrotechnic 
devices as it creates an additional f i re hazard. 
3.13-5 
GUIDELINES 
3.13.1.2 Destruct  
Should a waiver be  granted t o  allow a payload t o  have self-destruct  
capability, t h e  command/destruct  circuitry and mechanical interruption of 
t h e  explosive t ra in  should be  sufficiently inhibited t o  ensure a capability t o  
make t h e  system inert  on command from t h e  orbiter  or f rom ground control. 
3.13.1.3 Safe  and Arm 
a. If a waiver has been granted for  a dest ruct  system, its s a f e  and 
a rm device should have a positive mechanical lock (i.e., sa fe ty  pin) t h a t  
prevents movement from t h e  sa fe  t o  t h e  armed position. Removal of t h e  
sa fe ty  pin should not cause t h e  unit t o  arm. The s a f e  and a r m  devices shall 
have positive indexing, and visual indication of t h e  sa fe  or a rmed  position. 
3.13.1.4 Electrical  Circuitry 
a. Deployable payload pyrotechnics should have t h e  capability of 
being armed a f t e r  s a f e  distances from t h e  STS a r e  verified. 
b. Circuit  breakers and activation switches used to a r m  and init iate 
pyrotechnic devices should b e  located, guarded, placarded, and procedurally 
protected t o  avoid inadvertent  activation. 
c. The sa fe  and a r m  device control and monitor c i rcui ts  should b e  
completely independent of t h e  firing circuits  with separa te  noninterchange- 
able electrical  connectors. Arming and monitoring should not in i t ia te  
d. There should be  a n  a r m  and disarm interrupt of t h e  firing circuit  
of pyrotechnic devices with remote  control t o  e i ther  position t o  allow 
arming of pyrotechnics as l a t e  as possible in the  mission sequence. 
e. The a r m  and disarm s ta tus  of firing c i rcui ts  and discre te  
indications of pyrotechnic events  should have remote  monitoring capability 
t o  provide warning of hazardous conditions. 
f. Firing sequence logic should receive power from a source other  
than the  pyrotechnics bat ter ies  t o  avoid possibility of inadvertent  arming 
and firing of pyrotechnic devices. 
g. Pyrotechnic firing c i rcui ts  should be  separated f rom other  
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3.13.1.4 (continued) 
h. Where separation of f ir ing circuits from powered circuits through 
connectors is impractical, pin-to-pin and pin-to-case separation and electri- 
cal resistance should be maximized. 
i. Circuit and pin assignments within a connector should be such 
that any single short circuit occurring as a result o f  a bent pin wi l l  not allow 
current to  be applied to the pyrotechnic subsystem circuit. 
j. The fir ing circuit disarm interrupt should be as close to the 
pyrotechnic device as possible to prevent antenna effects from energizing 
the circuit. 
k. Firing circuits should be of minimum length and should use 
twisted wire pairs to minimize receiptof stray electrical energy from other 
circuits, RF sources, or buildup of a static charge. 
I. Firing circuit shielding should be continuous from the power 
source to the case with no gaps. Shielding should be grounded to  the payload 
structure at  both ends where possible. 
m. The fir ing circuitry should be designed to protect the power 
supply from a power drain in the event the device short circuits upon 
activation. 
n. Pyrotechnic circuits should be isolated to  prevent adverse 
effects from transients and ground loops. The fir ing circuit should have a 
separate return line to the power source for each initiator. 
3.13.1.5 lnif iator Characteristics 
a. The NSI or its equivalent should demonstrate a "no-fire" 
threshold when one ampere of direct current or one watt of power is applied 
for 5 minutes. 
b. The "all-fires' reliability of the NSI or i t s  equivalent should be 
demonstrated by test and analysis. 
c, Initiator pin-to-pin and pin-to-case resistance should be estab- 
lished to  preclude shorts or static chargeldischarge through the bridgewire, 
Compliance should be demonstrated by test and analysis, 
a. Propellant-operated devices such as mortars, thrusters, and 
circuit interrupters sh~u ld  demonstrate a structural capability of f i r ing in a 
locked-shut mode without fragmentat ion. 
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3.13.1,6 Propellants (continued) 
b. Solid propellant rocket motor or liquid rocket engine start 
cartridge nozzle weather seals that rupture or expel at  motor ignition should 
not leave remnants that significantly alter the flow through the nozzle, 
affect the pressure in the chamber, or damage the turbine blades or nozzles. 
3.13.1.7 Explosives 
a. The number and types of high explosives should be minimized. 
HNS, HMX, and RDX are the preferred high-explosive materials (in that 
order) because of their thern~al-vacuum characteristics and their relative 
insensitivity to shock. 
b. No splicing of LSC (linear shaped charges) or MDF (mild 
detonating fuse) should be allowed, This wi l l  eliminate one possibility for 
interrupting the explosive train. 
3.13.2 Flight Operations 
a. To reduce their susceptibility to  inadvertent firing, pyrotechnics 
should be armed as near to the t ime of expected use as is practical without 
compromising reliability . 
b. To l imi t  exposure to  inadvertent firing, pyrotechnics should be 
disarmed promptly when they are no longer needed. 
3.13.3 Ground Operations 
3,13.3.1 General 
a,. Special clothing that is flame retardant, static free, and with 
grounding provisions should be used during pyrotechnic installation. 
b. Materials capable of generating static-charges should not be used 
for pyrotechnic i tem packing, shipping, or ground handling. 
c. The suppliers of pyrotechnic devices are responsible for obtaining 
the proper explosives classification and the regulations for packaging, 
shipping, and storage of explosives, The Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic 
Specification, JSC 08060, provides the basis for control of all space shuttle 
pyrotechnics at the various levels of activity and should be considered for 
use by the payload developer. 
d. Pyrotechnic handling, inshi  lation, checkout, and test operations 
should be conducted by .I-echnical ly  quai if ied personnel in accordance with 
approved detailed procedures. 
3.13.3.1 General (continued) 
e. When conducting operations involving pyrotechnics, the minimum 
number of personnel should be exposed to the smallest quantity of 
pyrotechnics for the shortest time consistent with safe operations. 
f. Procedures should be written for ground operations involving 
pyrotechnics. These should include specific safety precautions such as 
grounding requirements, number of personnel, required tools, and electrical 
checkout equipment. 
g. Safe and arm device safety pins should be marked with a 
streamer when installed. Removal of the safety pin should be as late as 
practical before launch. 
3.13.3.2 Installation 
a. RF silence should be established and maintained during installa- 
tion and electrical connection of pyrotechnics. 
b. Sensitive initiating elements should be installed in the system 
just prior to electrical hookup as late as possible before launch. 
c. Shielding caps should be installed on initiators during shipment, 
handling, and storage. The cap's outer she1 l should be conductive, provide an 
RF shield, and make a positive electrical contact with the case. The cap 
should not be closer to the pins than the pins are to the case. 
a. Continuity test equipment should not be capable of delivering 
sufficient current to initiate or degrade pyrotechnic devices. (Standard 
b. A hazardous-current test of pyrotechnic circuits should be 
conducted prior to making f iring-circuit connections, and any residual 
current in the circuit should be eliminated before making the connection. 
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3.14 RADIATION 
.- On all previous manned space programs, the harmful effects of natural and 
f radiation were minimized by careful attention to cabin and e~uipmen-i 
shielding design, limits to radiation sources allowed onboard, allowable crew exposurk times, 
and accurate monitoring of radiation levels, I t  is of primary interest that such safe radiological 
controls be continued on the ST§ program and proposed payload elements. 
NASA implementation of NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) rules and regulations requires 
that the use of radioactive sources in the payloads to be flown on the STS must be reviewed and 
approved by JSC. This approval process may be initiated by use of JSC form JSC-44 which may 
be obtained from the JSC Space Shuttle Program Office. For payloads using RTG's 
(radioisotope thermoelectric generators) such as SNAP (systems for nuclear auxiliary power) and 
similar devices, approval wil l involve procedures identified in the NASA ERDA (Energy 
Resources and Development Agency) Interagency Agreement 1052.72A. 
There are various sources of ionizing radiation and electromagnetic interference type radiation 
which must be adequately controlled on payload elements to prevent damage to the shuttle 
spacecraft, other payload components or experiments, and the crew. Radiation-sensitive equip- 
ment includes ordnance system pyrotechnic circuits, communications, and orbiter control 
systems. Examples of potential payload radiation sources or devices include: 
I .  RITE (radioisotope for thermal energy) fuel capsule. 
2. Isotope Brayton power conversion system using heat capsules containing radioactive 
material such as plutonium 238. 
3. Nuclear reactor power source. 
4. Radionuclide tracers, calibration, and check sources. 
5, X-ray emitters, particle accelerators, vidicons. 
6 .  Radar or communication antennas. 
7. Microwave generators. 
Lasers are another source of radiation; because they are optical devices, safety guidelines 
concerning these payload elements are enumerated in section 3.10, OPTICAL. 
Associated Hazards.- Payload radiation sources may significantly contribute to the radiation 
levels to which the crew of the orbiter may be exposed, and these should be shielded and con- 
trolled. Table 3.14-111 shows the current radiation exposure limits established for fl ight 
crewmen. The limits presented in the table have been established by the Radiation Safety Panel 
for Manned Spaceflight and represent "re total allowable radiation limits for the crew from all 
sources. As a general guide, individual payloads should be designed to a factor of one hundred 
below the limits presented in table 3,14-Ill, and any requested deviations should be reviewed and 
evaluated on an individual basis. 
TABLE 3.lrr-ill,- RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS AND EXPOSURE RATE 
CONSTRAINTS FOR UNIT REFERENCE RISK* 
30-day maximum 
Quarterly maximum 
Yearly maximum 
*For details, see "Radiation Protection Guides and Constraints for Space Missions and Vehicle 
Design Studies Involving Nuclear Systems, Report  of the  Radiobiological Advisory Panel of t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  on Space Medicine, Space Science Board, National Academy of Science, 1970." 
**REM (Roentgen equivalent man) KEM is a unit of radiation dose equivalent. For details, s e e  
"International Commission on Radiation Protection," Publication No. 9, 1966. 
In addition t o  crew injury, t h e  principle equipment oriented radiation damage considerations a r e  
bulk (crystal) damage and ionizing (surface) e f f e c t s  associated with semiconductor electronics, 
ionization e f fec t s  in materials ,  and dynamic interference e f f e c t s  in sensors. The most sensitive 
components t o  bulk damage a r e  light emit t ing diodes in solid s t a t e  displays and high power 
semiconductors, Other  radiation sensitive devices include grazing incidence X-ray telescopes, 
air-glow photometers, and nuclear gamma ray spectrometers  for high energy stel lar  astronomy. 
Electromagnetic radiation, generated by t h e  operation of radar equipment, induction heaters,  or  
communications equipment, can be hazardous if it is of suff ic ient  magnitude t o  a f f e c t  the  firing 
c i rcui ts  of ordnance devices, It could also a f f e c t  electronic control circuits, disrupt t h e  
transmission of da ta  and other  communication t o  and from ground stations, and be  hazardous t o  
personnel. 
The guidelines in this section deal with t h e  handling, shielding, servicing and other  means  of 
limiting radiation sources such as  radioisotopes and nuclear reactor  power sources and 
radioactive materials  such a s  paint and simi lar coatings. Electromagnetic and microwave 
sources  of radiation a r e  also covered. 
A report  illustrative of guidelines and background for "re design, control, and operation of 
ionizing radiological equipment is provided by the  General Electric study 72SD4201 completed 
in January 1 972, t i t led  "Manned Space Fl i g h f l u c l e a r  Sysf e m  Safety," 
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3.14.1 Design 
There a r e  various and specific Government regulations regarding t h e  use of 
major radioactive sources. The guidelines in subsection 3.14.1.1 deal with 
typically large radioactive sources and suggest design pract ices  for sa fe  
utilization. The guidelines in subsect  ion 3.14.1.2 cover typically small 
radioactive sources. The JSC Space Shutt le Program, Off ice  should be 
contacted for instructions and applicable requirements for s a f e  usage and 
handling of all these  materials. 
Ionizing Radiation Sources 
a. Isotope and reactor  sys tems using liquid metal  in heat  t ransfer  
loops should be designed for s a f e  handling and freedom from liquid metal  
loop leakage. Liquid metal  r e a c t s  violently with water  and moist air. To 
minimize t h e  e f fec t s  of this hazard, t h e  following options should be  
considered: 
( I )  Toxic, corrosive, or  explosive coolants should be avoided 
where feasible. Power conversion systems featuring t h e  Brayton cycle  or 
t h e  organic Rankine cycles permit  relatively low tempera tu re  operation 
allowing t h e  use of nonliquid metal  coolants. 
(2) Double-walled conta inment  of t h e  liquid metal  should be 
provided throughout t h e  coolant loop. 
(3) An inert, dry gas  blanket around t h e  heat  source should be 
used during all storage, transporting, and launch operations following 
assembly of isotope heat  source components. 
(4)  Liquid metal  leak detect ion should be  provided during all 
operational phases. 
b. Adequate blast overpressure, fragmentation,  and fireball pro- 
tection should be provided t o  assure  containment of all radioactive material  
if an accident  occurs. 
c. Payloads containing reac to r  o r  isotope systems, tracers,  X-rays, 
ca thode ray tubes, radar, and o ther  sources of ionizing radiation should be 
shielded, oriented, or  otherwise limited t o  prevent exceeding crew radiation 
limits outlined in table 3.14-111 and a s  controlled by t h e  Radiation Safety  
Panel at JSC. 
d. Reactor  and isotope systems should be instrumented t o  allow 
ground and flight crews t o  monitor radiation levels of cri t ical  e lements  and 
t empera tu re  and pressure of t h e  primary hea t  transfer loop t o  d e t e c t  
leakage and thermal performance. 
3.14.1. I Ionizing Radiation Sources (continued) 
e. A redundant lockout circuit should be provided to prevent 
inadvertent activation of a nuclear system. 
f. A redundant automatic means of reactor shutdown should be 
provided to control operation under all contingencies. 
g. Direct visual or TV coverage should be provided during isotope/ 
component transfer to allow the ground or flight crews to see that the 
radioactive material is properly located and shielded. 
h. Equipment should be provided for locating radioactive material 
which has been inadvertently released in a manned area or module. 
i. Thedesignofpayloadreactor coolantloopsthatuseliquidmetal 
as a primary coolant should not require breaking or opening during orbital 
operations because of the very high temperatures involved. 
k. A reactor jettison system capability should be provided with all 
nuclear payloads to protect the crew and vehicle. Safe procedures should 
also be established for the disposal of radioactive waste or radiation- 
contaminated material. 
I. A positive and permanent shutdown system should be provided 
for malfunctioning reactors and for reactors which have completed their 
m. Design of nuclear hardware should include intact reentry and 
impact to protect the general public from potentially dangerous radiation. 
3.14.1.2 Radioactive Materials 
b. Radioluminescent materials should have positive mechanical 
avoided. The deposited energy from radioactive material wil l eventually 
break the paint bond releasing particles into the atmosphere where they 
could be ingested by the crew or lodge in their eyes. 
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Injury 
Radiation, 
Contamination, 
( I )  Each proposed use of radioluminescent material should be 
approved through the JSC Space Shuttle Program Office. 
c. Where radioluminescent material best satisfies system 
requirements, the following precautions should be taken: 
(2) Only the minimum amount of the radioactive materials 
should be used. 
(3) Radioactive materials should be completely sealed or 
encapsulated in substances having low damage potential from the inherent 
radiation. 
(4) The seals for radioactive material should withstand damage 
due to ground or space environment, accidents, or mishandling. 
(5) The component bearing the radioactive substance should be 
designed for replacement with no damage to the seal of the radioactive 
substance. 
(6)  The substance to which radioactive paint or similar coating 
is applied should be rigid enough to prevent paint flaking due to flexure. 
(7 )  Each item containing radioactive material of a quantity 
sufficient to require NRC licensing should be permanently marked in a 
manner approved by the JSC Space Shuttle Program Office. 
Illness/lnjury 
( I )  Properly shielded and f irmly secured storage vaults should 
be provided for radiation sources. 
d. In general, components containing radioactive materials should 
be labeled "Radioactive Material" in accordance with NRC rules and 
regulations. Systems hardware containing these components should be 
brought to the attention of the JSC Space Shuttle Program Office. 
Radiation, 
Contamination 
(2) Special caution and warning sensors in conjunction with STS 
provided instrumentation may be advisable to detect any level of radiation 
leakage from storage vaults or containers. 
e. To minimize the probability of radioactive material spillage and 
the effects thereof, the following precautions should be considered: 
(3) Special clothing should be provided for personnel involved 
in handling or using radioactive materials, The need for protective clothing 
will depend on the nature of the operation and the degree of containment of 
the radioactive material. 
PAYLOAD SAFETY G U  
3.14.1.2 Radioactive Materials (continued) 
(4) S t r i c t  procedures should be provided for t h e  handling and 
use of radioactive materials. 
(5) Spare shielded containers should be available in which 
radioactive material  can be  temporarily s tored in t h e  event of an  accident. 
(6) All components and equipment containing radioactive 
materials  should have redundant seals t o  p ro tec t  against  leakage. 
3.14.1.3 Electromagnetic InterferencelMicrowave 
Explosion, a. Adequate shielding of control and communication equipment, 
Loss of Entry pyrotechnic devices, and other  cri t ical  equipment is needed t o  prevent loss 
Capability of control or  monitoring functions because of saturation of e lect ronic  
circuits  and t o  prevent initiation of explosive devices from induced currents. 
I l lness/lnjury b. It may be  necessary t o  provide a backup (emergency) commu- 
nications link t h a t  will not  be a f fec ted  by EM1 or  t o  establish procedures and 
schedules which consider t h e  periodic disruption of normal communications. 
Explosion, c. Induction heaters  a r e  a potential source of EMI. The EM1 signa- 
Injury, Shock tu re  of all such heaters  considered for  use should, therefore,  be determined, 
and t h e  unit exhibiting t h e  lowest €MI should be  t h e  preferred unit. 
lnjury 
lnjury 
Radiation 
d. When EVA activit ies a r e  required, a means should be provided t o  
isolate all power f rom equipment generating microwave and/or electro- 
magnet ic  radiation. 
e. To protect  personnel during ground operat  ions, shields, guards, 
and warnings should be provided where EM1 emit t ing equipment is operating. 
S t r i c t  procedures should also be  provided for these  operations. 
f. Radio frequency equipment should be shielded t o  preve t 2 
continuous exposure of personnel t o  RF levels g rea te r  than 10 MWICM . 
This level has been adopted by many Government agencies a s  a standard t o  
prevent a c u t e  and chronic R F  radiation damage t o  any organ of t h e  body. 
1 3 a ' 4 4 Z  Flight Operations 
Contamination, a. To prevent possible radiation leakage danger t o  ground and flight 
injury crews, nuclear reactor  power modules should be designed for t ranspor ta t  ion 
t o  space while in a preoperational mode. The reactor should not be 
act ivated while in immediate proximity t o  the  orbiter. 
Radiation, 6. To protect  t h e  flight crew, on-orbit nuclear cargo transfer 
Injury operations should not require EVA, 
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3.14.2 Flight Operations (continued) 
c. Unauthorized personnel should be restricted from using radiation 
producing equipment or handling and using on-board radioisotopes. The 
installation of appropriate caution signs and other means of warning fea- 
turing visible or audible signals should be considered. 
3.14.3 Ground Operations 
a. Once assembled, an isotope heat source is active and contin- 
uously emits radiation and heat. A redundant ground cooling system should 
be provided to dissipate this heat during prelaunch operations. Radiation 
shielding for the protection of ground crews and critical equipment should 
also be provided at this time. The following guidelines should be considered 
to minimize these concerns: 
( I )  Radioactive material should be assembled in radioisotope 
power systems as late in the countdown sequence as feasible to reduce the 
hazards to the crew and equipment and to provide minimum impact on 
prelaunch operations. 
(2) The isotope heat source ground cooling system should be 
designed so that two failures must occur before system cooling is lost. 
(3) The isotope ground cooling system should be adequately 
instrumented to sense any loss or degradation of heat dissipation capability. 
b. Payloads producing nuclear radiation of sufficient quantity to 
create hazards to the general public should be transported in protective 
modules or casings capable of withstanding a launch vehicle explosion on the 
pad and worst-case reentry and crashlanding contingencies. 
c. Any ground support equipment used within the spacecraft and 
which requires the use of radioactive materials should be designed to control 
the level of external emissions to protect personnel and STS subsystems 
from detrimental effects. 
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3.15 STRUCTURES 
.- The structural subsystem consists of beams, plates, housings, brackets? 
braces, attachmen"rittings, structural fasteners, and other types of metal or nonmetal 
members whose functions are to support components or to attach integrated payloads, The 
payload members are passive, i,e., they do not utilize, controi, or develop energy, They resist 
corrosion from the use environment and absorb energy in the form of load stresses and heat. 
These internal stresses weaken the molecular structure of the materials and can init iate crack 
formation and subsequent structural failures. Structural failures can be catastrophic and cannot 
be tolerated in spaceflight operations. It is, therefore, essential that considerable effort be 
spent in the analyses and selections of materials for characteristics which are compatible with 
the use environment. 
Associated Hazards. The associated hazards with payload structures are collision, corrosion, 
injury, and loss of orbiter entry capability. They are created when a structural member fails 
under stress. The failures can be of two types; plastic deformation, or a br i t t le failure. The 
latter is more cri t ical in the design of safe payload structures. 
In metall ic materials, the br i t t le failures are caused by stress corrosion, hydrogen embrit- 
tlement, and structural fatigue. In aerospace usage structural failures due to  stress corrosion 
cracking have been numerous enough to warrant attention. Criteria and recommended practices 
have been developed and are documented in NASA SP series technical reports. Materials and 
alloys susceptible to  corrosive effects are also identified in the reports, and their use should be 
avoided. The reports also discuss analytical techniques such as fracture mechanics to provide 
methodology for understanding and controlling crack formations in structural elements. 
Applicable cri ter ia and practices from these reports are summarized in the guidelines o f  this 
section. 
The acceleration/deceleration forces created by launch, orbit, and entry environments as well 
as as abort or crashlanding conditions are stated in the Space Shuttle Payload Accommodation 
Document, JSC 07700, Volume XIV, and should be considered in structural designs, Emphasis is 
placed on preventing structural failures which can cause equipment to  become projectiles that 
can enter the crew compartment and injure the crew. Failures of  primary structural elements 
of automatic payloads during deployment can pose collision hazards with the orbiter as well as 
injury potentials to  the crew. 
Certain material used in structural applications in the space environment have been found to  
outgas and emit toxic fumes creating hazards to personnel. In this sense, the structural 
subsystem guidelines wil l overlap with the guidelines developed in Section 3.8, MATERIALS. 
The sPructural subsystem also overlaps with the mechanical subsystem (see section 3.9, 
MECHANICAL), These subsystems should be reviewed by the structural designer. 
The safety guidelines in this section are written to recommend adequate structural analysis in 
the design of  payload structures and selections of materials compatible with the use 
environment. Suggestions are also included with regard to  crashlanding provisions for 
containing payload equipment to  preclude crew injury, MSFC drawing I OM33 107A, "Design 
Criteria for Controlling Stress Corrosion," should be reviewed f ~ r  additional information on 
stress-corrosion cracking. 
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Collision, a. Structural analyses should be performed on all payload structures 
Corrosion, to show that all elements of the design, such as the strength, stiffness, 
Injury, Loss of structural stability, and fatigue, meet all specified criteria for the 
Entry Capability anticipated loads and environments, including crashlanding loads. The 
analyses should include static and dynamic stress analysis and vibration 
analysis for loads and environmental data. The analyses should be compiled 
and documented. Structural analyses should be performed on payloads which 
were originally designed for launch environments other than the STS. 
Overall loads analysis for the combined payloadlshuttle structure should be 
performed. 
Collision, b. To reduce potential hazardous effects of stress concentrations in 
Injury, Loss of primary structure, some general practices which should be considered in the 
Entry Capabilit structural analyses and design are to: 
I I ( I )  Use multiple load path structure where permissible. I I ( 2 )  Make gradual changes in sections and symmetry of design. 
(3) Minimize the number of cutouts and discontinuities in 
prirnary elements. 
(4)  Design for the peak stress rather than the average stress to 
be carried by structural members, especially at stress concentrations, 
(5) Avoid attachment of secondary brackets, fittings, handles, 
steps, and hoses to areas of high stress. 
( 6 )  Avoid use of rivets to carry repeated tensile loads. 
(7) Eliminate sharp edges for personnel safety and to reduce 
stress concentrat ions. 
(8) Select fasteners of sufficient size and proper material to 
carry design loads and impose proper pressure on joints through pretension. 
(9) Provide allowances for distortions and stresses resulting 
from thermal expansion and contraction of the space temperatures, 
Corrosion c. Fracture mechanics technology should be applied as design 
criteria in analysis of flaw growth and fracture characteristics of materials. 
Specif ie applications include pressure vessels and glass enclosures. 
3.15-4 
a. If aluminum alloys are considered for structural applications, 
either coated or chemically treated alloys which are less susceptible to  
general corrosion and pitt ing or alloys with tempers having high resistance 
to  stress-corrosion cracking should be used. Certain alloys are more 
susceptible to stress-corrosion cracking under high sustained tensile stresses 
when exposed to salt air ambient typical of sea coast atmosphere. 
b. Caution should be exercised in the selection of high strength, low 
alloy qteels heat-treated to high strength levels (1 80,000 psi) ( 12,656 
kg/cm ) and above as they are extremely sensitive to  stress corrosion. 
Because of the relationship between strength and susceptibility to stress- 
corrosion cracking, it is a recommended practice to use the lowest strength 
material compatible with design. 
operations of any kind after heat treatment. Steel parts which have been 
acid cleaned, plated, or exposed to hydrogen through use of acid pickling 
process, and hydrocarbon lubricants, should be baked and checked for 
hydrogen embrittlement. Cadmium plated tools should not be used on 
d. In the use of titanium, procedures should be provided to assure 
careful use of cleaning fluids or other chemicals which can induce stress- 
corrosion cracking, hydrogen embrittlement or can reduce fracture tough- 
ness. The use of hydrochloric acid, cadmium compounds, chlorinated cutting 
oils and solvents, methyl alcohol, and compounds containing mercury with 
titaniuin should be avoided. 
e. Structural materials should have high tolerance for flaws 
throughout the anticipated service l i fe of the structure. These materials 
should be resistant to br i t t le crack propagation in the use environment. 
f. In the design of payload structure which can create hazards to 
personnel, materials should be selected to be free from stress-corrosion 
cracking throughout their service life. This may be accomplished by an 
effective combination of the following: 
( I )  Identification and control of the environments to which the 
structure wil l be exposed during construction, storage, transportation, and 
(2) Selection of alloy compositions and tempers having hig 
resistance to  stress-corrosion cracking in the use environment. 
3.15.1.2 Structural  Materials (continued) 
(3) Control of fabrication and other  processes which may 
introduce residual tensile stresses or  otherwise damage t h e  material. 
(4) Limitation of t h e  combined residual and applied tensile 
stresses t o  below t h e  threshold s t ress  level for  t h e  onset of cracking through 
t h e  service  life of t h e  vehicle. 
g. In t h e  design of s t ructura l  members, t h e  use of dissimilar metals, 
which when used together form electrical  couples leading t o  galvanic 
corrosion of t h e  member, should b e  controlled. When t h e  use of dissimilar 
metals  is unavoidable, protective,  noncorrosive materials  (coatings) t o  
prevent galvanic corrosion act ion should be  considered unless t h e  metal  
couple has been satisfactorily demonstrated for the  proposed application. 
Galvanic corrosion can readily lead t o  structural  failures, especially in 
brackets, braces, etc. 
h. If honeycomb materials  a r e  t o  be used a s  structural  elements,  
procedures and instructions should b e  provided t o  prevent delamination of 
t h e  skin from t h e  honeycomb s t ruc tu re  during fabrication. Delaminated 
honeycomb can  c r e a t e  serious hazards t o  personnel since its structural  
s t rength  has been degraded. Field repairs t o  delaminated honeycomb 
mater ia ls  a r e  very difficult and require controlled procedures t o  assure 
adequate  repairs. 
i. Definitions of environments t o  which t h e  structural  mater ia ls  
will be exposed should include but not be limited t o  t h e  following: 
( I )  Chemicals t o  be  used in t h e  cleaning, etching, and rinsing 
(2) Types of inspection fluids, marking inks, crayons, and 
lubricants t o  be  used on t h e  s t ructura l  elements. 
(3) Types of machining fluids and testing fluids t o  be  used. 
(4) Atmospheric use environments. 
(5) Service chemicals t o  be  used during operations. 
j. In t h e  design of s t ructura l  elements which a r e  t o  be  joined 
together by welding, t h e  welding process se lected should be  compatible with 
t h e  metallurgical properties of t h e  material  t o  avoid hydrogen 
embri t t lement  and possible structural  failures. 
3.15-6 
3.15.1.3 Structural  Supports (continued) 
a. Structural  provisions, such a s  handrails, foot  restraints,  and 
a t t a c h  points for tethering, should be  considered in t h e  design of payload 
s t ructures  for ease  of transfer of equipment and c rew aids during 
intravehicular or  extravehicular activities. 
( I )  Loading and unloading of t h e  payload on or  off t h e  
transportation vehicle. 
( 2 )  Moving loads at  t h e  launch s i t e  by ground equipment. 
(3) Installation into and removal f rom t h e  shutt le.  
Structural  protection should be  provided for all sensitive, payload equipment 
whose failure during mission operations will c r e a t e  hazards t o  t h e  crew. 
by the  payload structures.  
d. Mechanical support devices, such a s  brackets for movable control 
mechanisms, should be  secured by a minimum of two fas teners  t o  prevent 
rotation o r  displacement which could lead t o  mechanism failures. 
e. Bolts, nuts, and similar s t ructura l  fas teners  should be se lected 
for size, strength,  and resistance t o  corrosive environments t o  avoid s t ress  
corrosion under operational conditions. Consideration should be given in t h e  
design for  t h e  maximum shear forces  imposed on t h e  fas teners  in t h e  event  
of a crashlanding. Selection of t h e  proper fas teners  t o  contain equipment 
during a crashlanding can prevent t h e  creation of equipment projectiles. 
Contamination f. Proper hardness and heat  t r ea tment  for structural  fas teners  
should be specified a s  required for applications. Use of improper torque 
values or  incorrectly se lected fas teners  may result in equipment failures. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The following documentation was used either to develop the subsystem guidelines or to direct 
the user to additional information on that subject: 
I. NASA REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION 
Title SourceINumber Date 
Safety Policy and Requirements for NASA Hqs./None September 1975 
Payloads Using the National Space 
Transportation System 
Space Shuttle Payload Accommodation JSCIJSC-07700 Vol. XIV July 3, 1974 
(Revision C) 
Space Shuttle Flight and Ground System JSCIJSC-07700 Vol. X January 7, 1974 
Specification (Change 13) 
Flammability, Odor and Offgassing NASA Hqs./NHB 8060. l A February 1974 
Requirements and Test Procedures 
for Materials in Environments That 
Support Combustion 
Manned Spacecraft Criteria and JSCIJSCM 8080 May 19, 1975 
Standards 
Range Safety Manual Vol. I USAFISAMTECM 1 27- 1 July 16, 1973 
(Headquarters Space and Missile Test 
Center) 
Contamination Control Principle NASA Hqs./NASA SP-5045 1967 
Contamination Control Handbook NASA Hqs./NASA SP-5076 1969 
NASA JSC Requirements for Materials JSCISE-R-0006A 
and Processes (See SD72-SH-0 172, 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Materials Control 
and Verification Plan) 
April 1973 
Safety and Environmental Health MSFCIMM 1700.48 October 15, 1974 
Standards 
Space Shuttle Program 
Ground Operations. 
JSCIJSC 07700, Vol. IX October 22, 1975 
Retention and Application of Saturn MSFCINASA TMX-64574 September 14, 197 1 
Experience to Future Programs 
I. Range Safety Policies and WALLOPS1 177 I. I March 6, 1973 
Criteria 
2, Environmental Test Specifications WALLOPSIWS- 100- l April 16, 197 1 
Title Source/Number Date 
NASA REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION (continued) 
Range Safety Manual (Volume I )  USAFIAFE TRM 127- 1 September 1 972 
Aerospace Fressure Vessel Fracture NASA Hqs./NSS/HP- I 740. I February 22, 1974 
Control (NASA Headquarters Letter) 
Bibliography of Source Data for the JSCIJSC-07000 
STS Payloads Coordination Activity 
(Rev. F) 
Design Criteria for Controlling Stress MSFCI I OM33 I07 
Corrosion Cracking (Rev. B) 
August 1975 
August 20, 1975 
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability NASA Hqs./NHB 5300.4(1D- 1 ) August 1974 
and Quality Provisions for the 
Space Shuttle Program 
Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic JSCIJSC 08060 
Specification Change 3 
Space Shuttle Program Lightning JSCIJSC-07636 
Protection Criteria Document 
Nonmetallic Materials Design and JSCIJSC-0268 1 
Test Data Handbook 
August 3 1, 1974 
September l I ,  1973 
June 1974 
Cleanliness of Components for Use MSFCIMSFC-SPEC- 164 October I, 1970 
in Oxygen, Fuel, and Pneumatic 
Systems 
Testing Compatibility of Materials MSFCIMSFC-SPEC- 106 September 16, 1966 
for Liquid Oxygen Systems 
2. PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION DOCUMENTATION 
Payload Descriptions - Sortie, 
Summarized Level A Data 
(Prel iminary) 
MSFCILibrary No. July 1975 
T75- I55 1 1 
Payload Descriptions - Sortie, MSFCILibrary No. July 1975 
Summarized Level B Data, Volume II - T75- 157 10 
Books I and 2 (Preliminary) 
Payload Descriptions - Automated, MSFCILibrary No. July 1975 
Summarized Level A Data T74- 1 6046 
(Preliminary) 
Payload Descriptions - Automated, MSFCILibrary No. July 1975 
Summarized Level B Data, Volume I - T74- 1 6047 
Book I (Prel iminary) 
Title Source/Number 
PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION DOCUMENTATION (continued) 
Payload lnterfaces Team Documentation JSCIJSC 093 10 
(P/L Accommodations, Interfaces, through 09325 
and Ground Operat ions) 
Final Report of the Space Shuttle Payload GSFCIT73- 181 52 
Planning Working Groups, I I Volumes through 18 16 1 
Phase A Conceptual Design Study of MSFCITMX-64895 
the Atmospheric, Magnetospheric and 
Plasmas in Space (AMPS) 
Large Space Telescope Phase A MSFCITMX-64726 
Final Report (Volumes Ill, IV, and V) 
First Two Years of Shuttle Missions - 
Integrated Mission Planning - Volumes: 
1. 111 - Spacelab Pallet Only - ATMB MSFCINone 
2. 111 - Spacelab Pallet Only - HEAISMM MSFCINone 
3. V - Mission 9 MSFCINone 
4. Vll - Mission 10 MSFCINone 
5. None - Mission 16 MSFCINone 
Sortie Laboratory Preliminary 
Definition Study 
Engineering and Operational Interfaces GSFCINone 
with Spacelab - Solar Astronomy Payloads, 
ShuttleISpacelab (Midterm Review) 
(Ball Brothers) 
Payload Planning Data Basic Users Guide MSFCINone 
(Preliminary) 
Marshall Information and Display System MSFCIMA-0 10-00 1 -2H 
I Users Manual 
Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) Systems GSFCINone 
Definition Study Report 
Study of Shutt le-Compat ible Advanced LaRCINASA TM X-28 1 3 
Technology Laboratory (ATL) 
Space Transportation System Payloads NASAICASD-NAS-74-004 
Data and Analysis (General Dynamics) 
Interim Upper Stage (IUS) System MSFCISR-IUS- I00 
Requirements 
B-3 
Date 
February 1975 
May 1973 
November 1974 
December 15, 1972 
October 10, 1974 
December 3 1, 1974 
October 25, 1973 
October 28, 1973 
March 18, 1975 
November 1972 
April 22, 1975 
None 
September 1974 
November 1 974 
September I973 
December 1974 
November 15, 1974 
Tit le SourceINumber 
PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION DOCUMENTATION (continued) 
Functional Requirements for the JPL-750-46 
HEAO-8 BGR-3 Gamma-Ray 
Spectrometer Instrument 
Space Shuttle Orbital Flight Test (OFT) NASA Hqs. Memo 
Payloads Planning (John F. Yardley) 
OFT Payload Planning with Supplemental JSCINone 
Edition (Prel iminary) 
Payload Accommodations and Interfaces JSCISSV 75- 1 - 1 
(Rockwell International) 
Proceedings of the Space Shuttle Sortie GSFCINone 
Workshop - Volumes I and II 
3. SPACELAB - DESIGN SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND STUDIES 
Spacelab System Requirements (ESRO) MSFCISLPI2 I00 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (ERNO) MSFCIRP-ER-0003 
Critical Items L i s t  (ERNO) MSFCILI-ER-000 I 
Cleanliness and Contamination Control MSFCIPL-ER-00 1 7 
Plan (ERNO) 
Safety Assurance Plan (ERNO) MSFCIPL-ER-00 15 
Cleanliness Specification (ERNO) MSFCISR-ER-0007 
Safety Specification (ERNO) MSFCISR-ER-0002 
Product Assurance Plan (ERNO) MSFCIPL-ER-00 I I 
Residual Hazard L i s t  (ERNO) MSFCILI-ER-0002 
Spacelab Experiment Payload Safety MSFCINone 
Study (General Dynamics) 
Spacelab Experiment Payload Safety MSFCICASD-NAS-74-053 
Study (General Dynamics) Phase 1 
Spacelab Payload Accommodation MSFCISLPI2 104 
Handbook (ESRO) 
Spacelab/Orbiter Interface 
Specification (ERNO) 
Date 
June 16, 1972 
June 2, 1975 
September 2, 1975 
February 17, 1975 
August 3 1, 1972 
through 
September 4, 1972 
November l I, 1974 
October 8, 1974 
October 18, 1974 
October 18, 1974 
February 7, 1975 
February 1975 
February 5, 1975 
January 15, 1975 
October 8, 1974 
May 15, 1974 
September 30, 1974 
May 1975 
March 3 1, 1975 
Tit le Dale 
SPACELAB - DESIGN SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND STUDIES (continued) 
Spacelab System Specification (ERNO) MSFCISY-ER-000 I March 2 1, 1975 
Spacelab System Requirements (ESRO) MSFCISLPI2 I00 November l 1 ,  1974 
Spacelab Parts, Materials and Processes MSFCIPL-ER-00 16 October 2 1 ,  1974 
Plan (ERNO) 
Spacelab Parts Materials and Processes MSFCISR-ER-0006 March 17, 1975 
Specifications (ERNO) 
4. SAFETY GU IDELINES/CRITERI A/CHECKLISTS/STUDIES 
Air Force Safety Manual USAFIDH 1-6 July 20, 1974 
Spacelab Program System Safety MSFCINone 
Checklist (Draft) 
Flight Projects Safety Guide JPLl60 1-4 
Space Flight Hazard Catalog JSCIJSC 00 1 34B 
MVM '73 Hazard Catalog JPLlD208-30023- 1 I 3  
Safety CriteriaIGuidelines and Preliminary JSCIJSC 068 15 
Hazard Analysis of Potential Shuttle 
Payloads (Preliminary) 
Skylab System Safety Checklist Flight MSFCISA-003-002-2H 
System Design 
Safety Manual AMESIAHB 1 700- 1 
Skylab System Safety Checklist MSFCISA-003-003-2H 
Experiment System Design 
Skylab System Safety Checklist MSFCISA-003-004-2H 
Experiment GSE Design 
Sky lab System Safety Checklist-GSE Design MSFCISA-003-00 I -2H 
System Safety Checklist 
Sky lab Program Report 
System Safety as Applied to Skylab JSClA74-33 
(K. S. Kleinknecht and Bobby J. Miller, 
NASA JSC) Int. Astro. Federation Paper 
Spacelab Experiment Payload Safety Study MSFCINAS 8-29462 
Phase I Hazard Summary (General Dynamics) 
NASAIWALLOPS Safety Analysis Report WALLOPSINone 
for NASAIMPI Barium ION Cloud Project 
March 1974 
February 10, 1972 
October 6, 1975 
1973 
April 1973 
November 197 1 
January1975 
November 1 97 1 
November 197 1 
July 197 1 
May 30, 1974 
September 1974 
September 1974 
January I I, 197 1 
Tit le SourceINurnbet- 
SAFETY GUIDELINES/CRITEKIA/CHECKLISTS/STUDIES (continued) 
NASAIWALLOPS Safety Analysis Report WALLOPSINone 
for March 3, 1970 Solar Eclipse 
NASAIWALLOPS Safety Analysis Report WALLOPSINone 
for Operation Antarqui 1975 
NASAIWALLOPS Squib Hazard WALLOPSINone 
Evaluation Project 
Space Shuttle Pyrotechnics JSCINone 
(W. H. Simmons, Mgr. Pyrotechnic 
Subsystems JSC-NASA) American 
Defense Preparedness Association 
(Paper) 
Planetary Project System Safety JPLINone 
Management Matrix, L. C. Montgomery 
Fluorine System Handbook JSCINASA C2-72064 
Human Engineering Guide for Equipment Library of Congress 
Engineers (Second Edition) Card 54-8698 
Project Safety Plan - Mariner 
Venus - Mercury 1973 
ManlSystem Design Criteria for MSFCIMSFC-STD-5 12 
Manned Orbiting Payloads 
FLTSATCOM Safety Design Criteria (TRW) DOD/D00652 
Safety Plan, HEAO High Spectral Resolution JPLIEX 32-DD-0 10 
Gamma Ray Spectrometer BRG-3 
Safety Report for Apollo Gamma Ray JPLl750-34 
Spectrometer 
In-space Propellant Systems Safety - MSFCISD 72-SA-0054-2 
System Safety Guidelines and Requirements 
(Volume 11) 
Clear Air Turbulence Detection System - MSFC/S&E-P- 13 1-72 
Safety Plan 
Publication Number 9, International NoneINone 
Commission on Radiation Protection 
Radiation Protection Guides and Constraints NoneINone 
for Space Missions and Vehicle Design 
Studies Involving Nuclear Systems, Report 
of the Committee on Space Medicine, 
Space Science Board, National Academy of 
Science 
Date 
February 12, 1970 
April 14, 1975 
May 18, 1967 
October 2, 1974 
April 25, 1972 
November I, 197 1 
August 12, 1974 
December 26, 1973 
November I ,  1972 
February 27, 1970 
June 23, 1972 
May 19, 1972 
1966 
1970 
Tit le Source/Number Date 
5. PAYLOAD RELATED STUDIES AND REPORTS 
Space Shuttle Sortie Payload Crew JSC/222 141222 15-HO 13-RO-00 May 15, 1973 
Safety and Systems Compatibility 222 14/1-10 14-RO-00 
Criteria (3-Volumes) (TRW) 222 15/1-10 14-RO-00 
Manned Maneuvering Unit Mission JSCILibrary No. 
Definition Study (URS Corp.) (3-Volumes) T75- I 1297 
T75- 1 1298 
T75- 1 1299 
LC-39 Pad Emergency Egress Status KSCJNone 
Report 
Astronomy Spacelab Payloads Engineering GSFCJF75-23 
Test Flight Interface Study 
(Final) (Ball Brothers) 
Solar Physics Engineering and Operational GSFCJ75-I I 
lnterf ace Study - Astronomy Spacelab 
Payloads - Final Report (Ball Brothers) 
Interim Report of the Astronomy Spacelab GSFCJT76- 10636 
Payloads Study through - 1064 1 
o Executive Volume 
o Solar Physics - Volume I 
o Ultraviolet and Optical Astronomy - Volume If 
o High Energy Astrophysics - Volume Ill 
o Mission Analysis - Volume IV 
o Engineering - Volume V 
January 1975 
November 6, 1974 
November 1975 
July 30, 1975 
July 1975 
Shuttle Orbital Applications and MSFCIMDC-G4494 April 1973 
Requirements (SOAR) Final Report 
(McDonnell) Also SOAR II Study 
Research and Applications Module MSFCJGDCA-DDA7 1-004 December 17, 197 1 
(RAM) Phase B Study (Multi-Vol.) (TRW) 
Performance and Design Requirements NoneISS-2236 15 A September 10, 1969 
for Burner IIA - General Spec. (Boeing) 
Final Briefing - NASA Study C-ll NASA Hqs./OP- 1069 I June 19, 197 1 
Advanced Mission Safety Studies 
(Aerospace Corporation) 
Space Rescue Operations - Final Briefing NASA Hqs./None 
(Aerospace Corp.) 
Atlas Reliability Testing Program NoneIZX-7-033 
"Search for Crit ical Weakness" 
March I I, 197 1 
July 3 1, 1958 
Compatibility Study of a Cryogenic LeRCIGBCA BNZ October 15, 197 1 
Upper Stage with Space Shuttle 7 1-020-3 
(Convair Aerospace Division of 
General Dynamics) 
Title SourcelNurnber 
PAYLOAD RELATED STUDIES AND REPORTS (continued) 
Study of Space Station Crew Activity JSClD2- 1 1 4254- I 
Safety and Damage Control and 
Containment (Boeing) 
Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study MSFCIGESP-7059 
(General Electric) (3 Volumes) GESP-7064 
GESP-7067 
Space Station Safety Study (Boeing) JSCIMSC-00 189 
(Volumes I and 2) Crew Safety Guidelines 
Safety in Earth Orbit Study JSClSD72-SA-0094 
(Rockwell/Space Division) 
Volumes I, 11, IV, V, & Contract Summary 
Orbital Assembly and Maintenance Study JSCINone 
(Martin Marietta) 
Advanced Missions Safety (Experiment- NASA-OMS 
Safety) Volumes I, 11, and Ill (Aerospace IATR-72(73 16-0 1 )- 1 
Corp.) 
Manned Spaceflight Nuclear System MSFCl72SD420 I 
Safety (General Electric Study) 
ScoutIShuttle Integration Study LeRCIT 197-0 13 
(Vought Division of LTV) 
Integrated PowerIAtt itude Control LaRCINASA CR-2383 
System (IPACS) Study 
Volume I - Feasibility Studies 
Integrated PowerIAtt itude Control LaRCINASA CR-2384 
(IPACS) Study, Volume 2 - Conceptual 
Designs 
Ballistic Entry Technology LaRCINone 
Test (BETT) Vehicle (McDonnell Douglas) 
Tug Operations and Payload Support None/PD-72-28 
Study (Rockwell/Space Division) 
Lessons Learned on the Skylab Program JSCIJSC-09096 
Study of Airborne Science Experiment AMESITM X-62,287 
Management Concepts for Application TM X-62,288 
to Space Shuttle (Volumes I, 11, & 111) TM X-62,289 
Shuttle Sortie Simulation Using a Lear AMESITM X-62,283 
Jet Aircraft (Mission I )  
Shuttle Spacecraft Simulation Using AMESITM X-62,352 
a Lear Jet Aircraft (Mission 2) 
Dale 
July 1968 
October 2 1, 197 1 
January 1970 
July 12, 1972 
March 14, 1975 
October 1972 
January 1972 
January 30, 1973 
April 1 974 
April 1974 
November 1974 
December 13, 1972 
July 18, 1974 
July ,1973 
December 1972 
January 1974 
Tit le Source/Mumber 
PAYLOAD RELATED STUDIES AND REPORTS (continued) 
Preliminary Report on Lear Jet AMESITM X-62,408 
ShuttleISpacelab Simulation (Mission 4) 
Preliminary Report on CV-990 
Shuttle Simulation (Mission I )  
AMESITM X-62,358 
NASA CV-990 Airborne Laboratory AMESINone 
Experimenters' Handbook 
Interactive Data Management Systems AMESITM X-62,367 
for Airborne Research 
Proposal for a Space Base Nuclear MSFCIA-2 1997 
System Safety Study (3-Volumes) 
(General Electric) 
Space Base Nuclear System Safety MSFCIGESP-7067 
Study (General Electric) 
6. PAYLOAD INTERFACE 
Space Shuttle System Payloads JSCIJSC-09255 
lnterface Activities (JSC Payload 
Coord. Of f  ice) 
Space Shuttle System Payload JSCIJSC-07700- 14-PIV-0 1 
lnterface Verification Volume I 
(General Approach Requirements) 
Interface Verification Equipment JSCIJSC 09773 
Study (IVE) (JSC Payloads Coord. 
Off  ice) 
Low Cost Small Instrument Pointing GSFCINone 
System (SIPS) Study (Final) 
(Ball Brothers) 
DOD Space Transportation System (STS) SAMSOITR-73-280 
Payload lnterface Study (Volumes I & 11) 
DODISTS Payload Interface Study SAMSOITR-75- I36 
- FY 75 Extension Final Briefing 
(McDonnel l Douglas) 
Space Tug/Shuttle lnterface Compatibility MSFCICASD-NAS 75-0 17 
Study - Final (Volume I - Executive 
Summary) 
Retinal Damage from Repeated Gibson,G.L.M. 
Subthreshold Exposures Using a Ruby 
Laser Photocoagulator (Aerospace 
Medicine, Vol. 44. pp. 433-437) 
B-9 
Date 
December 1974 
April 1974 
May 10, 1974 
August 1974 
May 19, 1970 
October 2 1, 197 1 
November 8, 1974 
April 15, 1975 
June 17, 1975 
August 1975 
October 1973 
May 1975 
June 1975 
Title SourceINumber 
7. GROUND AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND EQUIPMENT 
Payload Deployment and Retrieval JSCINone 
Operations (Flight Operations Division 
White Paper) (Preliminary) 
Study to Evaluate the Effects of EVA AMESISD 75-SA-0056 
on Payload Systems (RockwellISpace 
Division) 
Study of Roles of Remote Manipulator JSC/T74- 18544 
Systems and EVA for Shuttle Mission 
Support (ESSEX Corp.) 
Development of an EVA Systems Cost JSClT75- 1 1 300 
Model (URS Corp.) (3 Volumes) T75- 1 1 30 1 
T75- 1 1302 
Spacelab L i fe  Sciences JSCINone 
Mission Simulation (JSC L i fe  Science 
Division) (Boeing) 
Schedules and Status Summary KSCIK-SM-03.2 
Payload Ground lntegrat ion (Volume 11) 
Viking 75 Orbiter, Test and Operations JPL/6 12-22 
PI an 
STS Planetary Mission Operations JPLl760- 122 
Concepts Study - Final Report 
Launch Site Accommodations Handbook KSCIK-SM- 14 
for STS Payloads (Revision 1 ) 
Facilities Handbook for Hangar A 0  KSCIK-SM- 14.X 
(Preliminary) 
Facilities Handbook for Hangar AM KSCIK-SM- 14.X 
(Preliminary) 
Facilities Handbook for Hangar AE KSCIK-SM- 14.X 
(Preliminary) 
The KSC Safety Program 
(Management Instructions) 
KSCIKMI I 7 I O.IB/SF 
Launch Site Ground Operations Safety KSCl25833-F002-RO-00 
Requirements for Shuttle Payloads 
(TRW) 
ApolloISaturn (IB, V) Skylab Ground KSClK-V-053 
Safety Plan (Volume I l l ,  Revision 3) 
October 22, 1975 
May 9, 1975 
October 1974 
July 1974 
August 1974 
March 17, 1975 
April 12, 1973 
April 15, 1975 
February 1975 
None 
None 
None 
October 9, 1970 
November 1974 
November 15, 1974 
GROUND AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND EQUIPMENT (continued) 
Wallops Ground Safety Plans 
1. Radioactive Cesium 144 W ALhOPSINone 
2. Liquid Ozone W ALLOPSINone 
3. Toxic/Flammable Pentaborane WALLOPSINone 
4. N i t r ic  Oxide Gas WALLOPSINone 
5. ChlorineTrif luorideand 
Acetonitri le 
6. Hydrazine mixed with Barium Salts WALLOPSINone 
and Fluorine Oxidizer 
7. Sodium and Lithium Release W ALLOPS/None 
Experiments Plus Barium 
Canisters and Holex Igniters 
8. Radioactive Americium 24 1 WALLOPSINone 
Payload Requirements for KSC Pad KSCINone 
Payload Changeout Room 
Shuttle System Ground Operations KSCIK-SM-09 
Plan 
Launch Site Processing of Hazardous KSCINone 
Pay loads-Final Report 
(Teledyne/Brown Eng.) (Volumes 1 -7) 
MercurylAtlas Launch Vehicle Factory USAFITOR-594(110 1 )RP-3 
Rollout Inspection General Operating 
Procedures (Aerospace Corporation) 
8. MILITARY STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
Hydraulic Fluid, F i re Resistant MIL-H-83282A 
Synthetic Hydrocarbon Base, 
Aircraf t  
Hydraulic Systems, Aircraft9 MIL-H-5440F 
Types I and 11, Design and Installation 
Requirements 
Bondir~g, Electrical (Far Aircraft) MIL-B-5089 
Date 
January 20, 1966 
March 27, 1962 
July 28, 1965 
November 7, I 962 
October 8, 1963 
October 6, 1970 
September 7, 197 1 
August 18, 197 1 
May 1975 
May 1975 
October 3 1, 196 1 
Electroexplosive Subsystems, MIL-STD- 15 1 %  
Electrically Initiated, Design 
Requirements and TesMethods 
Title Source/Nurnber 
MILITARY STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS (continued) 
Standard General Requirements for MIL-STD- I522 
Safe Design and Operation of 
Pressurized Missile and Space Systems 
Wire, Electric, Fluorocarbon 
Insulated, Copper 
Color Codes for Pipelines and 
Compressed Gas Cylinders 
MIL-STD- I0 I B 
Date 
NASA-JSC 
